Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1996

American Literary Environmentalism, 1637-1872.
David Mazel
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Mazel, David, "American Literary Environmentalism, 1637-1872." (1996). LSU Historical Dissertations and
Theses. 6204.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6204

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy subm itted.

Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality

illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

AMERICAN LITERARY ENVIRONMENTALISM, 1637-1872

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of English

by
David Mazel
B.A., Adams State College, 1985
M.A., Adams State College, 1937
May 1996

UMI Number: 9637792

UMI Microform 9637792
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

© Copyright 1996
David Mazel
All rights reserved

To my father, Sanford Mazel

in

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their patience and expert editorial feedback, I
would like first of all to thank Dana Nelson and Daniel
Fogel, my dissertation directors, and committee members Carl
Freedman, Kent Mathewson, Elsie Michie, and Paul Paskoff.
Cheryll Glotfelty, SueEllen Campbell, Tom Lyon, David
Robertson, and Ann Ronald have each been helpful in less
direct but nonetheless important ways.

I owe special thanks

to the members of the writing groups in which I have worked:
Joanna Barszewska Marshall, Leonard Vraniak, Catherine
Williamson, and Janet Wondra.

I owe a debt also to Rebecca

Solnit, whose book Savage Dreams pointed the way to much of
my own thinking.
I am grateful for permission to reprint part of Chapter
* One, which appeared as "American Literary Environmentalism
as Domestic Orientalism" in Harold Fromm and Cheryll
Glotfelty, eds., The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in
Literary Ecology (University of Georgia Press, 1996).
I must acknowledge finally the support and
encouragement of my friends Ximena Gallardo, Kimberly
Harrison, Chris Healey, Val Mattimore, Phyllis Ann Thompson,
Drayton Vincent, and most of all my father, Sanford Mazel.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................

iv

LIST OF FIGURES .......................................... vi
ABSTRACT ............................................... vii
CHAPTER
1. Introduction: Literary Environmentalism .......

1

2. Acts of Environment ...........................

52

3. Performing Wilderness in The Last
of the Mohicans .............................

98

4. Writing the "Nation's Park": Three Views
of Yosemite .................................

155

5. Savage Dreams and The End of Nature:
Two Views of the Postnatural Landscape ......

216

WORKS CITED

......................................... 232

APPENDIX: Letter of Permission ........................

242

V I T A ................................................... 243

v

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Problematizing landscape ............................

5

2. The authorizing interpretive sign ...................

9

3. A new channel of mass communication ................. 23
4. Textualizing landscape ..............................

27

5.

The outdoors as the site of unmediated reality ......

31

6.

"A culminating fusion of sexuality andviolence" ..... 69

7.

The rural cemetery as a site of outdoor recreation .. 175

vi

ABSTRACT

The American environment is a mythic narrative that has
served to mystify the social and economic relationships
linking people and place.

This study examines the early

writing of the environment, from the 1637 Pequot War to the
creation of the first national parks in the late nineteenth
century.

Chapter 1 draws on the work of Michel Foucault and

Edward Said to theorize "literary environmentalism" as a
knowledge-power formation that functions as a domestic
Orientalism.

Chapter 2 theorizes the narratological and

psychosociological bases of environmental constructions
generally before analyzing two colonial texts whose literary
environmentalism is paradigmatic: John Underhill's Newes
from America (1638), which writes the New England wilderness
via tropes of gender and race that explicitly link the
environment's description to its possession, and Mary
Rowlandson’s The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God (1682),
which recapitulates but also complicates these figures.
Chapter 3 analyzes James Fenimore Cooper's The Last of
the Mohicans (1826), paying particular attention to how its
wilderness serves to naturalize the regeneration of a
racially "pure" American civilization.

Chapter 4 analyzes

three works related by their linked constructions of
Yosemite Valley.

Lafayette Bunnell's account of the

Mariposa Indian War (1851-1852), The History of the

Discovery of the Yosemite, utilizes an aesthetic discourse
to justify the ethnic cleansing that accompanied the
"discovery" of Yosemite.

Frederick Law Olmsted's 1865

management report on the new Yosemite Park implicates the
national park idea in an urban-industrial ideology of
"social sanitation through outdoor recreation."

Clarence

King's Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada (1872) links
environmentalism and literary realism to the exigencies of a
fast-maturing corporate capitalism.
My concluding chapter analyzes the idea of the
"postnatural" in two contemporary ecocritical texts, Bill
McKibben's The End of Nature and Rebecca Solnit's Savage
Dreams.

McKibben's work recapitulates the early colonialist

and capitalist trope of the "virgin wilderness," while
Savage Dreams refuses the concept of an originary nature and
adopts a more promising mode for a genuinely revisionist
environmental writing, one that refuses to seek in nature
the sorts of lessons and remedies available only through a
conscious engagement with this nation’s own cultures.

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Literary Environmentalism

From far Dakota's canyons,
Lands of the wild ravine, the dusky Sioux, the
lonesome stretch, the silence . . .
The battle-bulletin,
The Indian ambuscade, the craft, the fatal
environment. . . .
— Walt Whitman, "Death-Sonnet for Custer" (401)
In glorifying Custer's death at the Little Bighorn,
Whitman conflates an act of resistance to United States
colonialism with what may justly be called a canonical
landscape.

He writes of "far" lands, of what is not present

at the scene of reading and can therefore only be
represented, and his representation utilizes a language at
once both romantic and racist, a language scarcely able to
distinguish people from place: the ravine is "wild" and the
Sioux are "dusky," but both seem equally insignificant
within the vastness of the landscape itself.

Indeed the

wildness and the duskiness seem to function identically, as
parallel markers of what is really important: the very
otherness of a grand western landscape in which the canyons,
the people, and the resistance are all of a piece.
Whitman uses the term environment here with an
etymological precision that is fundamental to this study.
While the term "literally refers," as Richard Slotkin has
argued in Fatal Environment, to General Custer's "being
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surrounded and killed by Indians,"
Whitman means it to suggest something more: the
idea that Custer's death completes a meaningful
myth-historical design, a grand fable of national
redemption and Christian self-sacrifice, acted out
in the most traditional of American settings. And
it is essential to the illusion of this myth that
Custer's fate seem somehow implicit in the environ
ment, a moral and ideological lesson which seems
to emerge from the very nature of things— as if
Nature or God composed the story and assigned its
meanings, rather than men.
In this way, "[a]n environment, a landscape, a historical
sequence is infused with meaning in the form of a story"
(11).

And like Slotkin's Myth of the Frontier, this envi

ronment has been (and remains) complicit with the notions of
capitalism and Manifest Destiny which have, again in
Slotkin's words, "been the building blocks of our dominant
historiographical tradition and political ideology" (15).
Like the notion of the frontier, this storied American
environment has a lengthy and continuous history, with roots
in the colonial period and an undiminished power today.

But

it would not quite be accurate to speak of a "Myth of the
Environment," as if the environment were something we have a
myth about.

Rather, the environment is itself a myth.

It

is a "grand fable," a complex fiction, a widely shared,
seldom questioned, and by now ubiquitous nationalistic
narrative.

Nor would it be accurate to say that the

environment is merely a narrative, for that would be to
underestimate narrative's tremendous power to imagine and
shape the world.

(Consider those other narrated fictions,

gender, race, and nation.)

This power of narrative is something for which on the
one hand we might be thankful.

The idea of the environment,

after all, is coextensive with the environmental movement,
and thus with an entire constellation of genuinely
progressive political reforms.

On the other hand, the

environment's ideological underpinnings are by no means
entirely consistent with the ideals of Green politics.1 As
is true of the Myth of the Frontier, much of the
environment's power and durability resides in its unseen
ideological efficacy, in its ability to obscure basic
economic, political, and historical relationships—
particularly in the way it "substitutes" itself "for the
complexities of capital formation, class and interest-group
competition, and the subordination of society to the
imperatives of capitalist development" (Slotkin 47).

By

thus obscuring reality, the idea of the environment has come
to provide Euro-Americans with "a new basis upon which to
understand their presence in America" (Greenfield 205)— that
is, with a useful stance from which to misunderstand that
presence, to mystify rather than clarify their relationships
to both the land and the people they have tried to displace
from the land.

The "environment" has helped to enable— and

helps still to sustain— many of the very forces and
activities that environmentalism claims to oppose.
Give Me a Sign
Slotkin insists that "[t]he present forms in which our
myths appear embody not only the solutions to past problems

and conflicts; they contain the questions as well, and they
reflect the conflicts of thought and feeling and action that
were the mythmakers' original concerns" (20), and this is
certainly true of the environment.

But our environmental

myth thus perdures only as part of the discourse of
environmentalism; it continues to make sense only through
the continuing efforts of those institutions charged in one
way or another with dealing with it or speaking for it.

The

environment seems stable and real only because it is
reconstituted, on a daily basis and at the most seemingly
benign levels of perception, within living institutions and
interlocking systems of signs.
To demonstrate what I mean, to clarify what this study
frames as the broad cultural politics of literary
environmentalism, I would like to turn now to figure 1.
Depicted in this Jim Dunagin cartoon is a landscape of
mountains, trees, and a meandering stream— a traditionally
attractive vista, an apparently pristine environment, a
scene we all "know" to be pleasing.

It is just the sort of

place where one might expect to find a roadside marker of
some kind, though no such marker is present.

In the upper

left-hand portion of the panel are a woman and her male
partner, viewing the scene from a position that commands
both the frame and the represented landscape.

With her head

turned toward the man, she asks, "Are you sure this is a
scenic view?

There's no sign."

Wittingly or not, this cartoon is about the
readability, ontological stability, and sexual politics of
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DUNAGIN’S PEOPLE

"ARE YOU SURE THIS IS A SCENIC VIEW ?
THERE'S NO S IS N ."

Fig. 1. Problematizing landscape. Cartoon by Jim Dunagin.
Baton Rouge, La. Advocate (30 October 1993): 6B.

landscape.

It is about how rivers and trees and mountains—

categories of the tangible, enumerable aspects of a
territory— are constructed as beautiful, as worthy of
special notice and protection, as part of "the environment"
in precisely the sense I am trying to develop, and finally
it is about who authorizes such constructions.

The joke

depends, of course, on our knowing, without being told by
the missing roadside marker, the absent sign, that the view
is scenic: only with this knowledge can we see the woman's
question as laughable.

But without the authorization of the

sign, the only way of knowing this for sure would be by
virtue of some innately knowable presence, some ability of
scenery to signify itself as such without mediation: one
should be able to tell, just by looking.
landscape lacks such presence?

But what if

What if we take this woman's

question seriously, and begin to share her suspicion that
perhaps it is not the landscape that grounds the sign, but
the sign that grounds the landscape?

Simply by reading

"sign" here in. its semiotic sense, we can enlarge these
questions into questions about the discursivity of the
environment itself.
The cartoon depicts a location where one might normally
expect to find an interpretive marker of some sort, an
authorizing sign; it depicts a situation where signs
establish norms.

If, as this study maintains throughout, it

is not the landscape that grounds the sign but the other way
around, what is it that in turn authorizes the sign?

To put

it another way, in a deliberate double entendre, who erects

the sign?

The cartoon gives clues.

First, the woman speaks

in response to the man's assertion (not part of the caption
but clearly implied by it) that the view is indeed scenic.
That his words can be left out of the caption in this way
indicates that his interpretation of the landscape-text is
the unmarked reading, the default, the assumed— just as his
is in general the unmarked gender.

It is his reading and

his authority that are presumed an adequate substitute for
those of the absent road-sign; institutional authority and
male authority are aligned and, in a pinch, interchangeable.
By contrast it is the woman's reading— unauthorized,
eccentric, laughable— that questions and problematizes the
institutional-male, which is to say, patriarchal, sign.

It

is her reading that challenges not only a particular reading
of a particular landscape but also the seductive and
ingrained illusion of landscape-as-presence itself.
Thus far I have treated the woman in the cartoon as if
she were a speaking subject.

But within the signifying

economy of patriarchy, "woman" does not truly speak; lacking
in presence, like the "far canyons" of the western
landscape, she is written— by "man," much as Dunagin has
indicated in the cartoon, where the female figure is
positioned so as to be encompassed within the man's view of
the scene, while she, by contrast, cannot take in man and
landscape simultaneously, but only separately.

He sees her

in the environment, while she sees him apart from it and
viewing it.

Suggesting the woman's identification with and

the man's separation from the environment, this composition

neatly illustrates concepts that have come to be challenged
by ecofeminism.

For this woman to speak as she does— rather

than remain as silent as the rest of the landscape and
simply be seen— can itself be seen as an ecofeminist act.
In contrast to the cartoon, the photograph shown in
figure 2 is no joke.

It depicts the uncontested operation

of a patriarchal literary environmentalism.

In this photo,

taken in Yosemite National Park, we again see a woman and a
man viewing a scenic landscape.

Between landscape and

viewers, however, is now interposed the sign, whose surface
defines the plane through which the landscape is visible—
purportedly even more visible than it would be otherwise,
since such signs are thought to help one see and understand
more clearly what lies behind them.

As before, the male

figure dominates the visual space of the illustration,
encompassing the woman within his view of the environment
while remaining apart from it himself.

His outstretched arm

and pointed finger foreground a particular feature of the
environment; his female companion looks where she is bid to
look and listens to the words that presumably accompany the
gesture.

But this time there is no implied challenge to the

man's authority.

If the woman has a different reading of

the landscape, there is no indication of it.

The

authorizing interpretive sign, which dominates the scene
nearly as much as the male figure, in fact forecloses on any
such divergent interpretation, just as it physically
encloses the woman between itself and the man.

The sign

mediates for both humans, but it seems to restrict only her.

*

F I G . 3 -1 .

V isitors to sp e c ific parks and other recreation areas often seek experien ces

that bu ild upon k n o w led g e from p reviou s v isits. Y o s e m ite N ational Park, C alifornia.
(P h o to by Grant W . Sharpe)

Fig. 2. The authorizing interpretive sign. Photograph by
Grant W. Sharpe. From Grant W. Sharpe, ed., Interpreting
the Environment (New York: Wiley, 1976): 46.
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Environmental Literacy, Environmental Politics
As we will see below, the American environment has been
fundamentally gendered and racialized by largely unconscious
narrative and psycho-sociological processes; it possesses
certain political valences by the mere virtue of having been
brought into discourse by particularly situated human
beings.

Beyond this most basic level of environmental

politics is another, implied by the notion of the
environment's totality, of its consisting, supposedly, of
everything that surrounds one.

This totality cannot in

practice refer inclusively and exhaustively to the infinity
that remains after a finite subset— whether some personal
"I" or communal "we"— is abstracted from everything else.
As the object of the study and concern and political action
of environmentalism, as a manifest target in concrete
practices, the environment is necessarily finite and
particularized.
Any politically actionable environment, that is, rests
upon two creations of difference.

First there must be an

initial discrimination of an outside from an inside
(signaled in figure 2 by the interposing of the sign between
the viewers and the object viewed).

Second, there must be a

secondary marking off and foregrounding of some targeted
portion of the remaining totality (signaled in figure 2 by
the man's pointing finger).
privilege with our attention?

But what part shall we thus
Out of an infinitude of

possibilities, what is to count as environment?

Surely not

everyone will agree on what counts— or if there appears to
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be an agreement, one may reasonably suspect that not every
one has been in on the choosing.

In engaging this level of

environmental politics, the critic is free to challenge
claims of universality and objectivity, to ask not only
"What has come to matter?" but also, "What has come to
matter to whom?"

The critic is also free to ask whether

what in any specific instance comes to count as the envi
ronment is that which matters to the culturally dominant,
and finally to explore the ways in which the construction of
the environment is itself an exercise of cultural power.
All this speaks to the insinuation of politics not
merely into explicit environmentalist practice— where one is
used to seeing and analyzing it— but into the environment
itself. where it remains inaccessible to the traditional
critic.

Underlying my approach to what is coming to be

called "ecocriticism" is the conviction that the critic
should highlight this more elusive politics.

Ecocriticism

should help us realize that our environmental concerns are
not exclusively of the order of "Shall this forest be
preserved? or "Shall this river be dammed?"— important as
such questions are— but also of the order of "What has
counted as the environment, and what may count?

Who marks

off its conceptual boundaries, and under what authority, and
for what reasons?

Have those boundaries and that authority

been contested, and if so, by whom?

With what success, and

by virtue of what strategies of resistance?"
These questions of boundary and authority will sound
analogically familiar to anyone who has followed the last

decade's controversies over the literary canon and notions
of cultural literacy.

The national parks can be thought of

as a canon of environments, a collection of Great Texts
whose meanings have been considered transparent and
unchallengeable, and whose political utility has been to
stabilize a particular vision of the culture that has so
reverently preserved them.

The canonized environments of

the national parks have for the most part been "read" and
"taught" in ways that today's cultural conservatives would
approve: as if, "transcending accidents of class, race, and
gender," in the words of Lynne Cheney, they embodied
"truths" which could "speak to us all"— helping thereby to
unify what these critics see as an otherwise fractured and
stratified society (14).

As William Bennett put it (in what

seems a cruelly ironic metaphor), the study of the Great
Books makes us all "shareholders in our civilization" (4).
More than a century ago, Frederick Law Olmsted had said
much the same thing about beautiful scenery.

As a wealthy

member of the New York elite, Olmsted was quite literally a
"shareholder" in his civilization; he was also the first
superintendent of the then-new Yosemite State Park, and he
felt landscapes like Yosemite's should be made available to
as many people as possible— should be widely read and widely
taught— because they exemplified great truths that could
help unify a badly divided nation.
during the Civil War).

(He outlined these views

They could also be the means to an

aesthetic and moral education that would help reduce crime,
elevate the public taste, and level class distinctions.2
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In arguing for the edifying powers of landscape,
Olmsted saw himself as arguing against a certain type of
reactionary park opponent, "the ignorant exclusive," in the
words of his mentor, the landscape architect Andrew Jackson
Downing, who has "no faith in the refinement of a republic"
and who would prefer to see marvelous landscapes pass into
private ownership.

Downing was arguing in favor of the

preservation as a public space of New York's Central Park;
Olmsted, extending a developing ideology of public outdoor
recreation from the urban to the wilderness setting, quotes
Downing at length in his pioneering report on the management
of the Yosemite Park.

The anti-park elitists, Downing had

predicted, would eventually be proved wrong and would "stand
abashed,"
before a whole people whose system of voluntary
education embraces (combined with perfect indiv
idual freedom) not only schools of rudimentary
knowledge, but common enjoyments for all classes
in the higher realms of art, letters, science,
social recreations and enjoyments. Were our
legislators but wise enough to understand, today,
the destinies of the New World, the gentility of
Sir Philip Sidney, made universal, would be not
half so much a miracle fifty years hence in
America, as the idea of a whole nation of laboring
men reading and writing was, in his day, in
England, (qtd. in Olmsted 21)
For both Downing and Olmsted, the environmentalism of the
early park movements was part of a larger array of
democratic reforms.

There are several points I could

mention here: that Downing’s invocation of a universal
literacy (and Olmsted's foregrounding of that invocation in
his own report) is just one more turn on the trope of

nature-as-text; that the two m e n ’s managerial vision
projects for the United States a highly suspect teleology of
"progress"; that the insistence on the "voluntary" nature of
a literacy compatible with "perfect individual freedom"
might be seen as actually betraying a certain nervousness
about that freedom, and so on.

But what I wish to stress is

how the comparison of the U.S. parks movement to England's
early literacy movement makes the most spectacular New World
landscapes into Great Books that can edify the masses, that
might turn each of us into a model citizen like Sidney.
Clearly the sort of literacy Olmsted had in mind was a
version of what E. D. Hirsch has termed "cultural literacy."
Hirsch theorizes cultural literacy, quite simply, as
"information that our culture has found useful, and
therefore worth preserving."

This information can quite

objectively "be identified and defined" (ix); it "is not a
mystery" and "can be taught to all" (xiv).

As with the

national parks, however, the notion carries with it an aura
of privilege.

"Only a small fraction" of this information

"gains a secure place on the memory shelves of the
culturally literate," and the importance of that select
fraction "is beyond question"— precisely because it serves
as a "collective memory [that] allows people to communicate,
to work together, and to live together" in "shared
communities".

In fact, according to Hirsch, cultural

literacy is "a distinguishing characteristic of a national
culture" (ix); it "helped create the nation-state" and "can
perpetuate

it

and make

i t t h r i v e . ”3

As several recent studies have established, however,
neither the concept of literacy nor its consequences are as
straightforward as critics like Hirsch seem to believe.4
Recent critiques have made it impossible to view literacy
straightforwardly as a disinterested provision of skills
giving access to "information"; it must be seen instead as a
complex and highly interested organization of reading and
writing activities in the interests of the state.

Following

such recent theorists as Harvey Graff and Wlad Godzich, this
dissertation treats environmental literacy as "a shorthand
description for a determinate set of relations that we have
to language"— to what literary environmentalism repeatedly
tropes as the language of nature— "relations that [arise]
under, and [are] conditioned by, concrete historical
circumstances" (Godzich 5).

As such, literacy is thus

something that "can be understood only in terms of its
historical development" and only by remaining attentive to
its "social and cultural contradictions" (Graff, Legacies
vii, 265).
Graff stresses the material bases and ideological
utility of writing throughout its history.

This utility is

apparent even in the "early civilizations of Babylonia and
Egypt," where "writing developed partly out of the need to
keep accounts and insure property rights."

In this

"historical use of writing," "social consolidation,
standardization, power, and control overlapped" and were
even then "closely tied to the exigencies of the state and
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empire," to the expanding need for "legitimation and
reproduction; order, control, and regulation; 'administration
and centralization" (Legacies 19).

In eighteenth-century

Europe, notions of a widespread literacy became linked more
specifically to notions of moral progress (173-174), and by
the nineteenth century, the meanings and uses of literacy
continued to proliferate, forming "new configurations" and
new "relationships between literacy and industrialization"
(260).

By the time of the early national parks movement,

literacy was felt specifically to condition a "controllable,
docile work force, willing and able to follow orders" (262).
In addition, "however nominal" literacy might prove in
practice, it was more and more held to signify "in theory
the observance of an ordained and approved social code"
(Graff, Legacies 263).

Most broadly:

The moral bases of literacy accompanied the shift
from a moral economy to a political economy in
Western Europe and North America from the late
eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. It
developed in response to sweeping societal
transformations. . . . Literacy was expected to
contribute vitally to reordering and reintegrating
the 'new1 society of the nineteenth century; it
represented one central instrument and vehicle in
the efforts to secure social, cultural, economic,
and political cohesion in the political economy of
the expanding and consolidating capitalistic
order.
Literacy was not a straightforward reform but a wide-ranging
and conflicted technology.

It would help effect a massive

societal transformation, replacing "traditional popular
culture with new values and habits" (including, as we shall
see, the new sensibilities underpinning tourism and
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landscape appreciation).

Still, its primary goal remained

"recreating cultural hegemony" in the new order (263-264).
By Olmsted's time literacy was thus expected to carry a
complex ideological burden, and certainly not all of its
uses were unproblematically progressive.

Indeed, "[i]ts

potential for liberation was at best one use among many, and
perhaps not the dominant one" (Graff, Legacies 340).

Even

so, conservatives were often apprehensive about literacy's
deployment.

Some, "haunted by fears of too much education,"

felt "it would weaken society by alienating people from
manual labor, threaten the natural social order, [and]
promote social mobility" (174).

Such fears were ameliorated

primarily by a growing conviction "that the masses should be
schooled properly" (262):
Reformers insisted that 'moral training, including
rudimentary reading, would make men content with
their lot, not ambitious, and that education would
increase social stability, not disruption.' The
social transformation required a replacement for
traditional ranks and deference; schooling, with
literacy the vehicle for its moral bases, was to
be the new social cement. In part, reformers
prevailed by arguing that their program would
serve conservatives' own goals: stability,
discipline, and deference. (315)
At the "core of the emerging consensus" was an "emphasis on
social morality" (315); "morality" in fact became the
concept that mediated the concerns of conservative and
reformer and enabled the consensus that made literacy
campaigns possible.
The "notion of literacy" that would thus become
"operative" was precisely that advocated by conservatives
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such as Bennett and Cheney, a cultural but not a critical
literacy.

It was, in Godzich's terms, "a restricted

literacy" that provided "for competence in a specific code,
with little, if any but the most rudimentary, awareness of
the general problematics of codes and codification in
language" (5).

Despite such restrictions, however, literacy

remained problematic for conservatives.

"Happily," as one

study has it,
literacy like education more generally cannot be
reduced to behavioral conditioning.
It endows
people with skills that they can (although do not
always) use to receive and emit messages of an
almost infinite range, a range that in any event
escapes the control of those who imparted liter
acy. . . . Literacy is potential empowerment.
(Arnove and Graff 26)
Despite

sometimes elaborate precautions, a "genuinely

radical

political culture developed during the eighteenth

and early nineteenth centuries, and literacy was a part of
it" (Graff, Legacies 324).
Interpreting Landscape: The National Park System
Whoever expounds a text . . . is an interpreter.
And no such person can go about the work of inter
pretation without some awareness of forces which
limit, or try to limit, what he may say. . . .
I
am describing the world as it is or as we all know
it, and am doing so only because its familiarity
may have come to conceal from us its mode of
operation.
— Frank Kermode (72-73)
It is in this context of literacy as a contingent,
thoroughly political, and contested sphere that I wish now
to examine a specifically environmental literacy, as it has

come to be provided by the National Park Service.

The sign

depicted in figure 2 is not just an isolated marker calling
attention to a unique natural entity.

It is, rather, one

element among many in a consciously constructed signifying
system, in that particular form of literary environmentalism
known to the National Park Service personnel who practice it
as "interpretation."

Because it is so completely methodized

within the Park Service bureaucracy, "interpretation" leaves
behind it explicit traces that in other forms of literary
environmentalism are more deeply effaced.

I want to take

advantage of the comparative transparency of interpretation
and analyze it here as a sort of introductory case study of
the operation of environmental literacy, as a demonstration
of the theoretical concepts discussed so far and a gesture
toward the chapters to come.

Taking seriously the woman in

figure 1, I want to analyze interpretation as a highly
interested, historically specific form of nature writing, an
officially sanctioned but also contested system for making
nature signify particular and desired meanings.
Though it has roots in the late nineteenth-century
nature-study movement championed by such educators as
Liberty Bailey and Anna Botsford Comstock, environmental
interpretation more properly begins with Enos Mills, "the
father of nature guiding," who as early as 1889 was
conducting educational field trips in what was to become
Rocky Mountain National Park.

Mills worked in an unoffical

capacity, but following the creation of the Park Service in
1916 he argued publicly that guides such as himself should

be taken on as regular employees (Weaver 29).

Park Service

director Stephen Mather was cool to the idea at first, but
gradually came to see in interpretation a way to build
appreciation for the parks among a public whose commitment
to wilderness preservation was still shaky.

He seems to

have first realized the full potential of interpretation
during a 1919 lecture by the ornithologist Loye Holmes
Miller, whose superb presentation had attracted an audience
both large and enthusiastic— a combination that was "exactly
what Mather was seeking" to counter the influence of "those
persons who would selfishly destroy park values."

Mather

asked Miller to bring his show to Yosemite, where he would
be designated a "special ranger" and paid a salary.

Miller

agreed, and worked in the summer of 1920 as the first
officially sponsored national park interpreter (Weaver 2932; Mackintosh 7).
Miller's employment marked the beginning of the
"carefully directed and planned public contact work" that
would quickly spread from Yosemite to Yellowstone and then
the other parks to become "the most direct and most
important function of the service."

Over the following

decades, with the help of sizable private grants and
donations, interpretation was integrated into the park
system as a whole.5

To coordinate interpretive activities,

Mather in 1921 appointed Ansel Hall chief of the service's
Education Division.

Two years later, Mather upgraded this

division and placed it on an equal footing with the
Service's two other major administrative units, the
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divisions of engineering and landscape architecture.

Almost

from the beginning, that is, the Service treated the
discursive construction of the park environment just as
seriously as the material construction of any other park
facility (Weaver 32; Mackintosh 13).
Hall began at once to systematize interpretation.

He

set up a training program, the Yosemite School of Natural
History, and formulated criteria for applicants for the new
position of Ranger Naturalist.

(Prerequisite to the

Yosemite program, for example, were at least two years of
college.)

Hall also organized the Yosemite Museum

Association, later replaced by the Yosemite Natural History
Association, whose task was to gather and disseminate
information on the park's natural and human history,
contribute to the educational activities of the Yosemite
Nature Guide Service, promote scientific investigation,
maintain a library, study and preserve the customs and
legends of the Native Americans of the region, and publish
Yosemite Nature Notes in cooperation with the Park Service
(Mackintosh 10, 13-14).

The Association functioned as a

sort of clearinghouse, assembling and relating the work of a
heterogeneous group of academic specialists— biologists,
historians, educators, anthropologists, and sociologists®—
in ways that were invaluable to the more modestly educated
rank-and-file of park interpreters.

Similar associations

sprang up at other parks, forming a broad, interdiscursive
institutional base for more refined and authoritative
constructions of the various park environments.

From the beginning, interpretation was driven not so
much by the park visitor's desire to learn but by the
Service's desire to educate and persuade, to use the
public's interest in spectacular scenery to build support
for preservation.7

By the 1950s, interpretation had become

an overt environmental politics, ostensibly grounded in the
1916 legislation establishing the Park Service, whose two
major objectives were "to provide for the enjoyment" of and
"to use and conserve" the parks.

In fulfillment of the

first aim, as then-director Conrad Wirth wrote in 1953,
interpretation gave the visitor the "background of
information necessary for his fullest understanding,
enjoyment, and appreciation of these areas."

In fulfillment

of the second, as Wirth added in a rather revealing
metaphor, interpretation served as an "offensive weapon in
preventing intrusion and adverse use" of park lands.

For

interpretation "to contribute to preservation" in this way
was seen as both "obligation and opportunity" (Mackintosh
105).
This sense of interpretation as an opportunity had
grown apace with the steady increase of tourism in the
parks, particularly following World War II.

By 1957 the

historian Christopher Crittenden— noting that annual park
visitation had surpassed the 250-million mark— could welcome
interpretation as a "new means of reaching our people," a
"new channel of mass communication."

(In figure 3, Jim

Dunagin wryly suggests the pitfalls of conserving parklands
by using them for "mass communication.")

To this "great and
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Fig. 3. A new channel of mass communication. Cartoon by
Jim Dunagin. Baton Rouge, La. Advocate (4 July 1994): 6B.
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wonderful opportunity," Crittenden added approvingly,
interpretive professionals had responded with a flurry of
activity, developing "new and very effective techniques and
methods of telling their story," experimenting
with many things: with different methods of
restoring or reconstructing historic buildings,
with ingenious maps and dioramas. . . .
They have
introduced special lighting and sound effects. In
toto they have tried out scores and hundreds of
devices in order that objects might become to the
visitor seeable and hearable.
Did all these things just happen . . .
without rhyme or reason? Obviously they did not.
They are merely evidence of a new approach, a new
philosophy. This latter is interpretation, the
effort to make real and vivid to our people our
common heritage, (qtd. in Tilden xii)
The Service's interpretive intent remained the same: not
merely to reify nature but, as Frank Kermode said of
literary interpreters, "to establish harmony between
canonized texts" (78)— to enlist each park landscape in a
totalizing framework, to inscribe it within a particular
metanarrative and thereby naturalize a particular liberalhumanist notion, in this case Crittenden's "common
heritage."
The new narrative technology being developed held great
promise in this regard.

While welcome and useful, however,

all this activity posed special problems.

Sometimes the new

techniques proved just as exciting as the natural objects
being interpreted, threatening to overwhelm the message with
the medium.

And in a rapidly expanding bureaucracy rife

with experimentation, fragmentation seemed inevitable.
was the Service to monitor and unify the content of its

How
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message?

Interpretation could not be allowed to "just

happen"; it would have to be systematized and disciplined to
a greater degree than before.

That in turn would require "a

new philosophy," a theory, and that theory would be provided
largely by Freeman Tilden's Interpreting Our Heritage
(1956)— a book still highly regarded by park interpreters
and widely used in their training.8
Tilden posited interpretation as multi-media narrative,
an active, innovative, and responsive storytelling practice.
The interpreter must become adept at "making a few words
tell a full and moving story" (57); the "lifeblood of
satisfying interpretation," he insisted, "flows from the
proper and ingenious use" of "devices of language" such as
metaphor, simile, and analogy (30).

The process is thus

more artistic than scientific, but science nonetheless
remains useful as an authorizing device, inasmuch as it
fosters "a vision of the continuity of law which looks like
a purpose in nature" (28).

What sort of purpose are we

supposed to envision in nature?

Tilden approvingly cites an

interpretive ranger who, ostensibly speaking of processes of
erosion and plant succession, "told a thrilling story of the
way the rock under our feet was attacked by the physical and
organic forces; how vegetation begins; the creation of
little harboring places in the rocks; the coming of grasses,
of shrubs, finally of trees.
(39).

Our grasses, our forests"

Without much effort, nudged by the images of the

"rock" and the "little harboring place," we can read here a
thinly veiled retelling of the familiar story of the arrival
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of the persecuted pilgrims at Plymouth Bay, and the
subsequent raising of villages, towns, and cities— a
providential metanarrative of progress and civilization,
mapped onto the historical field of the appropriation and
development of "our" nation, mapped finally onto the
naturalizing field of the park environment.

This, writes

Tilden, was stellar interpretation, capable of holding its
audience of travel-weary sightseers in "rapt attention" (39).
Textualizing Landscape
If the teacher is the guide, the curriculum is the
path. A good curriculum marks the point of
significance so that the student does not wander
aimlessly over the terrain, dependent solely on
chance to discover the landmarks of human
achievement.
— William J. Bennett (6)
Of the many ways of writing environment as readable
text, perhaps the most revealing is the interpretive genre
known as the SGT or self-guided trail (see figure 4).

The

SGT, which came into its own "as a major component of the
overall interpretive program" because of "budget problems
[and] lack of personnel," is an integration of "natural" and
written signs into a single text, "a meandering footpath
along which the visitor's attention is drawn to interesting
or unusual features which might otherwise be overlooked or
not fully appreciated."

Though designed to place visitors

"in direct contact with the park or forest resource" (Sharpe
247), such trails obviously afford a highly mediated
contact, with their natural elements carefully preselected
and then foregrounded and glossed by the written sign.

Out

Self-Guided Trails

FIG. 14-3.
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Perm anent stations should not be crow ded togeth er as in the a b o v e

example, but sh ould be at least 7 5 -1 0 0 ft ( 2 3 - 3 0 m ) apart. V isitors w ill ignore so m e
stations w h en the trail gets crow ded. (P hoto by Grant W . S h arp e.)

Fig. 4. Textualizing landscape. Photograph by Grant
Sharpe. From Grant W. Sharpe, ed. Interpreting the
Environment (New York, Wiley, 1976): 255.
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of a multidimensional and anarchic web is thus distilled a
linear sequence of signifiers, ordered into an apparently
coherent and monologic text that "will develop an awareness
of what makes up that environment" (250).
In designing the self-guided trail, interpretive
personnel are encouraged to "put a story together" "which
will unfold logically as the visitor moves from station to
station" (Sharpe 254).

To tell such a story well— to

maintain reader interest and achieve narrative closure— the
interpreter must pay attention to the written trail markers'
location as well as their content.

This is a matter of

syntax— the markers must be "oriented perfectly so there is
no misunderstanding about what is being interpreted" (266)—
and of suspense: the interpreter should "[w]ind the trail
around rock outcrops, trees, or other features," since the
narrative is "more exciting if you can only see short
segments at any one time" (254).

The interpreter must take

care in general not to work at cross-purposes to the Park
Service's designs upon the reader.

One training text, for

example, warns against laying out an SGT by "mark[ing] the
trees along the route with paint or axe blazes," because
doing so "disfigures the trees" (254)— damaging the trees
themselves, to be sure, but also, as my added italics are
meant to suggest, disrupting their efficacy as figures, as
signifiers of a pristine environment.
Not just the SGT but all forms of interpretation are
designed to render the environment readable.

According to

the National Park Service's Personal Training Program for
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Interpreters, interpretation must "help the visitor derive
meaning from [the] environment" (18).

Before designing a

project, interpreters are to ask themselves, "When you are
in the role of a visitor in an unfamiliar environment, how
do you derive meaning?" (23).

This is a matter not merely

of pedagogy but also of epistemology, of "the organized
knowledge and ways of knowing within the areas to be
interpreted" (16). Since "increasing the number of ways by
which a visitor can look at something rather than looking at
many things in just one way, helps a visitor derive meaning
from an environment" (23), interpreters should access the
full range of knowledges consolidated for them by such
groups as the Yosemite Natural History Association.

At its

most effective, that is, interpretation constructs the
environment interdiscurs ivelv.
Illusions of Presence
The controlling fact governing the development of
educational work in the National Parks is that
within these reservations multitudes are brought
directly in contact with striking examples of
Nature's handicraft. To lead people away from
direct contact with nature, to beguile them into a
building where they are surrounded by artifacts
. . . is contrary to the spirit of this enter
prise. The real museum is outside the walls of
the building and the purpose of museum work is to
render the out-of-doors intelligible.
— Hermon Carey Bumpus (104)
As is suggested by the oxymoronic phrase "to make
real," the Park Service's vision of interpretation— read
here as a naive theorizing of literary environmentalism
itself— proves highly problematic.

On the one hand, Tilden

writes that interpretation in the field is superior to
education in the classroom precisely because it is only in
the field that the student "meets the Thing itself" (3).
This is the popular notion of the natural environment as a
site of complete, unmediated presence— as exemplified, for
example, in the advertisement reproduced in figure 4, which
posits "the out-of-doors" as the site of "authenticity" and
informs us that in the outdoors "there are no perceptions.
Only reality."

On the other hand, even though interpreters

"work closely with the [natural] feature itself" and are "in
direct contact with" the park visitor, they nonetheless
"have a lot of media to rely on" (Sharpe 6)— and of what use
are media but to mediate between viewer and scene?
Despite the putative reality and presence of the park
environment, visitors "depend on park interpreters to tell
them what it's all about" (Personal Training 4).

To "stand

at the rim of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado is to
experience a spiritual elevation that could come from no
human description of the colossal chasm," but it nonetheless
requires the work of a vast institution, of "(t]housands of
naturalists," to reveal "something of the beauty and wonder,
the inspiration and spiritual meaning that lie behind what
the visitor can with his senses perceive" (Tilden 3-4).
With what, then, is the visitor in direct contact?

Not the

real after all, it seems, but only some inconsequential
surface, for the "true interpreter" must lead the visitor
"beyond the apparent to the real" (8).

The visitor depends

upon the interpreter's presumed ability, as Kermode put it
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T h e r e ’s n o pretending; You e ith e r have w h a t it takes to m a k e it in th e o u e o f -d o o r s , o r
y ou d o n 't , I t’s ca lle d a u th e n tic ity . G iv en th a t p eo p le h ave been',\Voaririg o u r o u td o o r
w e a r s in c c 1830, it s e e m s fair to
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Fig. 5. The outdoors as the site of unmediated reality.
Summit 1 (Fall 1990): 72.
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in the case of the interpreter of the literary text, "to
elicit senses not available to persons of ordinary
perceptions" (78).

Interpreters are "in the business of

conducting readers out of the sphere of the manifest" (85) —
and into the highly mediated sphere of environmentalist
discourse.
In doing so, writes Tilden, the effective interpreter
"pares away all the obfuscating minor detail and drives
straight toward the perfection" of the story (31).
Interpretation is a highly selective process of
foregrounding and suppression, and this suggests a critical
strategy for a poststructuralist ecocriticism or green
cultural studies: to inquire into what has been deemed
"minor" or "irrelevant" to the "perfection" of interpretive
stories, and to ask by whom and for what reasons such
decisions have been made.

Such a criticism would attempt to

bare the more subtly concealed devices of literary
environmentalism, to recover enough of its "obfuscating"
details to breach the closure of its texts and keep the
environment openly problematic.
Tilden quotes the following motto from a Park Service
administrative manual: "Through interpretation,
understanding; through understanding, appreciation; through
appreciation, protection" (38).

Omitted here is the step

that makes the interpretive process circular rather than
sequential: "through protection, interpretation."

With the

circle closed in this way, interpretation is no longer a
mere intermediate step toward the goal of protection; what
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we see instead is that in preserving landscapes we also
preserve the "grounds" of the stories we tell about them.
We must now consider the possibility that we value the
stories at least as much as we do the environment "itself,"
that while literary environmentalism clearly tells stories
in order to protect the landscape, it also preserves the
landscape in order to tell stories.

In this formulation— if

I may simplify— the task of the environmental historian is
to ask what happens when someone alters the environment,
while the task of the ecocritic is to explore what happens
when someone tries to alter the stories, and to give those
stories a genealogy by recovering their histories and
contexts.
One could also describe the ecocritic's -cask in terms
of the earlier discussion of literary canonicity.

To the

traditional critic, canonical works quite pointedly do not
speak of the specificities of existence in racialized,
gendered, and class-stratified societies; rather they "tell
us how men and.women . . . have grappled with life's
enduring, fundamental questions"— by which, of course, is
meant such platitudes as "What is justice? . . .
courage?

What is noble?" (Bennett 3).

What is

The Great Books are

not to be taught in an "ideological manner," "as if they
were . . . subordinated to particular prejudices" (16) but
rather in ways that allow us to "protect and transmit a
legacy" that is thought to be damaged by critical and
divergent readings (17).

Indeed, writes Lynne Cheney,

criticism which aims "to expose and refute their biases" is

not legitimate intellectual activity at all but rather an
unacceptable "form of political activism" (12).

What to

Cheney is unacceptable, however, seems to me to be precisely
what is necessary, and the questions I wish to ask of our
Great Landscape-Texts are very like the questions she
explicitly proscribes: "What groups did the authors of these
works represent?

How did their works enhance the social

power of those groups over others?" (12).

I propose to

enlist the nation's environmental narrative in a critical
rather than just a cultural literacy.
A Heritage Preserved for Him
Taking my cue from the gender politics implicit in
figure 2, I would like to give a brief example of what I
have in mind.

In 1957, Park Service director Conrad Wirth

wrote that interpretation's job is "presenting, for the
benefit of every American, an interpretation of the unique
heritage preserved for him in the National Park System"
(qtd. in Tilden vii).

Is there any contradiction in Wirth's

promise that interpretation would benefit every American by
illuminating a heritage preserved for him?

It is true that

women had worked in interpretation since at least 1917, when
the federal government licensed Esther Burnell as a nature
guide in what today is Rocky Mountain National Park.

By the

1980s, in fact, the number of women in the profession
actually equalled or exceeded that of men (Sharpe 10;
Mackintosh 74).

But this apparent gender equality owed less

to an enlightened Park Service mentality than to the
creation of an interpretive ghetto, created as male rangers

who associated natural-history work "with qualities lacking
in 'he-men'" gravitated toward other positions.

(In

addition, interpretive positions were not on the fast track
for career advancement.9)

Women, on the other hand, were

considered in all the usual ways to be especially suited to
the work; where men were considered "too independent and
hard to control," women were thought "natural hostesses,
more outgoing."

One supervisor, citing "studies in

industry," claimed women were better able "to perform duties
of a repetitive and routine nature," while another found
them "more susceptible to instruction, more obedient, and
. . . less of a management problem" (Mackintosh 16; 73-74).
With their presence in interpretation less an
expression of gender equality than a function of gender
stereotypes, it is not surprising that feminist rangers only
comparatively recently began to contest interpretive
constructions of gender.

It was not until the 1970s that

interpreters at Morristown National Historical Park in New
Jersey appropriated that park's rural landscape to ground a
chapter of Herstory, pointedly casting women as active and
capable agents by stressing their role in the American
Revolution as "both camp followers and those left to manage
daily farms while the men were fighting."

Such innovations

were received only cautiously within the profession, which
displayed a sense of reaction and containment even where it
was apparently sympathetic.

While admitting, for example,

that "the presence of women has desirably expanded and

enriched interpretive content," administrators stressed that
care must "be taken that undue emphasis is not given
tangential female roles at the expense of primary park
themes."

This comment presaged a more general retrenchment

that would occur when James Watt ran the Department of
Interior.

"As late as 1979," wrote one observer,

"environmental education [had been] an essential management
function for every park."

But during the Reagan years, "a

back-to-basics movement" squeezed out all but the most
traditional forms of interpretation, "frown[ing] on programs
not directly based on park resources or extending too far
beyond them."

The interpreter's job once again became only

"to interpret the resources and themes of our parks, not to
function as subject matter educators or as spokespeople for
special causes" (Mackintosh 71-75).

Morristown's modestly

feminist interpretation was eclipsed as "female roles" in
the nation's history were thus declared the merely
"tangential" concerns of a "special cause."
Environmental constructions may be contested along
lines of race as well as gender, as is clearly evident in
recent events at Little Bighorn National Monument— a park
whose very name was until quite recently a matter of bitter
dispute.

Little Bighorn, of course, is the location of

George Armstrong Custer's "fatal environment," the famous
1876 battle in which Sioux and Cheyenne troops defeated the
warriors of the U.S. Cavalry.

In 1879 the War Department

declared the site a national cemetery and erected a memorial
to the dead U.S. cavalrymen, but no memorial was set up to
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honor the Indian dead, and the monument itself, in a
deviation from the usual custom, was named not after the
location (Gettysburg, Antietam, Pearl Harbor) but after the
losing commander: Custer Battlefield.
In 1925, a Northern Cheyenne woman petitioned the
Secretary of War to allow the placement of a memorial to her
father, who had died in the 1876 battle.

The War Department

did not answer, and the issue apparently lay dormant until
the American Indian Movement renewed the woman's request in
1976.

By this time the site had become a national monument

under the management of the National Park Service.

Like the

War Department, the Park Service ignored the petition; in
response, AIM first placed an unauthorized plaque of its own
at the perimeter of the site and later, in 1991, conducted a
protest march at the monument.

By this time Ben Nighthorse

Campbell had been elected as the nation's first Native
American in Congress, and Barbara Booher, the second Native
American to attain such a rank within the National Park
Service, had been appointed monument superintendent.

That

same year, six decades after the original request and only
after a rancorous debate, Campbell sponsored and Congress
approved legislation authorizing the construction of an
Indian memorial and renaming the site Little Bighorn
Battlefield National Monument. 1°
Even after the name change, however, interpretation at
the site continued to operate within racist institutional
constraints.

In 1989, one of the monument's rangers, Randy

Parker, reported that he had been instructed to stop

recommending to visitors that they read Dee Brown's Bury Mv
Heart at Wounded Knee as background material.

What Parker

thought would help visitors to a more balanced understanding
of Indian-white relations had been deemed "too biased" by
the monument's park historian; not only that, but it was not
for sale at the Visitor Center's bookstore.

Superintendent

Booher supported Parker, but had no authority over the
bookstore, which— in an arrangement typical of the park
system— was operated by an independent nonprofit group, the
Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association.

When,

in response to a letter-writing campaign begun by Parker,
the Association's book-review committee took up the matter,
the vote was 4-3 not to carry the book. (None of the
committee members were Native Americans.)

Booher then asked

the Association's board of directors to override the review
committee; they too voted against the book, by the even
greater margin of 5-1.n
Theory: Literary Environmentalism as Domestic Orientalism
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.
— Wallace Stevens, "Anecdote of the Jar" (129)
Until recently, the critic of environmental literature
has tacitly assumed the existence of an entity, "the
environment," as both the motivation for and the object of
environmentalism.

As should be clear by now, this study

approaches "the environment" instead as a construct, not as
the prediscursive origin and cause of environmental
discourse but as an effect of that discourse.

As a set of
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represented relations, an idea rather than a presence, "the
environment" becomes manifest as what Michel Foucault called
a dispositif, a strategic category that organizes around
itself the heterogeneous disciplines that claim (in this
case) "the environment" as their common object of study and
concern.

The environment is that particular abstraction

that can be studied not only by what we think of as
environmentalists per se— that is, not just those who work
to protect it— but by all those whose pronouncements have
described it and elaborated upon it and validated it as
worthy of attention in the first place: the artists who find
it beautiful, the scientists who find it complex,
interconnected, and fragile, the theologians who find it
spiritually regenerating (however much they may once have
found it, as uncontrolled nature, vile and dangerous), the
sociologists who find it an antidote to the ills of urban
society, and so on.
In the traditional reading of Stevens's "Anecdote," the
famous jar not only exercises dominion over the wilderness
but retrieves it from "perceptual chaos," thereby rendering
it visible to the observer.

In much the same sense, the

environment makes objects, processes, disciplines, and
languages sprawl intelligibly around it, creating a sense of
order and relation out of an otherwise slovenly complex of
words and things. 12

The environment is the epistemological

catalyst that allows us to perceive as unified and logical
such recognizably environmentalist discourse as this quote
from Tu Wei-Ming, which I have selected almost at random

40

from a collection of essays entitled Worldviews and Ecology:
The unprecedented scientific and technological
achievement that enables us not only to survey all
boundaries of the good earth but even to measure
the thickness of the air we breathe is certainly
an established fact. Yet, a more compelling
actuality is the realization of how precious and
precarious this lifeboat of ours is in the midst
of the turbulent ocean of galaxies. This reali
zation, heightened by a poetic sensitivity and
infused by a religious sense of awe, impels us to
recognize as professionals as well as concerned
citizens of the world that we ourselves now belong
to the category of the endangered species. This
poignant recognition is deduced from the obvious
fact that we have mercilessly polluted our own
habitat.13
One would be struck by the sheer breadth of this sort of
statement, were it not so familiar.

In physical scope it

ranges from the local to the galactic; colliding audibly
within it are the varied languages of geography, biology,
atmospheric science, politics, ethics, and theology; its
rhetoric swings from the mundane and technical to the
belletristic.

How is it that such polyphonic text can

strike us as authoritative and not merely cacophonous?
Certainly its persuasiveness is enhanced by the urgency of
its genre (the jeremiad) and by its appeals to established
forms of authority.

But it is the discursive mediation of

the environment itself, as an apparently stable and selfevident center, that prevents such prose from seeming as
opaque as the fictional Chinese encyclopedia quoted by
Foucault in The Order of Things, that prevents us today from
sensing how at some earlier time, not really so long ago,
such words might have struck us as possessing "the exotic

41

charm of another system of thought," perhaps prompted us
even to shake our heads at "the stark impossibility of
thinking that."14
It is this interdisciplinarity, this intersection and
interlocking of discourses— and of the diverse and often
divergent ways of knowing the world for which individually
they speak— that creates the epistemological space within
which environmentalism may refer intelligibly to its object.
In this study I use the term "literary environmentalism" to
refer not narrowly to consciously engaged environmental
politics, but more broadly to the discursive processes of
constructing the environment— by studying it, by describing
it, and originally, as this study will show, by possessing
it.

The material and historical contexts within which these

processes take place do not completely determine the
environment, but they nonetheless prevent it from being, in
the words of Edward Said, "a free field of thought and
action" (3).

Nor can literary environmentalism be seen as a

self-evidently pure and "good" resistance to an external and
"bad" force that "exploits" the environment.

For however it

may represent itself and its history, environmentalism has
not always operated in isolation from or strictly in
opposition to power, but rather has often been an
establishment and consolidation of power, an alignment with
many of the forces it claims in the broadest terms to
oppose.

Necessarily, environmentalism seeks constantly to

buttress the speaking and acting authority of its agents by
establishing links, whether between those agents as

individuals, between individuals and institutions (both new
and preexisting), and between one institution and another.
Out of this peopling and institutionalizing of
environmentalism, this expansion and refinement of its
network, comes the elaboration of its discourse, the
incorporation of the otherwise unrelated ways of
classifying, measuring, and describing its object so evident
in the example above.
This study therefore views literary environmentalism
not simply as the written record of a political movement,
nor solely as Literary Environmentalism, as the production
of that movement's most inspirational and now canonical
texts.

Literary environmentalism is rather the textual

manifestation of a larger cultural practice, of an ensemble
of interlocking ideas, people, and institutions, of what is
today a sprawling formation within which environmental
discourse attains its intellectual, popular, and legal
authority— a formation within which the environment itself
has been invented and naturalized.

In other words, I treat

literary environmentalism as a sort of Orientalism, as the
latter has been formulated by Said: a "created body of
theory and practice" (6), the "corporate institution"
empowered to deal with the environment "by making statements
about it, authorizing views of it, describing it" and even
"ruling over it" (3).

Of the infinite potential modes for

exercising power, literary environmentalism will be seen as
just a particular "style for dominating, restructuring, and
having authority" (3) over the territories and lives— in
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particular, as we have already begun to see, the territories
and lives of Native Americans, of women, of the poor— for
which the environment is invoked as a representation and
which it inevitably misnames.is
An Environmental Prehistory
This dissertation explores what might be called the
prehistory of the environmental movement by analyzing the
shifting constructions of that movement's object, the
environment "itself," from the early colonial period to the
creation of the early national parks.

I will not pretend

that the range of texts I have selected for that purpose is
particularly representative; genuine representativeness did
not seem possible, and I was guided by other considerations.
I chose, for one thing, to privilege the popular over the
conventionally literary; hence my choice of three books that
were best-sellers in their time: Mary White Rowlandson's The
Sovereignty and Goodness of G od. James Fenimore Cooper's The
Last of the Mohicans, and Clarence King's Mountaineering in
the Sierra Nevada.

(The latter has the additional advantage

that the Yosemite landscape it helped to write remains a
tremendously popular text in its own right; unlike much of
the landscape of, say, Cooper's New York, Yosemite is still
"in print" and still widely read in the "original edition.")
I also wished simply to introduce some fresh material into
the discussion o.f "environmental literature," to present
alternatives to what seem to have become regular fixtures in
the field; hence the fact that this study contains little
Henry David Thoreau and absolutely no John Muir.

In Chapter Two of this study I theorize some specific
narratological and psychosociological bases of American
environmental constructions before analyzing their operation
in two colonial texts whose literary environmentalism
strikes me as paradigmatic.

John Underhill's Newes from

America (1638), a combined promotional pamphlet and account
of the Pequot War, writes the New England wilderness via
tropes of gender and race that explicitly link the
environment's description to its possession.

I then turn to

Mary Rowlandson’s The Soveraiqnty and Goodness of God
(1682), which recapitulates but also considerably
complicates these figures.

Lacking the blustering self-

assurance of Underhill's account, Rowlandson's writing is
tentative and nuanced, marked by hesitations and resistances
that suggest the possibility of radically rewriting the
American environment.
Chapter Three analyzes The Last of the Mohicans, paying
particular attention to its construction of a gendered and
racialized "wilderness" which, in its "virgin" purity, may
serve as the ground of a perpetual regeneration of a "pure"
white American civilization.

But however much the novel

tries to naturalize its visions of racial and natural
purity— and however much it tries to make its wilderness
landscape self-originating— the elusive and profoundly
troublesome figure of Magua always manages to frustrate such
aims.

This repeated disruption steadily erodes the novel's

confidence in the "reality" of the wilderness it writes,
reducing the story towards the end to a series of skits and
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masquerades that destabilize the very categories of "nature"
and "culture"— suggesting thereby that nature itself is
fully performative in the sense developed by Judith Butler
in her analyses of sex and gender.
Chapter Four examines three noncanonical works related
intertextually by their contributions to the canonicity of a
fourth text: the Yosemite landscape.

Lafayette Bunnell's

account of the Mariposa War (1851-1852), The History of the
Discovery of the Yosemite and of the Indian War which Led to
that Event, demonstrates the role of aesthetic discourse in
neutralizing the genocidal horrors of a paradigmatically
violent "environment," the Euro-American invasion and
conquest of Yosemite.

Frederick Law Olmsted's "The Yosemite

Valley and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove," the first
management report on the newly established Yosemite State
Park, implicates the very idea of the national park in an
ideology of what might be called "social sanitation through
outdoor recreation," a conservative social praxis that had
already proved effective in the urban and suburban East by
the time Olmsted adapted it to the wilderness of the West.
Continuing the theme of the East writing the West, I
turn to Clarence King's Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada
to demonstrate the links between environmentalism, literary
realism, and the exigencies of a fast-maturing corporate
capitalism.

Using his surveying and mountaineering

activities as figures for struggle, competition, progress,
and domination, King writes brilliantly of landscapes now
preserved as national parks, but simultaneously mystifies
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the social and economic developments that were to so
completely transform the remainder of the state.
In my concluding chapter I take up the question of the
"postnatural" as it has been developed in two contemporary
ecocritical texts, Bill McKibben's The End of Nature and
Rebecca Solnit's Savage Dreams.

McKibben claims his work to

be postnatural, but naively recapitulates the early
colonialist and capitalist trope of the "virgin wilderness";
Solnit, by contrast, refuses the concept of an originary
nature altogether and adopts a much more promising mode for
a genuinely postnatural environmental writing.

Radically

resituating the reader of the Yosemite environment in what
she terms the "hidden wars of the American West," Solnit
makes a point of recovering the voices that have been
silenced by traditional forms of environmental literature.
Savage Dreams refuses to seek in nature the sorts of

lessons

and remedies that are in fact available only through

a

conscious engagement with one's own culture.
I do not pretend to have written a full-fledged
of the environment.

history

My goals have been much more modest.

I

hope first of all simply to have demonstrated that the
environment has a history, that it is not simply "out there"
waiting either to be destroyed or preserved but rather that
it brings considerable historical and ideological baggage to
every discussion about it.

Second, I hope that this study

can suggest ways to bring the environment into larger
debates about imperialism, gender, race, and class, and
concomitantly to develop ecocriticism into a viable and
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productive form of postmodern intellectual work.

Certainly

we need a clearer understanding of the relations between
capitalism, colonialism, and environmentalism, for without
such an understanding, green movements risk running at
cross-purposes, naturalizing forms of social oppression even
as they combat the other toxic residues of the New World
Order.
Notes to Chapter One
1 Analyzing a variety of contemporary ecological
discourses in The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life; Nature's
Debt to Society. Andrew Ross argues that environmentalism
threatens a reactionary "revival of appeals to the authority
of nature and biology." He notes the historical flirtations
of fascist groups with ecology and conservation (4) and
suggests that "we may soon be engaged yet again in the
struggle to prevent nature becoming the referee of our fate"
(5). Also instructive in this vein are the chapters "Think
Like a Mountain" and "Nazi Ecology" in Luc Ferry's The New
Ecological Order.
2 Olmsted 21. I discuss Olmsted's views in much
greater detail in Chapter Four.
3 Hirsch xiv. Hirsch’s claim that the most crucial
knowledge can be readily identified and defined is itself
problematic, since the first of these terms implies a simple
recognition of a fact and the second the assignment of a
meaning. Hirsch's conflation of these terms indicates how
the idea of cultural literacy naturalizes value judgments as
simple "information."
Interestingly enough, just as Olmsted invokes literacy
in his theorizing of the environment, Hirsch argues for the
importance of cultural literacy by citing its utility in
comprehending environmentalist discourse (xiii).
4 In addition to the works cited in the text, see
Raymond Williams, Writing in Society: Harvey J. Graff, The
Literacy Myth; Literacy and Social Structure in the
Nineteenth-Centurv City: and Elsa Auerbach, "Literacy and
Ideology."
5 With Congress at first reluctant to sponsor
interpretive activities, the Park Service looked to outside
funding to pay for them and created quasi-independent
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organizations to help coordinate them. In 1918 Charles D.
Wolcott, secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, formed
the National Parks Educational Committee, which with
Mather's assistance created the nonprofit National Parks
Association, among whose purposes were "to interpret the
natural sciences which are illustrated in the scenic
features, flora and fauna of the national parks and
monuments, and to circulate popular information concerning
them in text and picture" (Mackintosh 6). To further such
efforts, John D. Rockefeller helped fund the museum at Mesa
Verde National Park in 1923; the Laura Spellman Rockefeller
Memorial Fund and the Carnegie Corporation paid for
interpretive facilities at Grand Canyon National Park,
including a museum that opened in 1926; and the Loomis
family, owners of the Los Angeles Times. funded a museum
that opened in Lassen Volcanic National Park in 1929. The
federal government did not fund any comparable facility
until 1930 (Mackintosh 12).
6 Interpreters are urged, for example, not to "rely
upon a limited set of time-honored techniques without
examining their current appropriateness" but instead to make
use of "[c]urrent knowledge about human behavior in leisure
settings" that will "suggest alternative interpretive
strategies" (Field and Wagar 44).
7 Grant W. Sharpe notes that in addition to its overt
political value in environmental.ism, interpretation has an
"often overlooked" "management aspect," affording a variety
of concrete benefits ranging from "favorably promot[ing] the
image of the agency which supplies it" (4) to providing
"substantial assistance to law enforcement through
educational persuasion" (18).
8 Tilden's book has had considerable influence.
William C. Everhardt, as head of the National Park Service's
Division of Interpretation and Visitor Services, advised his
interpretive staff in 1965 not just to read but to "[rjeread
Freeman Tilden's Interpreting Our Heritage," since "[t]here
isn't anything much better" (United States, Interpretive
Planning). Ten years later, Everhardt noted approvingly
that "for nearly a generation the profession has been guided
conceptually and philosophically by the teachings of Freeman
Tilden, through his classic, Interpreting Our Heritage"
(Sharpe xi).
9 In the field of higher education, some ten years
later, the same sort of gender inequality still obtains.
According to a study reported recently in The Chronicle of
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Higher Education, women make up 41 percent of new higher
education faculty overall. But women are "far more likely
to be employed in non-tenure track positions than males,"
and at research institutions approximately two men are hired
for every woman (Magner 18).
For more information (and a sampling of opinions) on
the renaming of the Little Bighorn National Monument, see
"Winners" 33; Lynch 11; Ward 76-87; Will 6B; and Kilpatrick
6B. Since the renaming, archaeologists have employed
sophisticated technology for reinterpreting the Little
Bighorn site. See Amato 293; Fox, Archaeology; and Fox, "A
New View" 30-37, 64-66.
11 For details of this controversy, see Lockhart 11A.
12 Pack 58. "Anecdote of the Jar" may well be the most
frequently analyzed of Stevens's poems. The most persistent
theme in its readings is that "a wild and disorderly
landscape is transformed into order" by the "presence" of
the jar. That order is not natural, however; it is wholly
"a product of the human consciousness," and "acts in the
imagination" (Baker 127). Order does not originate in
nature, but is the effect of "man’s desire for wholeness,"
which "leads . . . toward sur-roundness" (Riddel 43). One
critic writes that one of the poem's "critical points is
that the jar, while it may reflect the hill on which it
stands . . . is not nature" but a reflection, and "[o]nce
nature is reflected, it is art— the domain of the
imagination and not of the real world" (Perlis 47).
Yvor Winters disagreed with this prevailing view of the
poem, finding it "a purely romantic performance," "an
expression of the corrupting effect of the intellect upon
natural beauty":
The jar is the product of the human mind . . . and
it dominates the wilderness; but it does not give
order to the wilderness— it is vulgar and sterile,
and it transforms the wilderness into the
semblance of a deserted picnic ground. (229)
13 Tu Wei-Ming 19. Another contributor to Worldviews
and Ecology, Thomas Berry, writes:
General ecological studies can be too abstract or
too theoretical to constitute a recognized
scientific discipline. Biological and geological
studies can be too specialized. Environmental
ethics is a much needed study, yet it cannot
proceed in any effective manner without a larger
understanding of the natural world. The . . .
realm[s] of poetry and the natural history essay
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are important to establish the emotional-aesthetic
feeling for the w o n d e r s of the natural world and
to awaken the psychic energies needed. . . . But
these humanistic insights are themselves mightily
enhanced by a more thorough understanding of the
identifying features and intimate modes of
functioning of bioregions.
None of these studies can be done in
isolation from the others. . . . The relationship
of humans to the earth requires all these modes of
inquiry, all these modes of expression. (236)
And Tu Wei-Ming writes: "Far-sighted ecologists, engineers,
economists, and earth scientists, intent on developing a
communal critical self-consciousness for 'saving spaceship
earth,' have made an appeal to poets, priests, artists, and
philosophers" (20).
14 Foucault xv. Of course, some people have never
found environmentalist discourse to make much sense; one
thinks here of the irreducibility of the differences
explored in John McPhee's Encounters with the Archdruid. in
which, as the title suggests, one of the protagonists seems
to find environmentalism utterly alien as a system of
thought.
15 To demonstrate the extent to which my approach is
indebted to Said, I quote the following from Orientalism,
and invite the reader to substitute, more or less freely,
"environment" for "Orient," "literary environmentalism" for
"Orientalism,11 and so on:
[I]t needs to be made clear about cultural
discourse and exchange within a culture that what
is commonly circulated by it is not "truth" but
representations. . . .
In any instance of at
least written language, there is no such thing as
a delivered presence, but a re-presence. or a
representation. The value, efficacy, strength,
apparent veracity of a statement about the Orient
therefore relies very little, and cannot instru
ment ally depend, on the Orient as such. On the
contrary, the written statement is a presence to
the reader by virtue of its having excluded,
displaced, made supererogatory any such "real
thing" as "the Orient." Thus all of Orientalism
stands forth and away from the Orient: that
Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the
West than on the Orient, and this sense is
directly indebted to various Western techniques of
representation that make the Orient visible,
clear, "there" in discourse about it. And these
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representations rely upon institutions,
traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of
understanding for their effects . . . " (21-22).

CHAPTER TWO
Acts of Environment

The discussion thus far has repeatedly suggested the
contingency of environmentalism's object, the environment.
The environment is never freely constructed but rather is
shaped by the needs that prompt its invocation and the
processes involved in its representation.

The environment

is first of all a word, an element in a discourse, and thus
"populated," as Mikhail Bakhtin has it, "with the intentions
of others" (294).

It is also a narrated fiction, and thus

shares formal properties common to all narrative.

Finally,

as a product of the imagination it is both limited and
enabled by specific psychological processes, the workings of
anxiety and desire.

I wish now to take up these matters of

etymology, typology, and psychology— all preparatory to
reading John Underhill's 1638 promotional pamphlet, Newes
from America, and Mary White Rowlandson's captivity
narrative, The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God, as
paradigmatic exercises of literary environmentalism at
specific and formative moments in American environmental
history.
Etymology
A root verb plus a suffix, "environment" once quite
straightforwardly denoted "the action of environing":
environment (OED).

But with the obsolescence of the verb

"to environ," meaning to "encircle" or "surround," this
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active sense has been lost, so that we no longer hear it the
way we do in nouns such as judgement and government— words
that still resonate with the senses of the judges who judge
and the governors who govern, and that immediately recall
the legal and political structures which empower those
judges and governors.

Even when we use such terms as mere

nouns, and despite the work of ideology to cast them as
natural and inevitable, we still sense in them their
constructedness, their historicity and mutability and
politicization.

Judgments and governments are easily seen

to be not merely found, but enunciated, made, and imposed—
products of human will and activity, backed up, in the final
analysis, by the specter of violence.
What remains of our sense of environment, by contrast,
is not any action but a simple thing, not a fiction that has
been made but a fact that has been discovered.

Thanks to a

nominalizing process that effaces both act and actor, we no
longer speak of what environs us, but of what our
environment is.

This is not a trivial distinction, for

restoring to environment the sense of its originary action
allows us to inquire into not only what environs us, but how
it came to do so, and by means of what agency— questions
crucial to the discussion that follows.
If, as the OED suggests, environment originates in
action, what is the nature of the act, and who is the actor?
Put another way, is there a concrete noun that can be cast
as both agent and grammatical subject in a simple sentence
directly describing this originary, performative sort of
environment?

The OED is of little help in disentangling

today's environment-as-noun from the earlier environment-asverb, circularly defining the former as "that which
environs."

This circle is not broken when the dictionary

attempts a definition-by-enumeration, by defining the
environment is "the objects or region surrounding anything,"
for this simply yokes the noun to a substitute verb,
surround, which though not obsolete is more or less
synonymous with environ.

This is a mere deferral that does

not solve but merely disguises the problem of the
definition's essential circularity.

It seems clear that

whatever the concrete entities enumerated by the dictionary,
they do not comprise environment-as-noun until and unless
they perform environment-as-action; we are no closer than
before to knowing what the environment is. in the absence of
such action— or, to put it in two different but related
ways, what ontological immanence or absolute presence it
possesses that allows us to utter it as a noun plain and
simple.
The way out of this circle, I believe, is to uncover
the agency at work in acts of environment.

We must shift

our attention from the merely grammatical subject— the
elusive environment-as-noun— to something whose agency is as
real in fact as we assume the environment to be in speech.
We need to focus on the speaker who is environed, on
precisely that element which, suggestively enough, is left
out of the dictionary definition.

Bearing in mind the

political valence of the question, the identity politics
implied by its plural pronoun, we need to stop asking what
the environment is, stop trying to enumerate its defining

elements, and ask instead, "How is it that these enumerated
elements have come to environ us?"

The answer lies in the

presumption of the presence o f , and ultimately in the act of
entry b y , the speakers who can sensibly say, "our
environment."

It is not any action on the part of our

surroundings that has made them our surroundings, but the
onset of and the continuation of our being here: a matter
not of ontology, but of politics and history.

The originary

and defining environment-as-action, to which environment-asnoun always points and from which, however remote, it is
logically inseparable, points in turn to specifiable acts of
entry and occupation.

It is these that account for our

being environed, and hence of "having" an "environment" that
we can, in an anthropocentric and self-effacing and
depoliticizing shorthand, deploy as a noun.
We speak of "the environment," of environment-as-noun,
as some sort of genuine (as opposed to merely grammatical)
agent that "environs" "us," native, conqueror, and immigrant
alike, as if all shared the same history of environment-asaction.

Why this strange construction in which fully

agentive human actors are grammatically cast as passive and
undifferentiated objects?

As noted above, when people first

enter a region they have not previously known and begin to
speak of it as their surroundings, the region itself has
done nothing in particular to metamorphose from terra
incognita to environment.
entry.

What precipitates environment is

Environment corresponds to, is the inverted

expression of, a simultaneous and logically complementary
penetration— a word I use now consciously to introduce an

analogy between environmental and sexual discourses. As a
variety of feminist critics have pointed out, coitus can be
thought of not only as a penetration but also as, say, an
incorporation (as above, the two actions can be thought of
as logically complementary), yet the hegemonic term is
nonetheless penetration, privileged precisely because it
foregrounds a dominating, masculine sexual agency.

Use of a

term such as incorporation, with its ascription of sexual
agency to the female, is proscribed by a phallic code that
effaces female sexuality generally.!

In its complementarity

to originary acts of penetration, environment is clearly
analogous to incorporation.

Yet within environmentalist

discourse, penetration is not foregrounded but effaced:
agency is ascribed exclusively to what is in fact its
inescapably passive correlate.

Given that this discourse is

otherwise unmistakably phallic, such a construction seems
odd indeed, until we notice that it has the rhetorical
effect of purging environmental discourse of that
discomfiting history of colonialist and capitalist
"penetrations"— discovery and exploration, conquest and
commodification, the now-nameable environment-as-action, the
"rape of the land"— which precipitated the Euro-American
environment in the first place, a history which, in the
performative sense I have been trying to develop here, may
now be viewed as that environment.

The code shifts

attention from palpable actions and intentions and focuses
it upon an abstraction which not only lacks agency and
presence, but whose very conjuring is a mystification.
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Typology
The OED defines the environment— in its contemporary
usage in the discourse of environmentalism, that is, as
environment-as-noun— as the "sum total" of "that which
environs; the objects or region surrounding anything."

I

dealt earlier with the implications of the environment's
putative totality; here I wish to focus on the definitional
primacy of the externality that is implied in this
definition, on the way the very idea of environment divides
the world into insides and outsides.

The terms here suggest

a way of theorizing "the environment" as it is represented
in and as it performs in the narratives of literary
environmentalism, specifically, in terms of Jurij Lotman's
theory of narrative plot typology.

According to Lotman, the

mythic narrative features at root just two types of
characters,
those who are mobile, who enjoy freedom with
respect to plot-space, who can change their place
in the structure of the artistic world and cross
the frontier, the basic topological feature of
this space, and those who are immobile, who rep
resent, in fact, a function of this space. . . .
[A] certain plot space is divided by a single
boundary into an external and an internal sphere,
and a single character has the opportunity to
cross that boundary. (167)
On the most fundamental narrative level there are, as Donna
Haraway puts it in adumbrating this passage, only two
characters: "the hero and the limit of his action or the
space through which he moves" (234).

Haraway deliberately

uses "he" in this formulation because the narrative hero is
the "creator of differences," the one who differentiates his
interior from his exterior and as such is "structurally
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male."

The female is "both the space for and the resistance

to" such marking (234).

She is "an element of plot-space,"

in the words now of Teresa de Lauretis, "a topos, a
resistance, matrix and matter" (44).
Though Lotman wrote specifically of myth, de Lauretis
of Hollywood cinema, and Haraway of the deep structure of
scientific thought and research, it is not hard to recognize
in this pre-gendered "matrix and matter" the environment as
generally represented: ahistorical, ontologically stable,
utterly objectified, like any other feminized object in
patriarchal discourse "fixed in the position of icon,
spectacle, the one looked at, in which the subject sees the
objectification of his action and subjectivity" (Haraway
234).

The "fixing" of the environment in this position will

prove to be a sort of environmental exploitation in its own
right— not the obvious sort of physical destruction that
might appear to motivate the environmentalist narrative, but
the more fundamental conceptual appropriation, by the very
locating of its boundaries and identification of its
properties, of environment as raw cultural material.

Like

"Woman," this material is not only endlessly reconstructed,
but proves to have as one of its primary attractions its
endless availability for such reconstruction, as a sort of
renewable resource for constructing the masculine subject on
both the individual and the national level, through the
shifting and proliferating narrative strategies of literary
environmentalism.
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Psychosociology
We have yet to recognize the full implication of
the mother as a primary landscape.
— Paul Shepard (98)
Environment's implicit differentiation between that
which surrounds and that which is surrounded, between self
and other, is a process not solely semantic and narrative,
but also psychosocial.

In examining the way that "America's

oldest and most cherished fantasy" has been that of "the
land as woman, the total female principal of gratificationenclosing r environing 1 the individual in an environment of
receptivity, repose, and painless and integral satisfaction"
(Lav 4), Annette Kolodny critiques the demarcation of the
(male) self and the environment in terms congenial to this
study, most particularly in the way her model contextualizes
the psychological and links it directly to the literary.

In

the seventeenth century, Kolodny demonstrates, such quasi
environment al images as "Eden, Paradise, the Golden Age, and
the idyllic garden" were recast in response to contingent
historical and social realities, "subsumed in the image of
an America promising material ease without labor or
hardship, as opposed to the grinding poverty of previous
European existence."

The New World promised the European

a resurrection of the lost state of innocence that
the adult abandons when he joins the world of
competitive self-assertion; and all this possible
because, at the deepest psychological level, the
move to America was experienced as the daily
reality of what has become its single dominating
metaphor: regression from the cares of adult life
and a return to the primal warmth of womb or
breast in a feminine landscape. And when America
finally produced a pastoral literature of her own,
that literature hailed the essential femininity of
the terrain in a way European pastoral had never
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dared, and, from the first, took its metaphors as
literal truths. (6)
Material history here becomes psychologically grounded
metaphor, which then underwrites a naturalized gendered
"reality."

Though there may be an "instinctual drive

embedded in" this fantasy of a feminine landscape (7), it is
determined not solely "by personal psychology" but also "by
social context" (Land xii).

What Kolodny terms "regression"

here in fact seems shaped less by some universal desire to
escape from adulthood than by a fully contextual wish to
escape the rigors of an early capitalism, with its
competition and poverty, and into a fantasized and idealized
precapitalist Eden.

But of course there could be no such

escape; Kolodny stresses that the dynamics of an
expansionist colonialism ensured that "the suppressed
infantile desires unleashed in the promise of a primal
garden were inevitably frustrated,"
thwarted by the equally pressing need to turn
nature into wealth. In a capital-accumulating
economy, this demanded, on the one hand,
competition . . . and, on the other, a willingness
to violate the very generosity that had once
promised an end to such patterns.2
The specifically psychological component of Kolodny's
model is worth elaborating in some detail.

This could be

done in several ways, but most useful to my purposes— not
least because literary environmentalism comes to rely so
much upon the gendered discourses of science— is the objectrelations approach taken by Evelyn Fox Keller in her
analysis of the scientific construction of nature.

For the

infant, Keller writes, "[b]oundaries have not yet been drawn
to distinguish the child's internal from external
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environment" (81).

At this early time, the external

environment consists "primarily" of the mother, who is
"experienced as an extension of the child" until, via the
experiential stages outlined by Jean Piaget, the child
"learns to distinguish between self and other, between
subject and object."

This ability to perceive self as

separate from environment in turn "allows for the
recognition of an external reality to which the child can
relate— at first magically, and ultimately objectively."

(I

am using "environment" here as Keller uses it, to refer
generally to the "not-me" of the developing subject, rather
than to the more specific, operationally defined environment
of environmentalist discourse.)
This process, "fraught with intense emotional
conflict," is often described teleologically as
"development," but in fact does not lead unambiguously from
an inferior state to a superior one, since
along with the emergence of the mother as a
separate being comes the child's painful recog
nition of his/her own separate existence. Anxiety
is unleashed, and longing is born. . . . Out of
the demarcation between self and mother arises a
longing to undo that differentiation, an urge to
reestablish the original unity. At the same time,
there is also a growing enjoyment of autonomy,
which itself comes to feel threatened by the lure
of an earlier state. (81)
Maturity in this model is not achieved by attaining the
highest possible level of autonomy, but by successfully
negotiating the contradictory forces of autonomy and desire,
by becoming "sufficiently secure to permit momentary
relaxation of the boundary" between self and other (82).
This is the final but difficult step "of reintroducing
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ambiguity into one's relation to the world" (82-83).
This ambiguity, this "blurring of the boundary between
subject and object," inevitably "tend[s] to be associated
with the feminine" (87).

Keller quotes Hans Loewald:

Against the threatening possibility of remaining
in or sinking back into the structureless unity
from which the ego emerged, stands the powerful
paternal force.
. . . While the primary
narcissistic identity with the mother forever
constitutes the deepest unconscious origin and
structural layer of ego and reality . . . this
primary identity is also the source of the deepest
dread, which promotes, in identification with the
father, the ego's progressive differentiation and
structuralization of reality. (86-87)
Thus in addition to the familiar gendering of the
environment itself as feminine, this model predicts a
gendering of the ways of relating to that environment.

For

the masculine subject especially, the already difficult step
of "reintroducing ambiguity into one's relation to the
world" is made more difficult to the extent that it requires
a voluntary assumption of gender ambiguity in a society that
compels

gender clarity.

As we will see more specificallyin

my discussion of John James

Audubon

and James Fenimore

Cooper, relating to nature becomes a matter of gender
politics.
In the early stages of development, the difficulty of
moving from unity to autonomy is eased by an intermediary
between self and other that the British psychoanalyst D. W.
Winnicott terms the "transitional object."
example is the baby's blanket.)

(Winnicott's

As a signifier, this

transitional object is unmotivated, that is, it does not
intrinsically signify the mother, but does so only because
such a meaning has somehow been assigned to it, as a trope
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in the fluid signifying system of the maturing child.
Though the blanket itself is eventually given up, it is
neither forgotten nor repressed, as Winnicott stresses, but
rather "loses meaning" (5).

It simply ceases to signify, as

other objects displace it in a mediative system that changes
but continues unabated, since the need for mediation never
disappears.

The "transitional phenomena," in this model,

"become diffused . . . spread out over the whole
intermediate territory between 'inner psychic reality' and
'the external world as perceived by two persons in common,'
that is to say, over the whole cultural field" (5).
At least part of the tremendous power of the "natural"
environment to signify within the cultural field owes to its
continuing ability, as trope rather than "real" object, to
negotiate the tense boundary between interdependence and
autonomy.

That it will, as the "natural" portion of

Winnicott's cultural field, be strongly gendered is almost
inevitable, since (regardless of the specific shape it takes
as signifier) its raison d'etre, its collective and earliest
signified, remains the mother.

This environment-as-

transitional-object is not the "reality" of the world whose
welfare is ostensibly environmentalism's concern, no more
than the blanket is the mother.

It is a construct serving

not its own preservation but psychosociological need.
How can any of this help us read environment in a
specific historical and textual instance?

The theoretical

discussion suggests that literary environmentalism will
represent nominal environments via the effacement of
performed environments, specifically, via the misnaming of
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penetration as environment.

Such representations will

collapse time and action into space and place, reducing the
complexities and politics of the historical to the compara
tive simplicity and apparent neutrality of the geographical.
In the process, they will also mark off a feminized
narrative space within which a masculinized subject can
recognize, to repeat Haraway's formulation, "his action and
subjectivity."

Finally, as displaced object of desire, as

that whose delimitation both produces the self and threatens
to subsume it, this putatively agentive and feminine space
will be ambiguously constructed, something toward which the
subject is drawn yet also fears.
John Underhill's 1638 pamphlet Newes from America
illustrates these processes so well that it is almost
paradigmatic.

As a description of both the Pequot War and

the Connecticut landscape, it exemplifies the collapsing of
an antecedent environment-as-action onto environment-asnoun, in the process revealing the origins of a gendered and
racialized trope of landscape that will be accessed over and
over again in American literary environmentalism.
Warre-like Proceedings and Speciall Places
We know today— indeed it was known in 1876, but was
hushed up— that George Armstrong Custer and his men were not
ambushed at the Little Bighorn.

They were, however, quite

literally and fatally environed, and I think Walt Whitman's
use of the term in his "Death-Sonnet for Custer" is
instructive, invoking as it does the older and explicitly
military sense of environment even as it silences the
activity of history into the passivity of landscape— into

the "wild ravines" and "lonesome stretches" that would
eventually be canonized in the National Park system.

The

enduring fascination with Custer's "fatal environment," as
Richard Slotkin has argued, owes not only to the way it
rattled an apparently smug nation, but also to its apparent
reification of the notion of a powerful Native American
people whose renewed "aggression" could rationalize the
continuing seizure of their lands.

Though by far the best

known, the Custer myth was not the first to accomplish this
self-serving transformation of history into landscape-text.
The pattern had been set more than two centuries earlier, in
the Pequot War of 1637.
Originating in the desire of British colonists for
Pequot territory in what is now Connecticut, this conflict's
casus belli was a series of reciprocal kidnappings, murders,
and skirmishes involving English and Dutch colonists as well
as Pequot, Niantic, and Narragansett Indians— though it was
specifically against the Pequots that the General Court of
Massachusetts declared war.

An expeditionary force was

quickly drawn up, consisting of approximately a hundred
Englishmen and a backup force of Mohegans and Narragansetts,
led by John Mason and John Underhill.

This expedition

sailed out of Saybrook and cruised eastward along the coast
toward the Pequots' fortified village on the Mystic River.
Instead of attacking directly, the colonial force sailed
right on by to the east, "deluding" the Pequot warriors in a
way that "bred in them a securitie" (Underhill 36).

The

Puritan force then turned northward into Narragansett Bay,
landed secretly, and marched south and west overland— in

order, as Mason wrote, to "come upon their Backs" (2) and
storm the lightly guarded fort where the Pequot women,
children, and other noncombatants had been sequestered.
Completely fooled by these tactics, the Pequot guards were
still asleep when the Englishmen attacked at dawn, Mason at
one entrance of the fort and Underhill at the other.

Waking

amidst the slaughter, the Indians recovered quickly and
began to drive the Puritans back.

Mason and Underhill, at

opposite entrances to the-village, then set fire to the
wigwams and retreated outside, watching as the fires, "both
meeting in the centre of the fort, blazed most terribly, and
burnt all in the space of halfe an houre . . . many were
burnt in the Fort, both men, women, and children" (Underhill
39).

The fort had held at least four hundred people, and

Underhill noted that "so many soules lie gasping on the
ground so thicke in some places, that you could hardly passe
along" (39-40).

Those who did manage to escape the fire

were picked off by the soldiers outside, and by Underhill's
estimate, not more than five got out alive.

All but broken

after this massacre, the remaining Connecticut Pequots were
quickly dispersed, captured, or killed, and English
colonists immediately began occupying their newly conquered
territory.3
For a "civilized" author writing for a "civilized"
audience, the chronicling of such "savage" events posed an
obvious problem.

As Underhill summed it up: "It may bee

demanded, Why should you be so furious? (as some have said)
should not Christians have more mercy and compassion?" (40).
Both Mason and Underhill, in their separate accounts of the
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war, respond with a similar rhetorical strategy, a
displacement of agency and responsibility that was crude but
well calculated to satisfy a Puritan audience: "God was
above them," wrote Mason of the Pequots, "making them as a
fiery Oven . . .

Thus did the Lord judge among the Heathen,

filling the Place with dead Bodies!" (9-10).

The massacre

was not the Puritans' own work, but "the LORD'S DOINGS"
(14).

Both authors repeatedly cast themselves and their men

as passive, mere "feeble instruments" in the hands of God,
contrasting their own passivity against the fictional agency
of the victims, whose putative actions are deemed to justify
both the magnitude and the indiscriminacy of the slaughter:
[W]hen a people is growne to such a height of
bloude, and sinne against God and man, and all
confederates in the action, there hee hath no
respect to persons, but harrowes them, and sawes
them, and puts them to the sword, and the most
terriblest death that may bee: sometimes the
Scripture declareth women and children must perish
with their parents. (Underhill 40)
The rhetoric here displaces agency onto an undifferentiated
Other ("all confederates in the action"), shifting
responsibility for the action onto God and mystifying any
worldly motives for the massacre.

The discourse bonds

action with thing in an obfuscating manner that will prove
characteristic of later literary environmentalism.

The

Puritans, writes Mason, "got not the Land in Possession by
their own Sword," but rather because the "LORD was pleased
to smite our Enemies .

.

.

an Inheritance" (front.; 21).

and to give us their Land for
Underhill makes the same

linkage, promising the reader in the very first sentence of
his own account that he will "performe these two things,
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first give a true narration, of the warre-like proceedings
that hath been in New England these two years past," and
second "discover to the Reader divers places in New England,
that would afford speciall accommodations to such persons as
will Plant upon them."

He immediately reiterates: in the

"Relation of our warre-like proceedings" he will "interweave
the speciall places fit for New Plantations. with their
description" (1).

He will entangle "proceedings" and

"places," action and noun, the two facets whose interweaving
it was our purpose, in the etymological discussion above, to
disentangle.

With events and their narration thus beginning

to be subsumed into place and its description, Underhill
writes precisely of "the scenic Connecticut countryside"
(Nelson 12)— of the "scene" of history and aesthetic
attraction both, of "scenery" in the dual sense that still
reverberates confusedly in the discourse of environment.
The Dangers that Hedge It About
Underhill's text is particularly instructive in the way
it conflates event and place in an explicitly feminized
landscape that visibly encodes its narrative and
psychological groundings.

This is most evident in the map

(figure 6) included in Newes from America, immediately after
the title page, as a sort of preface to the verbal text
following it.

This figure's sexual symbolism has been ably

analyzed by Anne Kibbey, who first noted both that the
"illustration of the Puritan men attacking the Pequot fort
is also a drawing of a vagina" and that the massacre itself
"was the culminating fusion of sexuality and violence,"
closely linked to the concurrent persecution of Anne

Fig. 6. "A culminating fusion of sexuality and violence."
From John Underhill, Newes from America (London: Peter Cole,
1638): frontispiece.
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Hutchinson (110).

What remains to be discussed is the way

the figure's houses and palisades have been drawn to
resemble teeth, which is to say, the use the figure makes of
the motif of the vagina dentata.
Found in one form or another in the mythology of many
cultures,4

this image, with its recasting of penetration as

an aggressive incorporation, its projection of male sexual
violence onto a castrating female sexual "appetite," bears
psychological and cultural overtones significant to our
understanding of gender, violence, and the American
environment.

Kibbey argues that Underhill's drawing

signifies in a fashion that is "subverbal" and "dissociated
from language" (110), expressing not only its manifest
content but also the very degree of its repression, the
degree to which it is verbally inexpressible.

I suggest

here that the content itself, the particular metanarrative
inscribed by the drawing upon the paradigmatic environment
of Mystic, is a version of the myth of the culture-hero
known as Toothbreaker.

One version of this story describes

how ”[t]he first men in the world were unable to have sexual
relationship^] with their wives until the culture hero
broke the teeth of the women's vaginas."5

Whether it is the

persecuted Anne Hutchinson or the pictorially feminized
Pequot Indians, violence and misogyny— the woman palizado,
or beaten, as Underhill labels her on the map— is claimed as
a prerequisite to the establishment of the Puritan faith in
the New World.

His mission at Mystic being to secure the

conditions for a new establishment of Puritan culture,
Underhill casts himself as Toothbreaker: "Hear Entters
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Captayne Underhill," the sexual pun being not just about
penetration but what is perceived as the foundational act of
begetting culture upon nature, an act performed in faithful
Aristotelian style by the self-defining masculine subject
upon a feminine environment.
Parallelling this narrative model of the vagina dentata
motif is a psychological model, outlined by the psycho
analyst and critic Marie Bonaparte in her reading of Edgar
Allan Poe's novel, Berenice.

Bonaparte, "elaborating a

remark by Freud" in light of Poe's peculiar anxieties,
stresses
the equation of mouth and vagina and considers the
notion of the vagina dentata and its accompanying
threat as 'a factor with roots deep in infantile
experience.' At first it was the infant who
displayed aggressive, i.e., occasionally biting
behavior towards his [sic] mother's breast. Later
it is the adult who, due to a sense of guilt
stemming from his infantile behavior, feels
threatened by a mother who intends to castrate
him. (Malotki 206)
Vagina dentata imagery is thus "interpreted as a projection
of the unconscious anxiety of castration and is associated
with male impotence" (206).

Bonaparte characterizes Poe’s

sexuality as an irreducible complex of love and hate, "both
sadistic destruction and necrophilia" (218), as a splitting
between action and object, violence toward and yearning for
the same thing, destruction and nostalgia— certainly
familiar pairings in both environmentalist and colonialist
discourse.
Whether in the "subverbal" language of Underhill's map
or the displaced anxieties of Poe's character Egaeus, "the
danger of sexuality, the punishment that threatens all who
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yield," finds expression in an obsession with teeth,
specifically in
the notion of the female vagina being furnished
with teeth, and thus a source of danger in being
able to bite and castrate. . . . when Egaeus
yields to the morbid impulse to draw Berenice's
teeth, he yields both to the yearning for the
mother's organ and to be revenged upon it, since
the dangers that hedge it about make him sexually
avoid all women as too menacing. His act is
therefore a sort of retributive castration
inflicted on the mother whom he loves, and yet
hates. (Bonaparte 218)
This oedipality finds its echo in the feminized landscape
whose penetration and occupation are keenly desired but
threatened by, in Bonaparte's words, "the dangers that hedge
it about."

The writer of the colonialist environment must

work to maintain this love and this hatred in some
psychologically tenable relation, whether crudely, as in
Underhill's tale of "warre-like proceedings" and "speciall
places," or with the greater sophistication of later
environmental narratives.
This Wilderness Condition: Mary Rowlandson's Narrative
Immediately after setting foot on the soil of "New
England," William Bradford described that contested
territory as "a hidious and desolate wildernes," drawing in
his account upon the biblical narrative of the Forty Years'
Wandering and the conquest of Canaan, invoking one invasion
to authorize another.

Spinning out this conceit in his

History of Plymouth Plantation. Bradford laments that his
own people could not "as it were, goe up to the tope of
Pisgah, to vew from this willdernes a more goodly cuntrie."
Not only was there no such mountain near Plymouth, there was
no such "goodly cuntrie" to see from it.

There was nothing,
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Bradford makes clear, but wilderness.

More accurately, that

"nothing" was the wilderness, for the term as he is using it
refers not to any palpable reality, but quite pointedly to
an absence, to absence itself.

This wilderness is

perfunctorily described as full of "wild beasts and willd
men," but when Bradford's description shifts from such stock
generalities to the concrete and specific, it necessarily
reverts to the negative: "they had now no freinds to
Wellcome them, nor inns to entertaine or refresh their
weatherbeaten bodys, no houses or much less townes to repair
too" (96).

It is the same emptiness that John Eliot would

describe as the "wilderness where nothing appeareth but hard
labor and wants" (qtd. in Nash 26), a place devoid of
materiality and signification, where nothing appeareth and
whose only positivity is its provocation of human action:
"labor" engendered by "wants," the latter term being
readable as absence and as wish, as the machinery of desire.
This is precisely the wilderness of that earliest of
American frontier classics, Mary Rowlandson's 1682 captivity
narrative The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God.

It is a

wilderness posited almost exclusively by circumlocution, in
the unmistakeable language of lack:
[M]y thoughts ran upon my losses and sad bereaved
condition. All was gone, my husband gone . . . my
children gone, my relations and friends gone, our
house and home and all our comforts within doors,
and without, all was gone (except my life) and I
knew not but the next moment that might go too.
(326)
We had husband and father, and children, and
sisters, and friends, and relations, and house,
and home, and many comforts of this life: but now
we may say, as Job, "Naked I came out of mv
mother's womb, and naked shall I return." (336)
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The wilderness is where Rowlandson has "no Christian friend
near" (327), where she loses her child— which loss, rather
than any positive characteristic of her physical
surroundings, renders her in "this wilderness condition"
(329).

It is never the sort of landscape that subsequent

travelers might recognize by her descriptions of it; it is
precisely "the wilderness where there was nothing to be
seen" (359).
The terror of this defining blankness can be more fully
appreciated in terms of the Puritan habit of grounding both
personal experience and social order in a pervasive
textuality, in the belief that there was nothing, as
Adrienne Rich put it, "so trivial that it could not speak a
divine message."

The high stakes and uncertainty of

salvation made the Puritans eager and anxious readers of
their surroundings, a people for whom even the "piecemeal
thoughts of a woman stirring her pot" were "clues to her
'justification' in Christ" (x).

Such readerly introspection

played a key role in Puritan ideology and governance, even
during the best of times, and in the aftermath of a
tremendous public trauma such as King Philip's Wax it was
partly through acts of revision, a reassignment of meanings
in this saturating social text, that "Puritanism could once
again govern, by virtue of explanatory cogency, the entire
range of human experience" (Breitweiser 8).
There was nothing in the Puritan universe that did not,
or at least could not, signify.
interpretive code?

But by virtue of what

Like any reader confronted with a

seemingly unreadable text, Rowlandson's mission in the
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•wilderness becomes a hermeneutic one, that of creating and
justifying an interpretive stance and practice.

Rich quotes

Anne Bradstreet on the importance and difficulty of such a
mission:
[A]dmit this be the true God whom we worship, and
that be his word, yet why may not the Popish
religion be the right? They have the same God,
the same Christ, the same word: they only
interpret it one way, we another." (xi)
For the seventeenth-century Puritan, the difficulty here is
not just individual and idiosyncratic, but communal and
doctrinal.

It is not merely the justification of the

individual in Christ that was at stake, that demanded
closure; the justification of the "wilderness errand" itself
demanded not polysemy but a particular and authoritative
interpretation, for "if Archbishop Laud and the Hierarchists
back in England were right," as Rich put it, "what was one
doing, after all, on that stretch of intemperate coast?"
(xi).
What, indeed, was one doing there?

For the captive

Mary Rowlandson, frightened, hungry, freezing, and bereaved,
that question would have taken on an even greater urgency,
and she would by habit have attempted to read her surround
ings, her wilderness environment, in search of an answer.
As she herself put it, her "earnest and unfeigned desire"
was for a "token" or "sign" (329-330)— but that was
precisely what the wilderness could not, by definition,
provide.
It was when confronted with this sort of "vast
blankness," writes Nash of the New England coast's earliest
white settlers, that "couraged failed and imagination

multiplied fears" (26).

And it is indeed the imagination

that populates the otherwise empty Puritan wilderness, that
makes it teem, if not with tangible rivers and mountains and
trees, at least with the innumerable "troubles" and "diffi
culties" and "afflictions" (Rowlandson 2) that make it as
allegorical as the landscapes of Pilgrim's Progress or the
Inferno— in Rowlandson's words, a "lively resemblance of
Hell" (326), the "valley of the shadow of death" (363), a
"horrible pit" (364)— an inscription of the "real" landscape
of New England into an imported cultural landscape.

More

particularly, Rowlandson's narrative can be read (as I read
that of John Underhill) as an inscription of the
psychosexual dynamics of environment as manifested at a
particular historical moment, in this case King Philip's War.
Rowlandson's task differed somewhat from that faced by
Underhill in chronicling the events at Mystic.

Where the

Pequot War was naked white aggression, the events of 1675-76
constituted a genuine and substantial native resistance— the
most effective of the entire colonial period.

Philip's

Wampanoags, the Narragansetts, and other allied tribes
attacked some ninety settlements, completely destroying
twelve of them and killing several thousand colonists.

In

proportion to the white population of the time, it was the
worst war in Anglo-American history, claiming the lives of
one in sixteen colonial combatants and severely disrupting
commerce and trade.

To many back in England it called into

question the viability of the colonial endeavor itself.6
The defeat of the Indians in 1676 helped allay such
doubts.

But the psychological specter of environment, which
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this war may be said to have embodied, would continue to
haunt representations of the event.

Where John Underhill

had employed the trope of the toothed vagina to project
white penetration and aggression onto a feminized and
potentially castrating Indian environment, cartographically
figured as vagina dentata, Puritan accounts of King Philip's
War tended to signify the native threat via an even more
active and specific imagery, quite freely characterizing the
conflict in terms of an improper and unrestrained female
sexuality that threatened masculine power, as in this
description of how King Philip cemented his "conspiracy":
[H]is first Errand is to a Squaw Sachem (i.e. a
Woman Prince, or Queen) who is the Widow of a
Brother to King Philip, deceased, he promising her
great rewards if she would joyn with him in this
Conspiracy, (for she is as Potent a Prince as any
round about her, and hath as much Corn, Land, and
Men, at her Command) she willingly consented, and
was much more forward in the Design, and had
greater Success than King Philip himself. (Present
State [1])
This Indian queen— named only by the "unnatural" conjunction
of her sex and her power ("Squaw Sachem," "Woman Prince")—
at once genders and demonizes the resisting native.

It is

utterly "vain," as we read elsewhere, "to expect any thing
but the most barbarous usages from such a people amongst
whom the most milde and gentle sex delight in cruelties, and
have utterly abandoned at once the two proper Virtues of
Womankinde, Pity and Modesty."

The castration anxiety

underlying this construct is at times explicit.

What

Underhill's map had merely implied is in this account
performed:
[T]wo men coming from Malbury to Sudbury, were set
upon in the Woods by a Great Number of Indian
Women. armed with clubs, pieces of Swords, and the
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like, who by their numbers having over-mastered
the two poor Travellers, that had nothing but
small sticks to defend themselves with, beat out
their brains, and cut off their privy members,
which they carried away with them in triumph. (New
and Further 4)
Thus does the motif of the vagina dentata reappear in
the guise of penis captivus.

I wish now to read The

Soveraiantv and Goodness of God in terms of the loss and
retrieval of the phallus— of what would have been deemed Mr.
Rowlandson's, of Mrs. Rowlandson as she had functioned for
her husband in Lancaster society.

He had been the parish's

first minister, while she was the daughter of the village's
wealthiest resident and largest landholder.

She thus

"completes" him not only sexually but socially and
economically, and what is held captive is, among other
things, the status and economic power that he had gained
through her.

Cotton Mather described the situation thus:

Mr. Rowlandson (the faithful Pastor of the Church
there) had his House, Goods, Books, all burned;
his Wife and all his Children led away Captive
before the Enemy. Himself (as God would have it)
was not at home, whence his own person was
delivered, which otherwise (without a Miracle)
would have been endangered, (qtd. in Howe 92)
Mary Rowlandson's captivity here becomes just one loss,
among others, suffered by her husband.

This loss in turn

stands in for that unnamed loss which would have presumably
been inflicted upon his own person, with the bodily imagery
of an endangered "person" subtly but continually figuring
captivity of the wife as potential castration of the
husband.
Predictably, then, the captive narrator functions to
"shelter the masculine covenant" (Howe 97).

This function

becomes clearer after the Third Remove, when Rowlandson
comes into possession of a plundered bible.

This is a

crucial turning point in the story, and I would suggest that
part of the suspense now centers on the return of not just
Rowlandson but of the bible itself.

It becomes a narrative

of the captivity of the sacred word, and it is this primal
word, injected where previously there was none, that begins
the transformation of what had been "an unmarked
Christianography" (99) into the sort of legible wilderness
we will find in The Last of the Mohicans.

In this view,

Rowlandson functions not as independent writing subject but
as bearer of the phallus, a writer by proxy, shepherding the
logos through an as-yet uncoded space.
Rowlandson begins her sojourn in a wilderness like that
described by Bradford, a wilderness that is no positive
landscape at all but a condition, the mere site of her
bewilderment.

It is a place where she literally does not

know how to respond or what to do, even with her most basic
emotions: "Although I had met with so much affliction, and
my heart was many times ready to break, yet could I not shed
one tear in their sight: but rather had been all this while
in a maze, and like one astonished" (336).

Trapped where

there are no signs, Rowlandson longs for one.

Her "earnest

and unfeigned desire" is for nothing more than a "token," a
"sign" (329-330).
signify?

But how can the wilderness be made to

It is the bible that now, like the jar in

Tennessee, begins to systematize and encode the space around
it.

Once Rowlandson is able to advert to this text, she can

alleviate her bewilderment.

Her account up to this point
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has offered absolutely no description of the landscape as a
presence, but that landscape now becomes, in lockstep with a
mediating and authorizing scriptural gloss, the object of a
recognizeable description:
[QJuickly we came to wade over the river, and
passed some tiresome and wearisome hills. One
hill was so steep that I was fain to creep up upon
my knees, and to hold by the twiggs and bushes to
keep myself from falling backward. My head also
was so light that I usually reeled as I went, but
I hope all these wearisome steps that I have taken
are but a forewarning to me of heavenly rest.
"I
know, O Lord, that thy judgements are right, and
that Thou in faithfulness hast afflicted me,"
Psalm 119:75. (340)
For virtually every description of this nascent geography,
Rowlandson evokes a biblical landscape to match.

To read

and describe the landscape, she must simultaneously read her
Bible, in which the real landscape is to be found— the real
landscape of which the merely physical landscape through
which she travels is but a type, a comparatively
inconsequential manifestation:
We began this remove with wading over Baquag
river: the water was up to the knees, and the
stream very swift, and so cold that I thought it
would have cut me in sunder. . . . [B]ut in my
distress the Lord gave me experience of the truth,
and goodness of that promise, Iaiah 43:2. When
thou passest through the waters, I will be with
thee, and through the rivers, they shall not
overflow thee. (348)
At last, after many weary steps, I saw Wachusett
hills, but many miles off. Then we came to a
great swamp, through which we travelled, up to the
knees, in mud and water. . . .
I thought I should
have sunk down at last, and never gat out; but I
may say, as in Psalm 94:18, When mv foot slipped,
thv mercy. 0 Lord, held me u p . (350-351)
Here, perhaps, is the beginning of an environmental
interpretation, of the enlistment of the physical landscape
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in a legitimating master narrative— the initial writing of a
landscape that the Euro-American would be able to read in
order to justify her presence within that landscape.

And

while from a modern standpoint it may seem difficult to view
The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God as "nature writing” or
"environmental literature," it is nonetheless important to
our understanding of those genres because it so clearly
thematizes the gendered and historically responsive
practices that this study terms literary environmentalism.
The Wilderness Where There Was Nothing to Be Seen
Mary Rowlandson saw what she did not see said
what she did not say.
—

Susan Howe (128)

Rowlandson's early characterization of wilderness-asabsence sounds like nothing so much as the Western discourse
of "Woman," that fictional sex which, as Luce Irigaray put
it, "is not one," which "has nothing to show" and whose
"sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to see"
(352).

Wilderness and Woman are both predicated on their

own negation, on a refusal to "see" them as anything but
what they are not.

In the first instance this is

accomplished by means of a profoundly anti-ecological vision
of a disorderly nature and an ethnocentric dismissal of
native culture qua culture, in the second via androcentric
hierarchies in which "[f]emale sexuality has always been
conceptualized on the basis of masculine parameters" (350).
Also negated in each case is an entire realm of speech and
writing.

Rowlandson repeatedly posits wilderness as the

site of a sort of un-speech, an unintelligible "din," the
"noise and hooping" (330) of a feminized native Other.
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Shifting and confusing, as unreadable as the wilderness in
which it is found and of which it is, really, just another
"bewildering" component, this is the speech of those who are
"unstable" and "mad" (352), the complete antithesis of a
trustworthy speech: "there is not one of them that makes the
least conscience of speaking the truth" (342), "[s]o like
were these barbarous creatures to him who was a liar from
the beginning" (344).
Thus figured as predating the Fall and the onset of the
Law— "a liar from the beginning"— this is a surviving (hence
also a resisting) speech, one that has not yet, if I may
make explicit now the analogy I have been drawing with
ecriture feminine by citing the words of Helene Cixous, been
"called in by the cops of the signifier."

Rowlandson's

typologizing wilderness discourse functions to bring this
wild din "into the line of order," assigning each of its
elements "to a precise place in the chain that's always
formed for a privileged signifier," piecing it "to the
string which leads back, if not to the Name-of-the-Father"
then, in a "twist" that would seem to apply to the activity
of the bible-toting female captive, "to the place of the
phal1ic-mother" (347).
In thus encoding what had previously been defined as
uncoded and indescribeable, Rowlandson is not so much
objectively describing the wilderness as she is beginning to
replace it with something else, with a new discursive
formation that will be called (and still is called) by the
same name, but whose effects will prove entirely different.
As a crucial term in the dialectic of civilization and
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savagery, wilderness is to be subjected to what Cixous terms
the "phallologocentric sublation" (341), canceled but also
preserved and elevated within a larger synthesis.
Wilderness as the disorienting, chaotic, and inexplicable is
to be sublated into a reified hueristic, an unabashedly
explanatory construct.7
In this new discourse, wilderness becomes less and less
Other and more and more "at one with the phallocentric
tradition" (Cixous 337).

It is in this sense no longer

"wilderness" at all, and the ease with which it can continue
to pass under the same name may owe in part to the
deployment of the phallic mother to reinscribe it— just
another instance, perhaps, of the phallocracy deploying
women "to mobilize their immense strength against
themselves," to be the "executants" of men's "virile needs"
(336).

Rowlandson is enlisted as the mystifying agent of a

new literary environmentalism, as the nominal agent through
which patriarchy apostrophizes the wilderness with a version
of Cixous's facetious admonition: "Hold still, we're going
to do your portrait, so that you can begin looking like it
right away" (347).
If this emerging literary-environmentalist discourse is
in this way sublative, writing and elevating wilderness only
by simultaneously negating and misnaming it, how can it be
thought of as the discursive vehicle for a future wilderness
preservation?

What kind of preservation is it that is thus

predicated on a cancellation?

Environmentalism would indeed

later preserve landscapes physically more or less unaltered,
but only by means of an incessant and increasingly
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institutionalized teaching and stabilizing of what those
landscapes mean, a radical alteration of the destabilizing
character that would once have defined those lands as
wilderness.
Is there, perhaps, an alternative to this preservation
that is simultaneously an erasure, a possibility for a
preservation that would mean more than simply keeping an
expanse of land untrammeled, a praxis that would include
such preservation but also exceed it, challenging rather
than reinforcing the codes that negate the earlier notion of
the "wild"?

Taking my cue from Cixous ’s reference to the

unconscious as "that other limitless country," "the place
where the repressed manage to stay alive" (337), I suggest
that such a praxis would take seriously the old idea of
wilderness as both a geographical place and a psychic and
cultural condition while refusing the earlier characterizing
of wilderness as lack.

It would be analagous to an ecriture

feminine. a writing that "un-thinks" the negating
phallogocentric order (339), that breaks the codes which
otherwise reign in the wild and make it speak for something
else.

It would preserve wilderness as difference rather

than alienating it from its own wildness and fashioning it
into a mystified outlier of civilization.

Reconstructed in

a discourse that is, in Irigaray's words, "somewhat mad from
the standpoint of reason" and "inaudible for whoever listens
. . . with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in
hand" (353), this wilderness would be as foreign to a modern
environmentalist as today's "environment" or "global
ecology" might have been to a seventeenth-century Puritan.

In the particular case of Mary Rowlandson, this other
wilderness writing would be the expression of a thoroughly
disoriented body rather than a putatively satisfied soul, a
writing from a wilderness experienced as difference.

For

Rowlandson, certainly, the conditions for such a writing
were in place, with the tremendous emotional disruption of
her losses and captivity recalling what Cixous speaks of as
the moment when a feminine writing becomes possible, "that
radical mutation of things brought on by a material upheaval
when every structure is for a moment thrown off balance and
an ephemeral wildness sweeps order away" (337).
Rowlandson's experience must have palpably outstripped
the language in which she was constrained to relate it, and
Mitchell Breitwieser has remarked on the ubiquitous and
irreducible excess in her narrative, about how, in "a kind
of ideological misfire," thoughts "come forward that do not
reduce entirely to exemplary status" (8).

Instead,

Rowlandson repeatedly encounters "intensities of memory that
resist rather than aid exemplary reduction," and such
"intrusive dissonances" contribute to a "ruination of
meaning that allows various anomalous glimpses" of
"interdicted subjective presences otherwise almost
completely absent from the seventeenth-century New England
archive" (9).

Refusing or unable to ignore completely what

"experience did to comprehension" (12), her text "breaks
through or outdistances her own and her culture's dominant
means of representation" (10) to become "a transcription of
reality's astonishing and at least discursively hurtful
impact on systems of coherent representation" (11).

This excess is foregrounded in the Narrative at least
partly because of the conjunction of particular cultural and
historical imperatives.

There was, for example, the

political necessity, always present but heightened following
King Philip's War, of reassuring those who doubted the
wisdom of the colonial enterprise.

Counterposed to this was

the theological necessity of producing and maintaining that
state of acute anxiety over salvation so central to New
England Puritanism.

The first of these demanded a certain

closure in the interpretation of the local history and
geography, while the second thrived in a textual atmosphere
of polysemy and deferral in which one could read those
places and events incessantly, but could never be sure of
their meaning, any more than one could be sure of one's own
election.

It is in general difficult enough for texts to

smooth over what Lukacs has called the "discrepancy between
intention and performance" (qtd. in Breitwieser 13); in
Rowlandson's Narrative, the intentions themselves operate at
cross-purposes.

The text repeatedly arrives at impasses

created by the dichotomies that structure it, oppositions
between anxiety and reassurance, deferral and closure, the
personal and the political, the individual and the communal,
alienation and integration, experience and ideology, and
(Breitwieser's particular topic) grieving and exemplifi
cation.
Thus as Rowlandson tries to fit her experience into the
dominant discourse she finds that discourse's language, with
its typological conventions, to be woefully inadequate.

She

encounters irreducible dichotomies that repeatedly drive her
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narrative into a mode of de-pense, of un-thinking a
totalizing and communalizing framework of representation
unable to do justice to her specific experience and her
personal, psychological need.

The result is a double edge

that is at times haunting:
I can remember the time, when I used to sleep
quietly without workings in my thoughts, whole
nights together, but now it is other ways with me.
When all are fast about me, and no eye open, but
His who ever waketh, my thoughts are upon things
past . . .
I remember in the night season, how
the other day I was in the midst of thousands of
enemies, and nothing but death before me: it is
then hard work to persuade myself, that ever I
should be satisfied with bread again. But now we
are fed with the finest of the wheat, and, as I
may say, with honey out of the rock: instead of
the husk, we have the fatted calf: the thoughts of
these things in the particulars of them, and of
the love and goodness of God towards us, make it
true of me, what David said of himself, Psalms
6.6. I watered my couch with mv tears. Oh! the
wonderful power of God that mine eyes have seen,
affording matter enough for my thoughts to run in,
that when others are sleeping mine are weeping.
(365)
Audible in this passage are the resistances and refusals
that keep open the possibility of a "wildness" which her
narrative functions more generally to foreclose.

It

foregrounds, first of all, Rowlandson's continuing
alienation rather than her integration into the communal:
while the others are sleeping, she is weeping.

Mentioning

"God's goodness to us" but stressing what is "true of me."
it relativizes even as it universalizes, refusing, finally,
to subserve personal experience to political exemplification.
In a mode that is decidedly "un-thinking," Rowlandson
posits in this passage a temporal frame that juxtaposes the
elements of experience and exemplification, yoking them

together in ways that highlight their irreducibility.

She

does not assign her bewilderment and pain to some distant
past, which would allow her to deploy the immediate present
as a separate and more mature site of reassurance and
comfort.

Instead she replaces that logical temporality with

an asynchrony in which a season is compressed into a night
and the events of years past can be said to have occurred
just "the other day."

This living past does not prefigure

the present but rather actively contests it; thus Rowlandson
insists that "it is," not "was," "hard work" to wring any
assurances out of her experience.
Because it sustains the sort of anxiety that fueled
Puritan zeal, this acuteness of memory can be viewed as
having a certain theological efficacy.

But it also alienates

Rowlandson from her peers and disrupts any communal agreement
on the meaning of her experiences.

This aspect of the text,

this disruption of the drive toward closure and stabilization,
is foregrounded and epitomized where one might least expect
it to be— in the psalm quoted in the passage above.

This

biblical allusion might appear to be an appeal of the same
sort that putatively grounds Rowlandson's descriptions of
the New England wilderness, a finalizing referral to
biblical authority.

But the psalm itself expresses not so

much David's suffering, and the meaning of that suffering,
as it does his bewilderment. his inability to understand his
suffering and make it exemplify.

Not merely his "bones," as

he puts it, but also his "soul" is "sore vexed" (KJV Psalms
6:2-3).

It is not his physical suffering but precisely this

vexation of the soul from which he asks deliverance, and no
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such resolution in sight: "[B]ut thou, 0 Lord, how long?"
(6:3).

The psalm's subject is not suffering but deferral,

and it is no accident that, while David insists "[t]he Lord
hath heard my supplication" and "will receive my prayer"
(6:9), he nowhere gives the least indication that God has
answered or even will answer that prayer.

It is significant

that at such a moment of personal crisis Rowlandson refers
her readers to a psalm whose subjects are precisely
bewilderment and the longing for and deferral of closure.
At certain key points, Rowlandson's Narrative refuses
even the stark dichotomy of presence and absence in terms of
which the wilderness at first had been constructed.
Commenting on "the extreme vanity of this world," she notes
how "one hour I have been in health, and wealth, wanting
nothing: but the next hour in sickness and wounds, and
death, having nothing but sorrow and affliction" (365, my
emphases).

She juxtaposes the most apparently inassimilable

opposites: one hour it is presence, the next it is absence
that structures her existence.

But the two terms do not

remain wholly distinct, and Rowlandson underscores their
interpenetration, characterizing "presence," the putatively
positive and self-sufficient term, by means of a double
negative, "wanting nothing"— lacking lack, as it were, but
also, as she soon makes clear, desiring lack.

Reciprocally,

the negative term is formulated as a sort of positive, as a
having of nothing. Rowlandson moves immediately to exploit
the ambiguity of "wanting" as both lack and desire:
Before I knew what affliction meant, I was ready
sometimes to wish for it. When I lived in pros
perity . . . and yet seeing many, whom I preferred
before myself, under many trials and afflictions,
in sickness, weakness, poverty, losses, crosses,
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and cares of this world, I should be sometimes
jealous lest I should not have my portion in this
life. . . . But now I see the Lord had his time
to scourge and chasten me. The portion of some is
to have their afflictions by drops, now one drop
and then another; but the dregs of the cup, the
wine of astonishment, like a sweeping rain that
leaveth no food, did the Lord prepare to be my
portion. Affliction I wanted, and affliction I
had, full measure (I thought) pressed down and
running over. (365-366)
In a mixing of categories that leaves all ultimately
confused, absence becomes a "sweeping" plenitude, a "full
measure" "running over," and so on.

Such paradoxes create

an impasse that the text highlights but refuses to resolve.
At the end of the narrative, where we might expect an
attempt at closure, we find instead this reopening, this
preference for the disorienting "wine of astonishment" over
the sobering milk of exemplification.

Rowlandson preserves

her experience of wilderness in a de-pense. a refusal of the
writing by which that wilderness is more generally sublated,
and faintly audible in this refusal is the language with
which the wilderness might have been written.
Wildness and Wilderness
[W]hat a splendid contemplation . . . a magnifi
cent park, where the world could see for ages to
come, the native Indian in his classic attire,
galloping his wild horse, with sinewy bow, and
shield and lance, amid the fleeting herds of elks
and buffaloes. What a beautiful and thrilling
specimen for America to preserve and hold up to
the view of her refined citizens and the world, in
future ages! A nation's Park. containing man and
beast, in all the wild and freshness of their
nature1s beauty!
— George Catlin (261-262)
"Wilderness," writes Roderick Nash, is a term "heavily
freighted with meaning of a personal, symbolic, and changing
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kind."

It is not an easy term to define, however, even on

the most practical level, where "land managers and poli
ticians have struggled without marked success to formulate a
workable definition."8

As with environment, wilderness

cannot be defined down simply by enumerating its components;
instead "the number of attributes of wild country" seems to
be "almost as great as the number of observers."

This

relativity and subjectivity, which preclude any "universally
acceptable definition," stem from the fact that
while the word is a noun it acts like an adjec
tive. There is no specific material object that
is wilderness. The term designates a quality (as
the "-ness" suggests) that produces a certain mood
or feeling in an individual and, as a consequence,
may be assigned by that person to a specific
place. (Nash 1)
Just as an environment points to an action of environing,
and ultimately to a speaker whose environment is a misnaming
of a penetration, so too does wilderness point to both
action and speaker.

It is said to produce a certain mood or

feeling, but this action of "bewildering" cannot reasonably
be said to originate with the landscape, to constitute part
of its ontology; instead it reflects a mood of the speaker—
initially induced by an inability to read the landscape—
that is projected back onto the environment.

Wilderness is

a misnaming of an anxiety as a geography.
For the Puritans, as we have seen, the mood that
traditionally characterized wilderness was one of
uncertainty and lack.

To be bewildered was to find oneself

without the means to choose between a confusing array of
"conflicting situations, objects, or statements" and the
danger of bewilderment is the possibility that, lacking
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proper guidance, one might stray (OE wilder^ from the proper
path.

(In addition to Rowlandson, one thinks here of

Hawthorne's "Young Goodman Brown.")

"[Cjonceived as a

region where a person was likely to get into a disordered,
confused, or 'wild' condition," writes Nash, the key image
was "that of a man in an alien environment where the
civilization that normally orders and controls his life is
absent" (2).

This early conception thus relates wilderness

to power, for its defining absence is precisely the absence
of that pervasive complex of signs and institutions which
order and control and establish norms— power more or less as
it came to be understood since Foucault.
People native to and living in the wilderness, to the
extent that they were perceived as disordered and
uncontrolled, were themselves considered wild, and to the
extent that they threatened to disorder the lives of the
"civilized" Europeans with whom they came in contact, they
were functionally equivalent to the wilderness and readily
conflatable with it.

The close conceptual link between

"wild" landscapes and "wild" people, that is, was not one of
simple equivalence— -the Puritan did not think of Indians
simply as wild animals— but rather stemmed from their
functional alignment in the Euro-American dialectic of
wilderness and civilization.

It should not be surprising,

then, to find scholars ascribing parallel roles to both
Native Americans and to wilderness.

In The Savages of

America, for example, Roy Harvey Pearce examines "what it
meant for civilized men to believe that in the savage . . .
there was manifest all that they had long grown away from"
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(ix).

In America, he concludes, such men "could survive

only if they believed in themselves," and up until the
middle of the nineteenth century,
that belief was most often defined negatively— in
terms of the savage Indians who, as stubborn
obstacles to progress, forced Americans to
consider and reconsider what it was to be civil
ized and what it took to build a civilization.
Studying the savage, trying to civilize him,
destroying him, in the end they had only studied
themselves, strengthened their own civilization,
and given those who were coming after them an
enlarged certitude . . . in the progress of
American civilization over all obstacles, (ix)
This is the Indian as savage, as one term in a dialectic
through which the American might define (notably) himself as
civilized.

But it was not alone in serving such a function.

There was also the wilderness, about which Roderick Nash
makes much the same claim:
Wilderness was the basic ingredient of American
civilization. From the raw materials of the
physical wilderness Americans built a civiliza
tion; with the idea or symbol of wilderness they
sought to give that civilization identity and
meaning. (x v )
Pearce and Nash both distinguish between, on the one hand,
"real" Indians and their "real" lands, and on the other hand
the idealized Other, the scripted actor in a psychohistorical drama of American identity.

In wildness is not

so much the preservation of the world, as Thoreau would have
us believe, as of the self.

And any tangible, prediscursive

"realities" of native peoples and landscapes are more or
less irrelevant in this process, are perhaps even obstacles,
to be overcome not with guns and plows but with words,
through the discursive construction of an Other with the
required attributes— of a savage and a wilderness
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intertwined into a savage wilderness-

Like the Orient and

the Oriental within Orientalism, this wilderness came to be
viewed as both a source of civilization and as that
civilization's "cultural contestant," in Said's words, as
"one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other,"
the "contrasting image" against which it may define itself
(1-2), "a sort of surrogate and even underground self" by
means of which "it gained in strength and identity" (3).
By the time George Catlin issued his call for a
"nation’s Park,” the wilderness and the Indian were parting
ways in Euro-American thought.

Only the one was destined

for preservation; the other would be forced onto the
reservation.

The wilderness that had begun only as a

negative term demarcating the positive attributes of
civilization was becoming less of a resistant and dangerous
opponent and more and more securely a possession, an
attribute, a source of pride that could be subsumed into
civilization and begin to take on a positivity of its own.
It could be fashioned into an object whose proper
appreciation was a mark of the civilized individual, and
whose preservation was the mark of a refined civilization.
This reconfiguration can readily be situated in the history
of the early United States republic.

Following the

Revolution, Nash notes, ”[i]t was widely assumed that
America's primary task was the justification of its newly
won freedom" (67); Americans therefore "sought something
uniquely 'American, ' yet valuable enough to transform
embarrassed provincials into proud and confident citizens."
Their problem was that the "nation's short history, weak
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traditions, and minor literary and artistic achievements
seemed negligible compared to those of Europe."

The

solution lay in the fact that "wilderness had no counterpart
in the Old World":
nationalists argued that . . . wilderness was
actually an American asset. Of course, pride
continued to stem from the conquest of wild
country, but by the middle decades of the nine
teenth century wilderness was recognized as a
cultural and moral resource and a basis for
national self-esteem. (67)
A certain problem had been posed by the founding and
stabilizing of a national identity upon processes of
destruction that, as white Americans were coming to realize,
could not go on forever.

Catlin's early environmentalism

offered a neat solution: a wilderness that no longer had to
be opposed but could be assimilated and deployed by its very
preservation, as Italy might do with the Sistine Chapel, and
whose deployment could be made all the more effective by a
discursive inflation of the wilderness's value— a task which
would require that the sparely described, almost blank
Puritan wilderness of a Mary Rowlandson be replaced by the
richly textured, endlessly readable romantic landscapes of a
James Fenimore Cooper.
Notes to Chapter Two
1 See Penelope 186-187. Instead of "incorporation" one
might use other terms denoting the obverse of "penetration,"
but, reflecting the asymmetry of a patriarchal lexicon, no
such term seems exactly complementary in the full range of
its connotations. Marie Bonaparte uses the term
"incorporating" in her own discussion of female sexual
pleasure (Female Sexuality 105).
2 Land 4. Even at the most literal of levels, this
desire to escape a burdensome history and society was
conditioned by the capitalism one wished to escape, for the
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fantasies in question were circulated most widely by the
colonial promoters themselves (Land 9).
3 For details and a range of recent interpretations of
the Pequot War, see Drinnon 35-57, Kibbey 92-94, and Nelson
12-16.
4 See Leach 1152.
164, 213.

See also Legman 429-434 and Thompson

5 Leach 1152. Leach writes of this motif only as part
of Native American folklore; Jay Mechling, in an analysis of
contemporary alligator jokes, demonstrates that "the image
of a toothed vagina" also circulates much more widely and is
"still powerful in [Euro-]American male folk materials"
(79).
6 For detailed accounts of King Philip's War see
Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in
Kina Philip's War (New York: Macmillan, 1966) and Francis
Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and
the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P,
1975) .
7 For the Puritan, wilderness was not "natural" in
today's sense of being "governed" solely by the "laws of
nature"; it was thought of, rather, as ungoverned, chaotic.
We cannot "believe" in wilderness in this earlier sense any
longer, no more than we can conceive of a place in the
universe that is not subject to the "laws of nature." Even
the chaotic is now considered to follow the predictable
patterning described in modern chaos theory.
8 Nash 5. There has been a working definition of
wilderness in this country ever since the Wilderness Act of
1964 fully codified the term.
"A wilderness," according to
the act, "in contrast with those areas where man and his
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an
area where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain" (qtd. in Grumbine 377). Four elements of this
formulation will prove important in this study. Its stress
on wilderness as uninhabited land, where "man" only
"visits," effaces the history of early nonwhite presences on
the land. Its universalization of "man" as denoting all of
humankind similarly effaces a set of nonmasculine presences
on and interpretations of the land. Its binarism— the
contrast it draws between the natural and the humanly
altered landscape, and the sharp boundary that is thereby
implied— helps reify the notion of a "natural" or "divine"
inscription. Finally, the legislation's use of the classic
form of the speech act— the way it declares that wilderness
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is "hereby recognized," created through the perlocutionary
force of its enunciation— links it to the imperialist
performativity of the Spanish requerimiento, discussed at
length in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE
Performing Wilderness in The Last of the Mohicans
He slew them, at surprising distances,
with his gun.
Over a body held in his hand, his head
was bowed low,
But not in grief.
He put them where they are, and there
we see them:
In our imagination.
— Robert Penn Warren, Audubon: A Vision (3)
Literary environmentalism traditionally views nature,
and in particular nature's idealization, the "wilderness,"
as intrinsic and prediscursive, as an original, readable
body, a natural inscription whose legibility is logically
prior to any cultural marking..

In this chapter I want to

critique this "wild" natural body along the same lines as
Judith Butler's critique of the prediscursive human body.
Following Butler, I wish to examine nature as a body
"described through the language of surface and force" and
"weakened through a 'single drama' of domination,
inscription, and creation."

Just as a sort of "corporeal

destruction" is required "to produce the speaking subject"
(130), I want to examine how, in order for nature to
"speak," to signify "itself" through an apparently
unmediated textuality, nature "itself" must be similarly
dominated, inscribed, created— in short, destroyed.i

And I

can think of no better introduction to such a seemingly
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paradoxical project than the paradoxical career of John
James Audubon, that great lover of and prodigious destroyer
of natural bodies.
Prologue: Shooting as Writing
Longing for the preservation in words of what he knew
was to disappear in reality, Audubon pinned his hopes at
first on the art of his contemporary, the famed novelist Sir
Walter Scott.

"How many times I have longed for him to come

to my beloved country," wrote Audubon in his journal in
1826,
that he might describe, as no one else ever can,
the stream, the swamp, the river, the mountain,
for the sake of future ages. A century hence they
will not be here as I see them, Nature will have
been robbed of many brilliant charms, the rivers
will have been tormented and turned astray from
their primitive courses, the hills will be leveled
with the swamps, and perhaps the swamps will have
become a mound surmounted by a fortress of a
thousand guns. Scarce a magnolia will Louisiana
possess, the timid Deer will exist nowhere, fish
will no longer abound in the rivers, the Eagle
scarce ever alight, and these millions of lovely
songsters be driven away or slain by man. Without
Sir Walter Scott these beauties must perish
unknown to the world. (182)
I quote this passage partly to demonstrate the prescience of
Audubon's early environmentalist sensibility— his sympathies
seem modern enough, even if some of his specific predictions
are off the mark— and partly to highlight his own anxiety as
a writer, his conviction that his own work was somehow
inadequate to the task of representing and memorializing the
American wilderness.
unfounded.

As it turned out, that anxiety was

Audubon was no Sir Walter Scott, yet he could

write well enough when he chose to, and for several
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generations now his work has been routinely included in
anthologies of nature writing.
Audubon had a paradoxical sense of his own
environmentalism as both discursive and economic, as both
idealist and stubbornly materialist.

Remarking in 1835 that

America was still inadequately chronicling its vanishing
wilderness, he wrote that this was not "because no one in
America is able to accomplish such an undertaking."

He may

still have considered himself inadequate in this regard, but
he conceded that authors such as Washington Irving and James
Fenimore Cooper had proved themselves quite capable.

The

problem, rather, was that in spite of the work of such
writers the loss of nature was proceeding "with such
rapidity, as almost to rival the movement of their pen[s]"
(Audubon, Delineations 5).

The image here is of an almost

direct transmutation of disappearing things into newly
appearing words, of a discursive economic engine that mixes
labor ("the movement of their pens") with natural raw
material to produce the cultural commodity of text.
It was perhaps inevitable that Audubon would thus
associate the representation of nature with its consumption.
He had already done a good deal of work in taxidermy— a form
of nature writing that directly and visibly transforms
referent into signifier— and later in life he would support
himself through the sale of his famed paintings, each of
which had cost the life of not just one but several,
sometimes hundreds, of birds.

Throughout his life, that is,

Audubon participated in an economy that quite consumptively
commodified and traded in various aspects of wild nature, in
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a system in which the destruction of nature was quite
clearly not going to be prevented— Audubon never saw that as
a genuine possibility— but could at least be compensated for
by the concomitant production of valuable artifacts.
Driven by his own sometimes dire financial
circumstances, Audubon almost singlehandedly took the
emerging literary-environmental economy of his time to a new
level.

A financial failure earlier in life, he turned his

fortunes around with his elephant-folio edition of Birds of
North America, selling nearly two hundred copies at $1,000
per set.

In convincing publishers and patrons of the value

of what we recognize as a forerunner of the large-format,
"coffee-table" nature book, Audubon was doing more than
helping inaugurate a practice that still flourishes today.
He was also demonstrating that, via the mediation of art,
nature could participate in a new and more direct way in
culture— not, as in the Puritan conception of wilderness, as
the irreducibly Other accessible only via a troubled and
sometimes traumatic confrontation, but as an object directly
exchangeable for, and thus commensurate with, other objects
in the marketplace.2
Philosophically, Audubon would appear to have been a
neoplatonist.

He was so famously prolific with his gun

precisely because he wished to make each of his
representations true to an ideal type that was not to be
found in any single bird but could only be inferred from the
collectivity.3

In so doing, he "'typified' nature," in the

words of Donna Haraway; he "made nature true to type,"
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deploying his gun to reduce nature's unruly individual
variation to an imagined underlying structure (38).

This

reliance upon the typifying gun makes particularly manifest
the way that the "real" "body" of nature is transmuted and
made to participate directly in the cultural order, a realm
to which— in a thoroughgoing mystification— it is still held
by definition to be opposed.4
In Audubon's taxidermy and in the paintings based upon
it, the body of nature is quite literally emptied out and
made to signify on its surface.

In this specific instance

the writing instrument that accomplishes this, that destroys
the body and allows it to re-emerge as cultural artifact, is
figured most strongly not as the paintbrush or pen but as
the gun.

Positioned as it is at the very beginning of that

chain in which a living bird becomes first a stuffed figure
and only secondarily a painted image— first a surface and
then an image of a surface— it is the rifle and not the
paintbrush that first mediates between the "real,"
"prediscursive" body of nature and its destruction and
inscription.

And inasmuch as destroying a target implies

the previous existence of that target, the act of shooting
provides a powerful figure for the reification of a
prediscursive natural body.5
Sadly Abused by Man
Given Audubon's eventual successes, why would he have
felt that without the particular aid of Sir Walter Scott the
beauties of the wilderness "must perish unknown to the
world"?

It is tempting to answer that Audubon saw in Scott

103

a figure who could popularize an environmental movement—
someone whose literary skill (like that of John Muir later
in the century) could charm and motivate the public, whose
fame could popularize the movement, and whose cultural
authority could legitimate it.

But to say this is to

project the goals and strategies of a later environmentalism
onto a time when they didn't exist.

For Audubon, the danger

seems to have been not that the wilderness would perish
"unknown," but simply, as I suggested above, that there
would be little in the way of cultural accomplishment to
show for its loss.

It would never be exchanged for anything

possessing the sort of perpetual circulability traditionally
secured only in the marketplace of the high-cultural
artifact.

In 1826, he might have had little inkling of his

own eventual stature; he would indeed have had little reason
to think that "nature writing" would become a form of belles
lettres at all.

But by that time the cultural ascendancy of

fiction, and of the novel in particular, was perfectly
evident, and Scott was perhaps the most prominent novelist
then taking a direct interest in landscape.
It is not really surprising, then, that Audubon would
have wished particularly for Sir Walter Scott to take on the
job of immortalizing the wilderness.

Nor is it surprising

that Audubon would eventually pronounce James Fenimore
Cooper a capable substitute, for Cooper shared with Audubon
both an admiration of Scott and an early environmentalist
sensibility.

In his environmentalism, in fact— in the

intensity of his response to the destruction of the
wilderness and in his fictional modeling of a specific

stance toward that destruction— he clearly outstripped
Audubon.

As John F. Lynen put it, in economic terms that

echo Audubon's own formulation, Cooper's regret at the loss
of wilderness was not mere "sentimental nostalgia," but
arose "from the agonizing doubt whether civilization is
worth the terrible price men pay for it," and his novels are
driven partly by "the quest for some solid reality which
justifies the settlement of the wilderness" (174).

Audubon,

as late as 1835, could still question "[w]hether these
changes are for the better or for the worse" (Delineations
5); Cooper by this time seems far less ambivalent.

In

Nash’s words, Cooper "held no brief for exploitation," and
in Natty Bumppo he created a character who not only "honored
the wilderness and used it respectfully" but also could
serve as the author's mouthpiece in a repeated "condemnation
of the exploiter" (76-77).
In this view, it is Cooper himself speaking when Natty
Bumppo laments how "the beauty of the wilderness [has] been
deformed" by settlers who "scourge the very 'arth with their
axes," or of how "natur is sadly abused by man, once he gets
the mastery."6

That such environmentalist sentiments are

indeed Cooper's own is suggested by their universalization
within the Leatherstocking series— particularly in The Last
of the Mohicans, where, instead of being associated with a
particular character or social or racial group, they are
articulated through a variety of voices, both savage and
civilized, both narrated and narratorial.7

In The Last of

the Mohicans, it is only a certain semi-civilized type that
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does not share this basic environmental sensibility: a white
American implicitly figured as merely transitional, as too
advanced to possess the natural wisdom of the savage but not
yet refined enough to possess the aesthetic sophistication
of the fully cultured.

In the novel's otherwise Manichean

world, a love of wild nature occupies both poles, being
absent only in this presumably transitional middle realm
that will eventually, one supposes, be eliminated by a
civilizing and aestheticizing process— a process in which
Cooper would perhaps have seen his own novels as
participating.
Cooper would also have realized that -this sort of
American, closer to Audubon's ambivalence than to Natty
Bumppo's platitudinous assurance, was more typical of his
readership.

He would not have wanted to delineate the

character of the exploiter sharply enough for readers to
recognize themselves— or for Cooper to recognize himself— as
the object of the novel's condemnation.

The exploiter has

therefore only a vague and shifting presence, never being
depicted in detail or explicitly named.

Unlike the nature-

loving proto-environmentalist, who speaks confidently
through a universalizing range of identifiable voices, the
exploiter in Mohicans is camouflaged in passive construc
tions— as when the woods mysteriously "are gotten rid of"—
or in misplacements of agency— as when it is not people who
damage Glenn's Falls but simply "the application of the
water to the uses of civilized life" (55-56).

The result is

a faux dialectic in which the environmentalist viewpoint
circulates as a fully embodied position, that of the
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exploiter as a shadowy foil.

In ways such as these, the

genre of fiction afforded Cooper certain literaryenvironmental strategies that Audubon's environmentalist
nonfiction could not.

In particular it allowed Cooper to

create a space within which to posit an environmentalist
sensibility unfettered by the contemporary colonialist and
capitalist realities that would have considerably
complicated its expression.
Human Values and Natural Forms
To understand The Last of the Mohicans specifically as
literary environmentalism— and not merely a novel informed
by a recognizeably environmentalist sensibility--I want to
turn first to Cooper's novelistic technique.

The one aspect

of that technique which relates him most directly to Sir
Walter Scott, from whom he borrowed it, is his handling of
the convention of the picturesque.

More particularly, as

Blake Nevius has shown, Cooper learned from Scott how to
"combine picturesque action with picturesque scenery" (2),
and here the student may be said to have outdone the master,
for with Scott, "after a lapse of time we can recall his
characters and actions more vividly than his physical
settings," while with Cooper what we tend to remember is not
any action but a set of brilliantly evoked wilderness
tableaux (4).

In thus adapting and intensifying this

particular aspect of Scott's technique, Cooper made a
decisive move toward literary environmentalism— whose
primary effect, after all, is to naturalize narratives by
writing them as landscapes, and to do so convincingly enough
that, as Nevius says, we forget the originary action.

Arguing in similar terms for the primacy of Cooper’s
scenery over his plots, John F. Lynen has suggested how and
why Cooper's fiction might have taken this turn.

In

particular, Lynen suggests how the literary-environmental
qualities of Cooper's work hinge on questions of technique,
how they spring from the author's choices in handling such
basic formal challenges as plotting and characterization.
Foremost among Cooper's shortcomings as a novelist,
according to Lynen, "is the static quality of [his]
characters," it being "representative of Cooper's method"
that his "personages cannot change or grow" (178).

This

rules out the usual handling of plot, for in a novel "whose
situation remains unchanging, action is most completely a
matter of finding things out" (183), and the only "real"
plot consists "in the reader's and characters' understanding
of facts which remain constant" (176).

Instead of

developing in the usual sense, changing in response to the
action, Cooper's characters are simply "seen in the process
of discovering the truths of their situation" (178).
To formulate action and characterization as such a
process of discovery poses the problem of how the reader is
to find out what the characters are to find out, and how to
replicate in the reader the sense that "the truths of their
situation"— the emphasized pronoun here referring both to
characters and to readers— were there to be discovered all
along.

In order for Cooper to "manage" his novel's "real

action," it becomes necessary that "the landscape should
contain in its visible elements all the social and
psychological truths the story will bring into view."3

The
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adventures themselves do little more than "provide the
occasion for beautifully realized tableaux" (183), while the
novel's "true action" proceeds somewhere behind the surface
events, in the form of a constant implication and
suggestion.

It is

the movement of the author's thought, as he
describes the landscape, [that] foreshadows the
pattern of the story he will tell. . . . The
process of perception in which Cooper engages the
reader through his description of the setting
enacts in brief the process by which the narrative
will develop. (172-73)
The key to the action, the truth that is to be discovered,
remains "always an inference, always something intuited from
the tableau of the presently visible world" (175).
An example of such a tableaux and such an inference is
this deceptively objective-sounding description of a
wilderness landscape, offered up by the narrator in the
quiet lull that succeeds the gun battle at Glenn's Falls:
The uproar which had lately echoed through the
vaults of the forest was gone, leaving the rush of
the waters to swell and sink on the currents of
the air, in the unmingled sweetness of nature. A
fish-hawk, which, secure on the topmost branches
of a dead pine, had been a distant spectator of
the fray, now stooped from his high and ragged
perch, and soared, in wide sweeps, above his prey;
while a jay, whose noisy voice had been stilled by
the hoarser cries of the savages, ventured again
to open his discordant throat, as though once more
in undisturbed possession of his wild domains.
(81)
This scene provokes in the admiring Heyward "a glimmering of
hope,” a "reviving confidence of success" that will rally
him "to renewed exertions."

It is thus not only picturesque

but also inspiring— but inspiring of what, exactly?

We know

as readers what Heyward cannot know as a character: that

while it is indeed the "undisturbed possession" of America's
"wild domains" that is at issue, those domains are to be
wrested not only from the Indians and the French but also,
soon enough, from the British.

We can readily sense in this

passage a patriotic history rewritten as a description, a
thinly veiled picture of the American colonies following
"the uproar" of the French and Indian War itself.

The

victorious British crown, which maintains a shadowy presence
throughout the novel as one of the "distant monarchs of
Europe" (15), is written into this particular scene as the
fishhawk, "a distant spectator of the fray," perched
securely at the apex of a now-quiet empire.

Indeed it was

that very security— the fact that the colonists no longer
needed Britain to defend them against the French and Indian
threat— which had enabled the drive toward independence: no
longer "stilled by the hoarser cries of the savages," the
"noisy voice" and "discordant" notes of colonial discontent
make themselves heard immediately in the silence.
Exceeding the plotting function identified by Lynen,
such "descriptive" passages narrate and gloss mythic
passages in American history, presaging the later work of
the National Park Service interpreter.

For the ranger as

for the novelist, the process of managing such "plots" is
one of naturalizing key elements of a national ideology.
Indeed, as Lynen stresses, Cooper's "main problem in shaping
his narrative" is "to manage the revelations naturally, so
that the hidden essentials of the situation seem to rise to
the surface of consciousness as if they had always been
there and are now in the process of being noticed" (179-80).
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This is, significantly, a matter of implicating the reader,
for the trick lies in the "action of the reader's mind as
[notably] he comes to recognize the social scene through the
natural scene," thereby realizing, consciously or otherwise,
"that a single order underlies both society and nature"
(174).
The inscribing of particular colonial histories into
Cooper's wilderness landscape is underwritten by narratives
of gender and race that are themselves coded into that
landscape.

As has proved to be consistently the case with

the literary-environmental object, the wilderness of The
Last of the Mohicans is constructed by collapsing verb into
noun, history into place, narration into description— all
via tropes of sexualized violence directed against a
racialized Other.

Lying always beyond some "impervious" but

nonetheless always permeated "boundary" (1), Cooper's
wilderness is probed and explored until, as the narrator
summarizes, there is "no recess of the woods so dark, nor
any secret place so lovely, that it might claim exemption
from the inroads" of Europeans (11).

Figurations of just

this sort of coitus-writ-large (eerily repeating John
Underhill's earlier troping of the wilderness as a female
body to which has been ascribed the pseudo-agency of
"environing") are ubiquitous in the novel.

"After

penetrating through the brush," says the narrator of Natty
Bumppo, "matted as it was with briars, for a few hundred
feet, he entered an open space" (125); elsewhere we read of
a silence in the adventurer's camp "as deep as that which
reigned in the vast forest by which it was environed" (15),

Ill

of an "impenetrable darkness" "[w]ithin the bosom of the
encircling hills" (190).

Such imagery replicates the

castration anxiety so prominent in News from America: "the
forest at length appeared to swallow up the living mass [of
armed troops] which had slowly entered its bosom" (15).
Neatly linking tropes of gender and race, Cooper writes
his wilderness as a womb whose fertility will ensure a
posterity for whites but not for Indians.

Early in the

novel, Heyward's party "enter[s] under the high, but dark
arches of the forest" (22), then "penetrate[s] still deeper"
(28) to arrive at Glenn's Falls, where Uncas and
Chingachgook expose "the much prized secret of the place"
(52).

That prized secret, predictably enough, turns out to

be a cave, a sort of primitive Ur-womb which, in sheltering
the English couple, Duncan Heyward and Alice Munro, shelters
the symbolic progenitors of an as-yet unborn white nation.
In this context, the word "prized" is particularly
multivalent, becoming readable not just as "highly valued,"
but also as "seized," and again as "pried open" (OED)— the
single term collapsing the tropes of both virgin and whore,
the much-prized and the much-pried, in a context of violence
and warfare that is very much about both the seizing and the
future (racially pure) repeopling of the wilderness.
Part of the viciousness of the virgin/whore dichotomy—
invoked in The Last of the Mohicans as it usually is, as a
totalizing binarism— is that it leaves no room for
conceptualizing rape, a figure that might more appropriately
represent colonial acquisition of native land.

The novel's

caves do, nonetheless, recall John Underhill's mapping of
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the violated Indian palizado at Mystic.

As at Mystic, for

example, each of Cooper's caves features an anatomically
correct set of openings, front and back.

But in Cooper's

case the accompanying narrative is thoroughly mystifying,
lacking the unabashed honesty of Underhill's account.
Indeed, Cooper turns the Pequot story on its head, for now
it is a white lineage that is threatened by Indians, via a
dual forced entry that replicates exactly the assault by
Mason and Underhill at Mystic: "the cavern was entered at
both its extremities" (88).
The genocidal subtext in such scenes is not hard to
uncover.

An emblematized white reproductive capability

survives the Hurons's sexual/military assault; Alice is
"delivered" from the cave, captive but alive, just as she is
"delivered" a second time from the book's other symbolic
womb, the cave at the Huron village (263).

Her survival in

this second instance stands in contrast to the death of the
ailing young Indian woman, whom Heyward, pretending to be "a
great medicine" (246), has been charged with curing and who
clearly serves as a foil for the young, marriage-bound white
woman.9

(Notably, Alice is thus "born" in a sort of trans-

racial drag, passing herself off as the ill Indian maiden
whose very life Alice seems to appropriate even as she
performs it— one of the many links between drag and
performance I will explore later in this chapter.)

In a

combined racial and sexual politics, the landscape becomes
the vehicle for selectively breeding a future for whites but
not for Indians, a strategy of naturalizing— landscaping—
genocide as a simple failure to reproduce.
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Cooper relies heavily on this sort of literaryenvironmental poetics in his handling of characterization as
well as plot.

Lynen notes how Natty Bumppo's static and

shallow "wisdom" amounts to little more than "vague
Unitarian pieties" and quite reasonably asks, "[How can]
such

a bundle of received ideas and attitudes amount to a

personality?" (187).

The answer is by developing an

illusion of genuine character for Natty in what might be
called the novel's ideological, as opposed to physical,
space, "in the affinity between human values and natural
forms."

It is thus
the landscape [that] creates him, just as he, in
turn, interprets it. . . . [G]uided by Cooper's
statements, we unconsciously transfer to Leatherstocking our own responses to the novel1s land
scape. His behavior as a person acting within the
landscape seems to spring from such thoughts and
feelings as we ourselves have in merely looking at
the scene.
Leatherstocking’s identity is the
product of our novelistically controlled view of
nature; he becomes a person because his response
to nature is validated by our own. (187-88)

But our own responses, which supposedly validate Natty's,
are themselves conditioned by a long tradition of literaryenvironmental interpretations, among whose precursors we
might place those of Natty himself.

This interdependence

points not to a logical circularity but to a dialectical
interaction between writer and reader, interpreter and
interpretee.

Interpretive speech is expected and designed

to enact or awaken some state— new yet already present— in
an interlocutor; it is necessarily directed toward someone,
and in The Last of the Mohicans that someone is preeminently
Duncan Heyward.

If it is in Natty that Cooper delineates
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the figure and activity of the environmental interpreter, it
is Duncan whom he casts as the prototypical interpretee, the
American type for whom interpretation is to be performed.
Following the initial battle at Glenn's Falls, the
narrator explains how the "sudden and almost magical change"
from the stirring incidents of the combat, to the
stillness that now reigned around him, acted on
the heated imagination of Heyward like some excit
ing dream. While all the images and events he had
witnessed remained deeply impressed on his memory,
he felt a difficulty in persuading himself of
their truth. . . . [EJvery sign of the adventurers
had been lost, leaving him in total uncertainty.
(8 1 )

This "magical change" that links events and images,
replacing an active combat with a passive, surrounding
stillness, neatly evokes literary environmentalism's
mystified writing of violent history as peaceful
environment.

This environment cannot signify itself,

however; it must be interpreted, a process temporarily
blocked by the contrived absence of the interpreter, Natty.
And as Lynen argued, it is this narratorial management of
interpretation— of the discovery of the fixed truths of the
landscape— that constitutes the novel's "real" plot.
Heyward is left looking about him in bewilderment and
awe, like a Puritan captive waiting for a sign from God, or
an uninitiated tourist in a national park waiting for the
ranger in the green uniform to tell him what it's all about.
Scenes such as this establish a particular relationship
between Natty and Duncan in their respective roles as
interpreter and interpretee, a relationship replicated
between narrator and reader.

Such scenes emphasize in
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particular the opacity of the landscape to the uninitiated,
the utter dependence of the interpretee upon the
interpreter.

When Natty leaves the scene at Glenn's Falls,

Duncan's problem is cast explicitly as a fundamental problem
in knowing, "a difficulty in persuading himself of [the]
truth" of things, a problem in the interpretation of images
that have impressed themselves onto his memory but cannot by
themselves signify any definite meaning.

Mediation becomes

crucial: without the interpreter, Duncan is left "in total
uncertainty"; devoid of the "signs" that have been "lost,"
the wilderness simply ceases to signify.
It is for Duncan, more than any other character, that
the book's formative interpretation of the American
environment is to be performed— and through him, on behalf
of its contemporary readers.

As Nina Baym has pointed out,

it is Duncan and not Natty whose presence dominates the
novel: he is the only character to appear in every scene;
his is the "line of sight [that] organizes the action," even
though "some awkward plotting . . .

is required to carry

this through"; and virtually all of the action is "viewed
from his perspective.”

Heyward functions "as the reader's

surrogate, the position from which readers would view the
action if they were in the action" (73).

He is more than

just a surrogate, however, for the novel also figures him as
patriarch and progenitor.

As the aristocratic southerner

and ambitious officer getting an intense education in the
harsh realities of wilderness warfare, exhibiting his
heroism and fortifying his character in the French and
Indian War, he is readily recognizeable as a youthful George
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Washington, a fictionalized father-to-be of his country. 10
As such, his union with the racially pure and properly
feminine Alice— and his pointed rejection of the racially
"tainted" Cora— assures in advance the racial and gender
purity of not only the idealized American citizen but also
the future model of the interpretee.

Duncan and Alice

become prototypes of all those whose character and
citizenship are to be perfected, just as Freeman Tilden
would have it a century later, through the guidance of
environmental interpretation.
The novel's interpretation is in this sense both
present- and future-oriented, shaping not just Duncan
Heyward but also his descendants, Cooper's idealized
American readers.

This blurs a certain distinction that

might otherwise be set up between a narrator who interprets
for the reader and a character (Natty) who interprets for
other characters.

Instead, interpretation at both levels

can finally be seen as directed to readers, the one working
to perfect them through a direct interpellation in the
present, the other working indirectly, positing readers as
hereditarily already-perfected by virtue of their figurative
descent from their "father."

As Duncan's descendants, we

are to discover as already existing in ourselves the truths
that the characters are to discover as already existing in
the landscape.

Lynen's argument must thus be taken a step

further, for it is not merely the novel's characters that
are treated as static, but also its readers.

The American

environmental narrative is discoverable not only in the
landscape, but also in our own fictive ancestry.
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A Singular and 111 Concealed Disdain
"Book!" repeated Hawk-eye, with singular and illconcealed disdain; "do you take me for a whimper
ing boy, at the apron string of one of your old
gals; and this good rifle on my knee.for the
feather of a goose's wing, my ox's horn for a
bottle of ink . . . ? Book! What have such as I,
who am a warrior of the wilderness, though a man
without a cross, to do with books? I never read
but in one, and the words that are written there
are too simple and too plain to need much school
ing; though I may boast that of forty long and
hard working years."
— James Fenimore Cooper (117)
There remains to be written a history of this
metaphor . . . that systematically contrasts
divine or natural writing and the human and
laborious, finite and artificial inscription. It
remains to . . . follow the theme of God's book
(nature or law, indeed natural law) through all
its modifications.
— Jacques Derrida (602)
Propounded by an illiterate eccentric with no formal
education, with no institutional affiliation, with none of
the usual accoutrements of authority beyond his white race
and male sex, the environmental interpretations of someone
like Natty Bumppo might strike readers as at least a little
suspect.

And to the extent that they are directed to a

particular interlocutor in a particular time, place, and
situation, they should strike us not as universal but as
local and situated.

How does The Last of the Mohicans work

to overcome these handi-caps, to establish Natty's authority
as an interpreter of the wilderness?

More fundamentally,

how does the novel establish that there is anything "there"
in the wilderness to interpret in the first place?
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In the first of the epigraphs above, figuring the New
World wilderness as a stable text, as "God's book," Natty
valorizes and masculinizes the old notion of a preexisting,
"natural" writing and marginalizes and feminizes that of a
secondary and "artificial" human inscription.

He claims to

read only in the book of nature, which in its divine
transparency can speak immediately and truthfully to all.
But this contemptuous and sweeping avowal— a claim made
emphatically enough to betray some nervousness— is at once
qualified by Natty's offhanded admission of all those years
of study.

If the book of nature is in fact so transparent,

just what has he been working so hard at?

Evidently,

reading even a natural inscription can be laborious.

This

casual admission wrecks the otherwise neat binarisms that
would at first seem to bound and structure Natty's textual
wilderness, reinserting the artificial into the natural, the
opaque into the transparent, the human into the divine.11
Aligned with Natty's privileging of a natural over an
artificial inscription is his privileging of speech over
writing, and this avowal also runs immediately aground.

In

Chapter 3, where the proudly phonocentric woodsman expounds
upon the "ways, of which . . .

I can't approve," he ranks

the literacy of his own culture among them:
It is one of their customs to write in books what
they have done and seen, instead of telling them
in their villages, where the lie can be given to
the face of a cowardly boaster, and the brave
soldier can call on his comrades to witness for
the truth of his words. In consequence of this
bad fashion, a man who is too conscientious to
misspend his days among the women, in learning the
names of black marks, may never hear of the deeds
of his fathers. (31)

Perhaps this is in part a mere psychological defense, the
blustering of an otherwise proud character inwardly troubled
by his illiteracy.

Regardless of how it is intended, it

succinctly outlines nearly the whole of the phonocentric
pose, positing writing as feminine, mediated, distanced from
its referent, and unreliable— as absence and deferral— and
speech as masculine, direct, close to its referent, and
authoritative— as presence and identity.

This seemingly

simple formulation is riven with contradictions, however,
not the least of which is the way it identifies a putatively
superior reliance upon speech with a putatively inferior
race.

For it is "the pale faces," as Magua puts it in a

formulation similar to Natty's own, who do not have true
speech; whites "have two words for each thing, while a red
skin will make the sound of his voice speak for him" (91).
Even more disruptive is Natty's admission that writing
sustains the very privileges to which he opposes it, that
his illiteracy denies him access to that racist and
masculinist cultural heritage referenced here as "the deeds
of his fathers."
I want now to trace out the novel's thematizing of its
own "nature writing" via a sustained reading of two closely
related tropes: that of a divine inscription, which is
manifested variously as the inscribed body of the Indian and
the inscribed body of wild nature, and that of a fully
present speech, figured most powerfully and revealingly by
what Natty terms the "speech" of his rifle, Kill-deer.
Mary Rowlandson's narrative it is the Bible whose
circulation both initiates and works to stabilize the
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wilderness's textuality; in The Last of the Mohicans it is
the phallic rifle, la longue carabine, that tropes this
fundamental literary-environmental activity.

Deployed in

parallel functions, the categories of a present speech and a
natural writing are both posited by their binaric opposition
to the notion of an artificial inscription, to writing in
the popular sense of the word.

And the novel will thematize

the failure of both categories as a locus of stable and
self-evident "nature."

The Last of the Mohicans, in a way

that correlates closely with Butler's conception of
performativity, concludes by locating a radically
textualized wilderness neither in speech nor writing, but in
performance, or rather coperformance, that enlists the
reader in the ongoing cultural production of the
environment.
What Say Your Old Men?
Natty's phonocentrism can be seen as clumsily enacting
the paradoxical way that books, in Barbara Johnson's words,
"rebel against their own stated intention to say that speech
is better than writing" (43), as just another "modification"
of the general "theme of God's book."

But his pose falters

in much more politically charged ways within the colonial
context of the novel.

Natty laments his ignorance of the

deeds of his fathers during an overtly political argument
with Chingachgook over the justice of England's taking of
Delaware land; the scene dramatizes the native contestation
of a self-serving imperialist narrative even as it points up
the role of literary environmentalism in defusing and
containing such contestation.

Defending the ethics of white conquest, Natty maintains
that his own people's activities have been no worse than
those of the Mohicans.

Chingachgook, suspecting that the

white people's own histories would undermine that claim,
challenges Natty to back up his assertions by citing his own
tradition.

"You have the story told by your fathers," the

Delaware chief points out.

"What say your old men?" (30).

This certainly appears to be a decisive move, for the story
recorded by his fathers is precisely what Natty must now
admit he does not know; thus pressed, he can only point up
his illiteracy.

Put to the test by a member of a genuinely

speech-centered culture, Natty's own phonocentricity is
exposed as a wholly figurative stance without any real
contestatory force.

As a mere inability to read and write,

illiteracy can at best be only a figure for the positivities
of orality and phonocentricity which Natty pretends to
privilege.

The immediate result is that Natty finds his

entire position negated, and he is forced into a series of
embarrassing admissions— that "there is reason in an Indian"
(30), that "every story has its two sides," and that
Chingachgook's "traditions" are "true" (31).
Chingachgook, by contrast, is able to access the deeds
of his fathers, and it is precisely on that account that he
takes charge of the conversation, narrating "what my fathers
have said, and what the Mohicans have done" (31): a history
of his own people that justifies their claim to the
territory taken by the whites.

This counternarrative cannot

be refuted in any obvious way, for its pathos depends upon
its being true.

Instead of being refuted, it is merely
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interrupted and contained, first by having the conversation
bleed off into a discussion of the cause of the tides (31—
32)— a rewriting of politics as natural science— and then,
when Chingachgook resumes his narrative, by the timely
arrival of Uncas (33).
There is, however, a crucial sense in which Natty does
manage to access and deploy his own heritage, and in the
genuine imperial contestation which this chapter only
dramatizes, this deployment proves decisive after all.
Illiterate though he is, Natty does know at least one thing
about his fathers, for he knows that he is "genuine white."
And he knows at least one thing more, "that all the Bumppos
could shoot; for I have a natural turn with a rifle, which
must have been handed down from generation to generation"
(31).

In contrast to Chingachgook's rich oral heritage,

Natty's illiteracy leaves him with only a bare genetic
legacy, the "fact" of his race and an inherited skill in
shooting, upon which to base his own claim to the land.

The

novel— mystifying the real primacy of literacy in
colonialist ideology— boils the ethics of conquest down to
the notion of a superior race, and the fact of a superior
firepower.
I Will Tell/Kill You
"Words built the world and words can destroy
the world. . . . "
"Well, you take the words; I'll take the
rifle. That's the only word I need. R-i-f-l-e."
— Ishmael Reed (81)
Pressed by Chingachgook to relate the story told by his
fathers, Natty suggests that his rifle can somehow speak for
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him.

But this is hardly the only time the novel invokes

shooting as a figure for speech.

Elsewhere, for example,

Natty refers to a gun battle as a "conversation," in which
he offers to "let 'kill-deer' take a part" (208); during
another battle he requests of his comrades that until he
signals otherwise, "nothing speaks but the rifle" (328).
Thus when Tamenund asks "Which of my prisoners is la Longue
Carabine?" and Heyward answers, "Give us arms. . . .

Our

deeds shall speak for us!" (295), we are invited to read the
ensuing shooting contest as a sort of debate, and Natty's
superior shooting as a sort of eloquence, a great oration
comparable to those delivered in the same scene by Tamenund,
Magua, and Cora.
But what sort of words are spoken by a firearm?
However one might choose to translate such speech— "I hereby
declare you a corpse," perhaps, or in the more specific
colonial context of the novel, "I hereby pronounce you a
subject of my king"— it obviously does more than merely
convey information.

The pronouncements of the rifle are not

mere constantives, that is, but performatives in the classic
sense, speech acts that instantiate by means of their very
utterance a genuine change in the status of their
interlocutors.
Deconstructed by Chingachgook, Natty's phonocentrism
does not simply vanish; rather it is driven underground, as
it were, to lodge in this figure of the speaking gun.
Resurrecting itself there as a performative speech, it can
revive the old dream of a full presence in which word,
intention, and result— locution, illocution, and
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perlocution— are one.

The novel seems fascinated by such

speech and allegorizes it repeatedly, perhaps most notably
in the suspenseful shooting contest of Chapter 29 and at the
moment of Magua's demise in Chapter 32.
The performativity of the speaking gun parallels that
of another imperialist speech act, the Spanish
Recruerimiento, or "requirement."

Drafted in its "classic

form" in 1512 by Palacios Rubios, this formal document was
intended to address "the wide range of perplexing problems"
posed by the discovery of the Indies (Dickinson 300).
Spaniards such as Rubios worried in particular about two
things: the questionable ethics of conquest and
colonization, and the possibility that "civilized" men might
revert to "savagery" during lengthy sojourns among utterly
foreign peoples.

In response, the Spanish imperial

bureaucracy required its agents to read the Recruerimiento
aloud to native populations upon first contact, reasoning
that such a performance would, at that crucial moment, both
affirm the conquerors in their own European identity and
legitimate the conquest itself.

More precisely, the reading

was itself considered the act of subjugation: by declaring
natives to be subjects of the Crown, it was held to make
them subjects of the Crown.12
The speaking gun similarly subjugates the native as it
sustains the identity of the colonial.

In Newes from

America, John Underhill records that
wee had an Indian with us that was an interpreter,
being in English cloathes, and a Gunne in his
hands, was spied by the Ilanders [members of the
Block Island tribe], which called out to him, what
are you an Indian or an English-man: come hither,
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saith he, and I will tell you, he pulls up his
cocke and let fly at one of them, and without
question was the death of him. (7)
In the midst of this fluidity— signaled by an Indian
speaking a white man's language, dressed in a white man's
clothing, and carrying a white m an’s weapon— Underhill
assigns to the gun the power of stabilization, the ability
to accurately name the speaker's race, to answer the
question, "What are you?" even as it subjugates its native
interlocutor: "I will tell/kill you."

Notably, the

speaker's name is never actually mentioned; the passage
concerns not the name itself but the act of naming.

This

image of a man in a cross-racial drag, irrefutably
identifying himself in a virtuoso performance— and thereby
suggesting the performativity rather than any "natural"
fixity of identity— reappears much later as the
Leatherstocking, Cooper's white man in Indian clothing.
Underhill's Indian here anticipates the way that Natty and
other characters in The Last of the Mohicans will perform—
as Indians, as animals, as "nature"— in what Marjorie Garber
has termed narrative transvestism (13).

And the

interpreter's fatally stabilizing speech anticipates (right
down to the seemingly obligatory sexual pun) how the
speaking gun is to function in Cooper's novel.
No End to His Loping
In contrast to the sweeping formality of the
Reouerimiento— ritualistic, mediated, embedded in a
universalizing hierarchy— the performative speech of the
woodsman's rifle seems decidedly informal, personal, direct,
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and ad hoc.13

But the two practices function in much the

same way, and I want now to read the shooting match in
Chapter 29 of The Last of the Mohicans as a fictional
equivalent of the Reouerimiento.

Natty's shooting is

performed as part of a first-contact scenario, before an
assemblage of native people at the brink of subjugation; it
is also, as in the episode from Newes from America, prompted
by a crisis of identity— by Duncan Heyward's impersonation
of Natty.

And it is again a violent and patently sexual

exchange, in this case between the rifle and the two
(notably) domestic utensils that are its targets— an earthen
vessel (297) and a hollow gourd (299).
Natty sees his own identity most securely fixed in his
race, in his sense of himself as "genuine white," "a man
without a cross" (though he repeats these phrases frequently
enough to betray some anxiety about the matter).

But at

this crucial point in the novel, his identity hinges
literally on his inherited skill with the rifle.

It is not

as a white man that he is most renowned, but as la loncrue
carabine, as a great shot, and when Duncan challenges his
identity, it seems perfectly logical that a shooting match
should be proposed as a foolproof way to settle the issue.
Natty's final shot does indeed appear to secure his claim
once and for all.

With this shot his "word" is made "good,"

and the scene would seem rather straightforwardly to
emblematize stability in naming and authority in speech—
both who has it (the white male colonial), and how it is
attained (through a violent negation of the sexual and
racial Other).

The narrator figures Natty's impressive
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performance as a grounding of language, an end to deferral:
"It decided the question, and effectually established Hawkeye in the possession of his dangerous reputation" (300).
The episode seems to undo the metaphysical damage sustained
in Natty's ill-fated argument with Chingachgook back in
Chapter 3, successfully substituting his inherited shooting
ability for his inaccessible written heritage.
But more is at stake here than just Natty's identity.
Also at issue is the fixity of identity itself, and it is
certainly suggestive that the rifle so frequently fails to
speak unambiguously.

Even in this seemingly straightforward

shooting contest, Natty does not reestablish his identity
until the univocality of the rifle has first been brought
into some doubt.

For reasons not made very clear—

apparently to express his contempt for Heyward's challenge—
Natty lets off his first shot without appearing so much as
to aim.

He does this apparently casually but actually, as

the narrator makes clear, quite calculatedly: Natty intends
his shot to be not only more accurate than Heyward's, but
also more expressive. and to the extent that it thus
signifies on two levels at once it is no longer a
transparent speech but one requiring interpretation.

It is

paradoxically because Natty's performance is so convincing
that his audience is divided on whether to attribute the
rifle shot to skill or chance:
The first impression of so strange a scene was
engrossing admiration. Then a low, but increasing
murmur, ran through the multitude, and finally
swelled into sounds, that denoted lively opposi
tion in the sentiments of the spectators. While
some openly testified their satisfaction at so
unexampled dexterity, by far the larger portion of
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the tribe were inclined to believe the success of
the shot was the result of accident. (298)
Rather than pinning down identity and meaning, the rifle's
speech simply fuels another round of contestation within an
interpretive community.

Faced with this deferral, we would

do well to ask just what, precisely, we are to take as
Natty's "unexampled dexterity": his shooting or his acting?
When Underhill's native marksman fires at his enemy,
the narrator assures us that he "without question was the
death of him."

But in The Last of the Mohicans we find no

such assurances.

Instead we find just the opposite, acts of

marksmanship that repeatedly prove at the most crucial
moments to be ambiguous.

This is most notably the case with

the shooting of Natty's great nemesis, the one target he
cannot seem to pin down, the ultimate test of la lonaue
carabine's stabilizing power: Magua.

It is Magua who seems

to epitomize deferral itself, who repeatedly evades the
significations alloted him.

”[T]here never will be an end

to his loping," as Natty puts it, using a word that aptly
suggests the perpetual sliding of the signifier, "till
'kill-deer' has said a friendly word to him" (186), and
Magua does indeed seem to escape every effort made to
contain him.
Even at the novel's climactic death scene there is no
certain closure, for the cause of Magua's death is left
unclear even here.

Circumstances certainly imply that the

Huron is finished off by a "word from ’kill-deer,1" but the
question is rather pointedly left open.

Just where we might

expect certainty, the story foregrounds images of fluidity
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and indeterminacy, leaving the shooting of even such a great
marksman as Natty to fail as the trope of a present speech.
"A form stood at the brow of the mountain," says the
narrator in the novel's penultimate scene, "on the very edge
of the giddy height, with uplifted arms, in an awful
attitude of menace."
to Magua,
the

Surely this menacing form must belong

and "[w].ithout stopping to consider his person,

rifle of Hawkeye was raised" (338). But just before

firing Natty realizes he is aiming not at Magua, the novel's
personification of evil, but at Magua's utter opposite, the
"glowing countenance" of David Gamut.

A second later, the

real Magua "lopes" into view and attempts, once again, to
dodge the bullet that would name him:
[H]e made a desperate leap, and fell short of his
mark; though his hands grasped a shrub on the
verge of the height. The form of Hawk-eye had
crouched like a beast about to take its spring,
and his frame trembled so violently with
eagerness, that the muzzle of the half raised
rifle played like a leaf fluttering in the wind.
One might here repeat the words of Underhill's interpreter
and ask of Natty, "What are you, an Indian or an
Englishman?"

It is again a moment of extreme instability,

with the signifiers of racial and sexual identity sliding
out of control, leaving the putatively civilized white man
"crouched" like a "beast"— bestial in his crouched posture
and eagerness for the kill, impotent in his inability to
make his half-erect gun "speak."
When Natty finally does fire, the actual utterance is
played down, camouflaged in subordinate clauses:
Without exhausting himself with fruitless efforts,
the cunning Magua suffered his body to drop to the
length of his arms, and found a fragment for his
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feet to rest upon. Then summoning all his powers,
he renewed the a'ttempt, and so far succeeded, as
to draw his knees on the edge of the mountain. It
was now, when the body of his enemy was most
collected together, that the agitated weapon of
the scout was drawn to his shoulder. The
surrounding rocks, themselves, were not steadier
than the piece became for the single instant that
it poured out its contents.
Thus does the rifle speak— but to what effect?
The arms of the Huron relaxed, and his body fell
back a little, while his knees still kept their
position. Turning a relentless look on his enemy,
he shook his hand in grim defiance. But his hold
loosened, and his dark person was seen cutting the
air with its head downwards, for a fleeting
instant, until it glided past the shrubbery which
clung to the mountain, in its rapid flight to
destruction. (338)
Here the reader cannot say of Magua that Natty "without
question was the death of him"; the narrator juxtaposes
Natty's rifle shot and Magua's apparently fatal fall but
refuses to link them in any causal relationship.

If Magua

indeed had to summon "all his powers" just to "draw his
knees on the edge of the mountain," might he not have
dropped off through sheer exhaustion?

There is no real

evidence that Natty has in fact killed Magua; except for the
single word "destruction," there is no evidence to suggest
even that Magua has died.

We do know that Magua has escaped

every previous attempt to contain him; why not this one as
well?

Before passing judgment, we would do well to file for

habeas corpus.

Where indeed is the body?

The novel's final

chapter does show us the bodies of Cora and Uncas; we can
say with certainty that Cora is killed by one of Magua's
"assistants," and Uncas by Magua himself (337).
body of Magua is withheld from us .14

But the
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Even if we accept that Magua has died, we still cannot
say how.

By Natty's bullet?

By simple exhaustion?

There

is in the end no way to decide; just where we might expect
closure, the novel presents us with an enigma, an imaging of
the end of deferral as itself a deferral.

During its most

crucial performance— when this most powerful figure of a
fully present speech might most securely ground its claims—
the rifle speaks loudly yet seems strangely silent. 15
A Natural Inscription?
Early in the novel, spying the antlers of a deer just
visible through the dense foliage of the forest, Natty brags
to Uncas that he will take the buck "atwixt the eyes, and
nearer to the right than to the left."

Uncas finds this

hard to believe:
"It cannot be! . . . all but the tips of his
horns are hid!"
"He's a boy!" said the white man, shaking his
head while he spoke, and addressing the father.
"Does he think when a hunter sees a part of the
creatur, he can't tell where the rest of him
should be!" (34)
The "marksman's aiming" has here become, in John Lynen's
words, an exercise in "mak[ing] the mind conform exactly to
the conditions of nature" (188)— and among the conditions
implied by this passage is a regular and predictable
structure, a system of formal relationships that allows the
tips of the horns to locate the rest of the animal.

The

ability to access this structure is not claimed by Natty for
himself alone, but for any skilled hunter, and his claim is
held to be true not just of this particular deer, but of any
such creature.

The ability is neither idiosyncratic nor

132

contextual, that is, but general, not parole but lanque.

It

is a function of that structure by means of which signs on
the surface of nature can indicate the realities underneath.
Shooting here tropes the reading— and by implication the
very existence— of the divine inscription itself, of the
preexisting system without which the wilderness cannot be
thought of as both natural and readable.16
But is this structure truly "divine" or "natural"?

Can

a "pure" or "virgin" nature exist that is also transparently
legible?

That is, can the term "wilderness" as it is used

in The Last of the Mohicans have any sensible referent?

The

novel repeatedly raises these questions but rather pointedly
refuses to answer them.

In the scene above, for example,

Natty makes a constative claim— about nothing less than
nature's very structure— and offers to prove it by hitting
the buck in a precisely predicted spot.

But before he can

be put to the test Chingachgook intervenes, reminding Natty
that firing would reveal their position to their enemies.
The "typifying" power of the rifle is asserted, but never
tested.

Thus let off the hook, Natty need no longer prove

his assertion; instead he merely authorizes it.

His

response to Uncas's argument is reduced to an ad hominem
dismissal— "He's a boy!"— and an attempt to align himself
with the authority of the boy's father (who notably refuses
to take sides).

The shift is from a neoplatonic claim of an

absolute formal structure to the strategic utterances of the
sophist, to "mere" rhetoric, a shift reminding us that the
antlers themselves, from the moment they are invoked as a
signifier, are no longer natural but rhetorical.

As such,
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like any other signifier, they are no longer connected
either physically or semantically to what Natty must now
merely assert as their signified.

Natty cannot know that

the antlers are not in fact connected to a human being
rather than a deer— a distinct possibility in a novel which,
as we shall see, repeatedly has its human characters
performing a cross-species drag.
In The Last of the Mohicans, Natty shoots neither at
white people nor at such "good" Indians as the Delawares,
but rather at animals and such "bad" Indians as the Hurons.
This pattern limns the readable body of the wilderness at
which he takes aim, which his rifle is to "typify."

It

manifests and objectifies this body in what for Natty are
two not-so-distinct loci: the body of the "wild" Indian as
well as that of the wild landscape.-7

These bodies are

presented as naturally inscribed, but key passages in the
novel undermine this presentation, suggesting instead that
we may think of them, in Judith Butler's terms, as having
been made to signify on their surfaces.
The body of the wilderness is presented (and
simultaneously problematized) as part of a natural
inscription that preexists any reading of it and is

held to

be always distinguishable from any merely human writing.
Every time the fleeing Magua tries to cover his tracks, for
example, altering the signs of his passage by laboriously
writing a human landscape that mimics the "natural" one, the
woodsmen are consistently able to follow the trail.
Tracking becomes reading, a matter of tracing out a string
of differences, and the fact that Natty eventually does hunt
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Magua down is not so much a vindication of his pathfinding
skills as a reification of the divine inscription, of the
notion that there is a preexisting text to be found in
nature in the first place (which in turn is perhaps the
enabling presupposition of "nature writing").
The emblematic activity here is the close reading of
the artful writing of nature.

Notably it is the doomed

Uncas, "quick of sight and keen of wit" (213) who ultimately
proves the best reader, able to pick out the trail even when
Natty and Chingachgook have lost it.is

Natty explicitly and

favorably contrasts this pathfinding prowess to the reading
ability of "the young white, who gathers his learning from
books, and can measure what he knows by the page" (213).
Magua's great skill, by contrast, is writing "realistically,"
consciously arranging the marks that signify his presence so
that they will be indistiguishable from what is held by his
readers to be the preexisting field of natural signifiers.
Whenever possible, he traverses "a rock, or a rivulet, or a
bit of earth harder than common," any place where his
passage will not create difference, will not alter
significantly the natural configuration of the wilderness.
Nonetheless the woodsmen, reading with an extreme
skepticism, consistently manage to pick out the human from
the natural signifier: whenever Magua's artifice "severed
the links of the clue they followed, the true eye of the
scout recovered them at a distance, and seldom rendered the
delay of a single moment necessary" (214).
At length, however, Magua's nature writing does come
close to succeeding.

"The trail appeared to suddenly have
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ended" (214), and even though the foresters "applied
themselves to their task in good earnest," their
"examination resulted in no discovery" (215).

They try

again, this time "going over the ground by inches":
Not a leaf was left unturned. The sticks were
removed, and the stones lifted— for Indian cunning
was known frequently to adopt these objects as
covers, labouring with the utmost patience and
industry, to conceal each footstep as they pro
ceeded. . . .
At length Uncas . . . raked the
earth across the turbid little rill from the
spring, and diverted its course into another
channel. So soon as its narrow bed below the dam
was dry, he stooped over it with keen and curious
eyes [and] pointed out the impression of a
moccasin in the moist alluvion. (215-16)
Fleshing out the implications of this clue, the landscapereaders quickly establish that David Gamut, with the largest
feet in Magua's party, had been made to go first; carrying
Cora and Alice, the Hurons had then followed precisely in
his footsteps, leaving just the one print concealed by the
water.

"I can now read the whole of it," exclaims Natty,

choosing this moment to make explicit the trope of the
wilderness-as-book (216, my emphasis).
The critical practice of the adventurers is to
diligently seek out the human signifier.
recognize it when they see it?

But how can they

They can do so only by its

difference from the natural signifier, by the difference
between the bent twig and the straight one, the moccasin
print and the undisturbed mud.

From Saussure we know that

it is only out of such differences that meaning itself may
arise; more importantly, we know that in such a system
"there are only differences," and while "a difference
generally implies positive terms between which the
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difference is set up," Saussure emphasizes that "in language
there are only differences without positive terms" (120).
The novel's opposition of a natural to a human inscription—
as two separate, opposable systems, each with its own
independent positivity— is therefore illusory, for the very
comparison of the natural and the human— the very
observation of their difference— inscribes them in a single
system of differences.

This system can be considered

neither "natural" nor "cultural," for that very distinction
arises within the system and cannot precede it.
Uncas's discovery of this human footprint reprises that
moment so crucial to western meta-physics, the "emergence"
of "man."

It is the mythic moment of origin, the

"discovery" of that initial difference which makes it
possible for "culture" to differentiate itself from its
foundational Other, "nature"— the sort of moment replayed in
contemporary discourses by such events as the discovery of
an early hominid fossil, or the teaching of a chimpanzee to
sign.

"A cry of exultation immediately announced the

success of the young warrior," says the narrator, and the
"the whole party crowded to the spot," with Natty regarding
the moccasin print "with as much admiration as a naturalist
would expend on the tusk of a mammoth or the rib of a
mastodon" (216).
But why must this moment be reprised here, at this
particular juncture of this particular novel?

The aim of

the close reading is to locate the white maidens—
particularly Alice, the imperiled future of a civilization
that will fade back into savagery if, as its symbolic
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progenitor, she is suffered to bear the children of a
"natural" race.

Haunting the novel on the one hand is this

specter of miscegnation, whose mere biological possibility
challenges the racialist notion of fundamentally separate
orders of humanity.

But in addition there is the gradual

erosion of the nature/culture distinction itself, as the
adventurers' closer and closer reading of the landscape-text
uncovers that distinction's artificiality.

In order to

sustain a literary-environmental discourse that opposes
"civilization" to "wilderness" (and white to red, male to
female, and so on) the adventurers must sustain the
nature/culture system; to maintain that system they must
rescue Alice, whose purity alone can (symbolically)
reproduce it; to rescue Alice they must follow her trail,
and to trace out her trail they must parse ever-finer
distinctions between nature and culture.

It is Magua,

always profoundly troublesome, who threatens to expose this
circularity, this lack of any genuine origin.

It is Magua

who drives them to the borderland where difference and
meaning seem to disappear, and it is precisely there that
the mythic origin of culture must be asserted and celebrated
anew.
Along with the human trail, of course, is rediscovered
the wilderness through which it leads and against which it
is conceptualized.

It is only through the recognition of

the not-quite-effaced "human" signifier, the trace of
Magua's earlier passage and intention, that wilderness-asnatural-inscription once again becomes conceivable.

In this

sense Natty Bumppo is never in an uninflected or untrammeled
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"wilderness" at all, nor can he be.

The writer of nature—

Magua or his equivalent— is always and must always be one
step ahead of the "discoverer" of nature.

Of course,

literary-environmental discourse can continue to treat its
object as natural only through the banishment of that prior
human marking; just as environmentalist discourse will
generally efface the early presence of native Americans in
order to conceive of a "virgin" American wilderness
preservable in a "pure" state, so Natty must hunt down and
eliminate Magua and his "polluting" human mark.
Yet without that mark, the wilderness fades into
illegibility— another reason, perhaps, why The Last of the
Mohicans becomes so strangely silent at the moment of
Magua's long-anticipated "destruction" (338).

When Natty

has his peripatetic antagonist where he wants him, clinging
precariously to the cliffside, ready to drop any moment
under the strain, it is, as we have seen, a moment of
intense liminality.

Natty has just moments ago mistaken the

gentle David Gamut for the evil Magua, while the narrator
uncharacteristically figures the white hero not as savvy
woodsman but as bloodthirsty animal, "crouched like a beast
about to take its spring" while "the muzzle of the half
raised rifle played like a leaf fluttering in the wind"
(338).

It is difficult, finally, to know what to make of

this image of semi-erection, of a wavering phallus which
confounds the nature/culture boundary rather than clarifying
it.

Natty does, however, manage to raise his rifle.

He

shoots, Magua falls, but we still do not know whether it is
a bullet from Kill-deer that brings the Huron down, or
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simple exhaustion.

At this most crucial point, has the

typifying power of the rifle again been merely asserted,
without being proved?

A glance at Magua's corpse, a reading

of his transfigured body, might settle the matter, but that
body is never seen again— perhaps, as I prefer to believe,
because finally it could not be tracked down.
A Performance Worth Regarding
[T]he compelling force of transvestism in
literature and culture comes . . . from its
instatement of metaphor itself, not as that for
which a literal meaning must be found, but
precisely as that without which there would be no
such thing as meaning in the first place.
— Marjorie Garber (390)
"Long ago," wrote Anne Sexton in "Red Riding Hood,"
"there was a strange deception / a wolf dressed in frills, /
a kind of transvestite."

When Marjorie Garber quotes from

this poem in her Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and
Cultural Anxiety (375), we most readily assume that what is
"strange" about the "deception" is the image of a male wolf
in female attire, the crossing of the boundaries of sex and
gender.

Yet is it not also disconcerting to ponder the

crossing of species boundaries, to view this durable image
of the nonhuman dressed up as the human?

I want now to

treat cross-species drag and performance as a form of
transvestism in its own right, a confounding of the natural
in the accoutrements of the cultural (and vice-versa).
Always an index of broader cultural crises,
transvestism invites the contextualizing and historicizing
of texts that foreground it.

Transvestism "puts in question

identities previously conceived as stable, unchallengeable,
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grounded, and 'known,'" and "this disruptive act of putting
in question" is "precisely the place, and the role, of the
transvestite" (13).

In particular, transvestism points to a

"category crisis," a "failure of definitional distinction, a
borderline that becomes permeable" (16).

Parallelling

Judith Butler’s claims for the performativity of sex and
gender, Garber argues for "the extraordinary power of
transvestism to disrupt . . . the very notion of the
'original.'"
"not the

Category

crisis itself is seen ultimately as

exception but rather

the ground of culture";by

forcing and negotiating such crisis, transvestism in fact
"creates culture" (16, my emphasis).
Shirley Samuels has suggested that in writing The Last
of the Mohicans, Cooper may have been influenced by a LeniLenape origin myth in which
the drawing of human beings into culture is
accomplished by the pursuit and consumptionof the
natural. . . . The emergence of persons is thus
linked to the marking of the difference between
what's natural and what's cultural: nature worship
only becomes possible once the separation between
persons and nature has been violently effected.19
Any blurring of this "violently effected" separation raises
the specter of the submergence of persons, in a sort of
"miscegnation between nature and culture" (89), and the
latter half of Cooper's novel thematizes just this threat.
Beyond the merely personal interests of the white men who
seek the two white women out, the motivation is as much to
frustrate Magua's sexual claim on Cora as it is to
facilitate the courtship of Alice and Duncan.

This

obsession with racial stability is just one facet of the
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broader aim of effecting and maintaining separation
generally; it is necessarily bound up with the fixing of
other threatened categories, such as those of gender and
class, that are also seen as natural.

Near the conclusion

of the novel, for example, the liberal Munro makes a plea
for a general equality of gender, class, and race, hoping
that, if only in the afterlife,

"the time shall not be

distant, when we may assemble . . . without distinction of
sex, or rank, or colour."

Natty does not simply reject this

plea, but stabilizes "sex, rank,

and color" all at once by

subsuming them in the arche-category, nature: "To tell them
this," he says, "would be to tell them that the snows come
not in the winter, or that the sun shines fiercest when the
trees are stripped of their leaves!" (347).
But despite such conservative pronouncements of a
naturally fixed cultural order, the plot shift from chase to
rescue in The Last of the Mohicans occasions a discursive
shift from a foundationalist to a relativist and
performative worldview.

Before, the heroes' strategy hinged

upon the correct "close reading" of the wild body, a
strategy predicated upon a traditional view of Truth and
epitomized by the ability of careful reading to expose
Magua's artificial inscription— his artifice— by
distinguishing it from the seemingly natural inscription of
the wilderness.

Once the two women have been located,

however, the heroes rely almost wholly on artifices of their
own, on rhetoric and performance, on the contextualized
understanding of signifying practices seen as strategic
rather than simply "true" or "false."

As the novel
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approaches its finale, its groundings move away from Natty's
notion of a stable nature and toward the fluidity of
performance— suggesting that nature is not "natural" at all
but performative.
Critics have long complained of how Cooper's alwaysshaky plotting threatens to break down entirely toward the
end of The Last of the Mohicans, and of how this threat
necessitates the absurd substitutions which end up carrying
the plot— Heyward's impersonation of a native healer,
Natty's performance of a bear, Uncas's decidedly superior
performance of that bear, Chingachgook's performance of a
beaver, and so on.

But it is not just the plot that is

breaking down by this point: in addition, the crucial
silences of the speaking gun and the persistent insinuation
of human rhetoric into the putatively natural inscription of
the wild body precipitate a sense of category crisis, of a
breakdown in the very structures by means of which nature
and culture have been separated in the first place.

In the

wake of these twin failures, the book's drag scenes are not
ludicrous at all, but predictable attempts to reinstate the
threatened categories via another strategy.
Traveling deep in enemy territory, Duncan Heyward is
brought up short by what he will later discover to be a
beaver pond, but at first takes to be an Indian village:
The water fell out of this wide basin, in a
cataract so regular and gentle, that it appeared
rather to be the work of human hands, than
fashioned by nature. A hundred earthen dwellings
stood on the margin of the lake. . . . Their
rounded roofs, admirably moulded for defence
against the weather, denoted more of industry and
foresight, than the natives were wont to bestow on
their regular habitations. . . . [T]ne whole
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village or town, which ever it might be termed,
possessed more of method and neatness of execu
tion, than the white men had been accustomed to
believe belonged, ordinarily, to the Indian
habits. (218-219)
Heyward ponders this scene for several minutes, then sees
the "suspicious and inexplicable movements" of what he takes
to be natives but are really animals.

He next spies a human

form which he and Natty both take for an Indian but is
really a white man, David Gamut.

When all is revealed a

moment later, the narrator explicitly implicates his readers
in these unwitting performances, as usual aligning their
point of view with Heyward's:
The reader may better imagine, than we describe,
the surprise of Heyward. His lurking Indians were
suddenly converted into four-footed beasts; his
lake into a beaver pond; his cataract into a dam,
constructed by those industrious and ingenious
quadrupeds; and a suspected enemy into a true
friend. (222)
Neither Gamut nor the beavers have been consciously
performing here; they have not been wearing masks which they
suddenly doff so as to reveal the "true" significations of
their "natural" surfaces.

The "converting" is accomplished

rather by the narrator, who disguises his own activity in
the passive voice ("were suddenly converted").

Occupying

the position of grammatical subject that is thereby emptied
out we find various manifestations of "nature": the lake,
the cataract, the putatively "natural" Indians, and the
Other more generally: the "enemy."

The narrator further

effaces his own agency by subordinating his descriptions and
manipulations to the imaginations of his readers.

Yet the

effect— the reader's surprise— is the same as the shock that
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would have been effected by a consciously performed drag.
This little parable of misrecognition "acts" just like a
performance, yet appears "natural," a mere mistake on
Duncan's part.
Even after this naturalized performance has been
revealed, after the confused categories have supposedly been
clarified, there remains a certain residue of confusion.
The narrator leaves us not quite sure whether beavers are
wild (undomesticated animals) or civilized (intelligent and
industrious beings who construct well ordered communities).
The cultural continues to feel strangely natural, even as
the wild (cataract and lake) remains oddly artifactual and
human (dam and pond).
Later, at this same spot, Chingachgook dons the mask of
a beaver and affords readers a "real" performance of nature.
The spectacle this time is not that of a white man taking
animals for humans but of an Indian taking a human for an
animal.

As a party of Huron warriors file past the pond,

they pause to allow a member of the party to address this
"beaver" as his totemic kinsmen.

The warrior speaks "as if

he were addressing more intelligent beings" (284); as the
Hurons proceed into the forest, we readers find out what '
they never do: that they had been observing a more
intelligent being.
Had any of the Hurons turned to look behind them,
they would have seen the animal watching their
movements with an interest and sagacity that might
easily have been mistaken for reason. Indeed, so
very distinct and intelligible were the devices of
the quadruped, that even the most experienced
observer would have been at a loss to account for
its actions, until . . . the party entered the
forest, when the whole would have been explained,
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by seeing the entire animal issue from the lodge,
uncasing, by the act, the grave features of
Chingachgook from his mask of fur. (285)
Unlike Duncan, the novice woodsman, the experienced Hurons
should not have been so easily taken in.

The narrator makes

it sound simple enough: all they had to do was turn around
and look.

The plot, however, requires that they not look—

doing so would disconcert the adventurers' battle plan— and
so they do not.

In this scene the success of Chingachgook's

performance is notably not attributable to his skill; his
performance is marred by "distinct and intelligible"
"devices" that might easily have tipped off the observer.
The ability to detect the original beneath the mask— to limn
thewilderness by separating the natural from the cultural—
is no longer seen as a matter of acuteness of perception,

of

the sort of "close reading" performed upon the landscape
earlier by Uncas and Natty; it has instead become just
another narratorial device.
There is a certain playfulness in the way Cooper
highlights his narrator's and his readers' complicity in
these performances, but the question they raise is serious
enough:

How are we to know that any object presented to

readers as natural or original— right on up to that object
viewed as the most natural, that sine qua non of nature, the
wilderness— is not itself performed, a performance that a
self-effacing narrator chooses not to reveal to us in the
same way Cooper's narrator refuses to reveal Chingachgook to
the Hurons?

Significantly, I think, this question arises at

just the spot where Heyward was himself taken in.

If the

146

novel interpellates us as Heyward’s symbolic descendants,
the legatees of his readerly skills and weaknesses, it also
warns us to read with caution, to keep in mind the
possibility that beneath the surface of the signifiers of
the wild lay not some wild essence or foundation, but merely
the "grave features" of a human intention esconced in a
"mask of fur."20
According to Judith Butler, what is parodied in
transvestism is not any particular identity, but the very
"notion of an original . . . identity" (138).

At the Huron

camp, Duncan praises Natty's performance of the bear in
terms that similarly privilege performance over original,
noting that "the animal itself might have been shamed by the
representation" (257).

Natty responds that he

should be a poor scholar, for one who has studied
so long in the wilderness, did I not know how to
set forth the movements and natur of such a beast!
Had it been now a catamount, or even a full sized
painter [panther], I would have embellished a
performance, for you, worth regarding! But it is
no such marvellous feat to exhibit the feats of so
dull a beast; though, for that matter too, a bear
may be over acted! Yes, yes; it is not every
imitator that knows natur may be outdone easier
than she is equalled. (257-258)
Reappearing in this parody is the figure of the book, of
Natty's years of reading of the natural inscription.

But

here, reading is only a sort of hueristic, no longer an
attainment of Truth but a prelude to performance.

Before,

Natty's scholarship had consisted of reading nature,
learning to aim, making his mind "conform" to the wilder
ness, and it culminated in shooting, in proving out the
truths inherent in nature's preexisting structure.

Here,
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however, nature study culminates in drag and performance, in
the active creation of surface significations whose truth or
accuracy is contingent, ultimately ascertainable only in the
local efficacy of a performance.21
The emphasis on drag in The Last of the Mohicans
thoroughly undermines the earlier notion of the wilderness
"as mute, prior to culture, awaiting the inscription-asincision of the masculine signifier for entrance into
language and culture" (Butler 147-148).

Like the human

body, the "body" of "nature" must be seen as "not a 'being,'
but a variable boundary, a surface whose permeability is
politically regulated, a signifying practice within a
cultural field" (139).22

To introduce this episode that so

tellingly interweaves the themes of nature, culture, gender,
and performance, Cooper quotes from A Midsummer Night's
Dream, and the allusion neatly foreshadows the chapter's
theme of the play within the play, preparing us for the
dizzily nested performances to follow.

It also succinctly

emblematizes what I have taken to be the very "meaning of
this masquerade" (256), the performativity of wilderness
"itself."

"Have you the lion's part written?" asks Snug in

this epigraph, linking one of our most potent symbols of
wildness to the thoroughly human realm of discourse and
performance.

Answers Quince: "You may do it extempore, for

it is nothing but roaring" (255).
Notes to Chapter Three
1 I want to examine "by what enigmatic means" the
wilderness has "been accepted as a prima facie given that
admits of no genealogy." Butler writes that
[e]ven within Foucault's essay on the very theme
of genealogy, the body is figured as a surface and
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the scene of a cultural inscription: "the body is
the inscribed surface of events." The task of
genealogy, he claims, is "to expose a body totally
imprinted by history." (129)
Noting, however, the way that Foucault referred to "the goal
of 'history'" as the "'destruction of the body,'" Butler
continues:
As 'a volume in perpetual disintegration,' the
body is always under siege, suffering destruction
by the very terms of history. And history is the
creation of values and meanings by a signifying
practice that requires the subjection of the body.
2 This sort of commodification of nature was not unique
to Audubon, but in his case it is acutely obvious, if only
because he personally participated in the entire process.
He observed and shot the birds; he then represented them,
via the arts of taxidermy and writing as well as painting;
he then sought out and developed a market for those
representations; and he finally supervised their material
reproduction and distribution. It is in Audubon's case
particularly easy to see the literary environmentalist's
activities not as a break from but as continuous with the
earlier, more obviously economic activities of the sawmill
owner and the taxidermist.
3 Audubon's love of hunting has been widely noted. I
would add here an incident, detailed in Audubon's letters,
that very curiously links the gun to issues of gender,
representation, and identity. In February of 1821, when
Audubon was in New Orleans, a woman secretively commissioned
him to draw a nude portrait of her. Upon returning to this
job each day, Audubon found that the woman herself had
worked on the drawing, "not, she explained, because she was
dissatisfied, but because she wanted to mingle her own
talents with his." The portrait finished, the woman then
"signed it as though it had been her own," placing Audubon's
name "in a dark corner where it would be difficult to find"
(Adams 232). As payment she purchased an expensive gun
Audubon had picked out earlier and which she had engraved
with an emblem of her own design.
Not long after, along with hundreds of other men and
presumably with his new gun in tow, Audubon spent a day
hunting the golden plovers then arriving in huge flocks in
Louisiana. His own take is unreported, but he estimated the
kill that day alone at 144,000. His biographer, Alexander
Adams, writes cagily of Audubon that "[t]he adventure with
the erotic woman had done much to raise his spirits and so
had the sight of the golden plovers" (234).
4 Elaborating on the "historical mode of signification"
that has produced gender, Butler has theorized the dynamics
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of this mystification. If "the creation of values . . .
requires the destruction of’the body," then that very
destruction implies that "there must be a body prior to that
inscription, stable and self-identical, subject to that
sacrificial destruction," so that the very fact of inscription
seems to point to and to valorize (for we only "sacrifice"
what we value) some prediscursive natural body. Butler
continues with the observation that "cultural values emerge
as the result of an inscription on the body, understood as a
medium, indeed, a blank page." But
in order for this inscription to signify . . .
that medium must itself be destroyed— that is,
fully transvaluated into a sublimated domain of
values. Within the metaphorics of this notion of
cultural values is the figure of history as a
relentless writing instrument, and the body as the
medium which must be destroyed and transfigured in
order for "culture" to emerge. (130)
5 I will examine in detail the operation of this figure
in Cooper's violent wilderness novel, The Last of the
Mohicans, but it could be traced as well through other texts
in what might be considered a distinct genre of "nature
writing" that emanates, like Audubon's, from the barrel of a
gun: the trophies and essays of the noted conservationist
Teddy Roosevelt, for example, or (as Haraway has so vividly
shown) the dioramas created for the American Museum of
Natural History by Carl Akeley (26-54). Audubon in this
sense should not be seen as a "minor" nature writer, but as
one of the creators of the very object and medium of nature
writing, as an inventor of nature "itself."
6 Pioneers 80, 290; Mohicans 121.
Cooper quotations are from Mohicans.

All subsequent

7 Even such a demonized character as Magua, presented
more generally as an inveterate liar, is perceived as
speaking a truth when he says of the exploitative, landhungry "white man" that "his gluttony makes him sick," that
"God gave him enough, and yet he wants all" (301). In a
novel that more generally condemns the crossing of racial
boundaries, this universalized appreciation of nature is one
of few points on which voices both white and red find common
ground.
8 It is only when the novelist cannot have his story
thus "directly conjured from the natural scenery" that he
resorts to his sometimes absurd plots: "Cooper tends to an
excess of action because, in a more fundamental sense, he
can portray no action at all. Since his characters cannot
develop, their deeds" function mainly to create "visual
panoramas rather than a coherent story" (Lynen 179).
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9 This exemplary maiden and her partner, one of the
Hurons1 "bravest young men" (256), are the only Indian
couple put forth by the novel, as are Alice and Duncan, as a
procreative link to a racially unmixed future. Heyward is
spared the burden of any responsibility for figuratively
dooming an entire race by his failure to cure this woman:
"A single look was sufficient to apprise the pretended
leech, that the invalid was far beyond his powers of heal
ing"; the "slight qualm of conscience which had been excited
by the intended deception, was instantly appeased" (253).
10 Heyward's foil here is the aged Tamenund, regarded,
like Washington, as the father "of a nation" (Mohicans 305).
A figure "deeply venerated" and "well beloved," Tamenund has
"the dignity of a monarch, and the air of a father" (294).
The similarity of the two names is obvious enough, each with
three syllables, each syllable of the one retaining a
phonological correlate of the other: Wash/Tam, ing/en,
ton/und. It is significant that the elderly chief's star is
fading as that of the young white officer is rising.
11 My argument in this section draws upon Eric
Cheyfitz's "Literally White, Figuratively Red," especially
his comments on The Last of the Mohicans1 figures of the
book, writing, and orality (91-92 n. 17).
12 According both Spaniard and native a precise place
in a global teleology, the Requerimiento fixes identities
for both speaker and auditor, reaffirming the colonial in
his familiar heritage and completely reconstructing the
Indian into a "religious and legal fiction," in Cheyfitz's
words, a "pure figure" whose own specificities are "formally
denied" (74). The document's narration of the deeds of the
(Church) fathers subsumes native histories into an allencompassing patrilineage, claiming thereby a preexisting
and eternal dominion over both native peoples and their
lands.
13 These differing stresses on ritual and iconoclasm
might be seen as corresponding to contemporary Catholic and
Protestant theological styles. See Kibbey 42-64.
14 Mohicans features two extended episodes that
foreshadow Magua's demise, and in each the narrator is
ambiguous as to the efficacy of the rifle and fails to
"produce the body." During the battle at Glenn's Falls, a
Huron sniper is wounded and dislodged from his perch in an
oak tree. Duncan Heyward calls for a shot that would end
the man's suffering, but Natty refuses to fire again, citing
the need to preserve powder. Then, contravening his own
advice, he makes as if to fire anyway.
"Three several times
the scout raised his piece in mercy, and as often prudence

151

getting the better of his intention, it was again silently
lowered."
At length, one hand of the Huron lost its hold,
and dropped exhausted to his side. A desperate
and fruitless struggle to recover the branch
succeeded, and then the savage was seen for a
fleeting instant, grasping wildly at the empty
air. The lightning is not quicker than was the
flame from the rifle of Hawk-eye; the limbs of the
victim trembled and contracted, the head fell to
the bosom, and the body parted the foaming waters
. . . and every vestige of the unhappy Huron was
lost forever. (75, my emphasis)
15 This studied silence can be compared to the way,
following an earlier battle scene, Natty goes around making
sure his Huron victims have in fact been dispatched, making
a "circuit of the dead, into whose senseless bosoms he
thrust his long knife, with as much coolness, as if they had
been so many brute carcasses" (114). Natty has reason for
this brutality. Just moments earlier, Magua had been
engaged in a furious and seemingly fatal struggle with
Chingachgook. Natty tried to pick off the Huron with Killdeer, but— in yet another image of a category crisis, an
extreme fluidity, that occasions a figurative impotency— he
found the two Indian bodies indistinguishable, too tightly
intertwined to get a sure aim. Chingachgook finally gets
the upper hand and manages to stab his foe, apparently
killing him.
"Magua suddenly relinquished his grasp," we
read, "and fell backward, without motion, and, seemingly,
without life." Natty, "elevating the butt of the long and
fatal rifle," then wishes to settle the matter with a blow
to Magua's skull.
But, at the very moment when the dangerous weapon
was in the act of descending, the subtle Huron
rolled swiftly from beneath the danger, over the
edge of the precipice, and falling on his feet,
was seen leaping, with a single bound, into the
center of a thicket of low bushes, which clung
along its sides. The Delawares, who had believed
their enemy dead, uttered their exclamation of
surprise, and were following with speed and
clamour . . . when a shrill and peculiar cry of
the scout, instantly changed their purpose, and
recalled them to the summit of the hill. (114)
The precipice, the falling, the last-minute failure of the
rifle— all these prefigure the circumstances of the novel's
climax and warn us that rumors of Magua's death ought always
to be considered premature.

16 My argument in this section elaborates on Cheyfitz's
characterization of Natty Bumppo as a "consummate 'reader'"
of nature (66).
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Throughout The Last of the Mohicans, the Indian body
is assumed to be as transparently readable as the wilderness
of which it is figured as a part. Consider the narrator's
comments on the shooting of the Oneida sniper in Chapter 19.
"In place of that eager and garrulous narration, with which
a white youth would have endeavoured to communicate" such a
triumph, Uncas prefers "to let his deeds speak for themselves"
by "quietly expos[ing] the fatal tuft of hair, which he bore
as the symbol of victory" (195). Chingachgook performs a
close reading of this fragment of a body, placing "his hand
on the scalp, and consider[ing] it for a moment with deep
attention" before proclaiming: "Oneida!" (195-6).
Natty proceeds to explain to Duncan that while "to
white eyes there is no difference between this bit of skin
and that of any other Indian," Chingachgook can read it
"with as much ease as if the scalp was the leaf of a book,
and each hair a letter" (196). The palpability of the scalp
approximates and figures the sort of presence that western
metaphysics associates with speech, and Natty attempts to
infuse that presence into his own figures of writing and the
book. It is notable— but by now should not be surprising—
that this linguistic parable is occasioned by the shooting
of the Oneida. See Cheyfitz 92.
18 The novel posits no successor to the skilled readers
Natty, Chingachgook, and Uncas. The future belongs instead
to Heyward, whose notions of language are quite different
from Natty's. When, for example, Magua questions Heyward
about the whereabouts of Uncas, whom Magua is hotly
pursuing, Heyward's linguistic sophistication allows him to
turn deferral into delay:
"Le Cerf Agile is not here?"
"I know not whom you call the 'nimble deer,'"
said Duncan, gladly profiting by any excuse to
create delay.
"Uncas," returned Magua, pronouncing the
Delaware name with even greater difficulty than he
spoke his English words.
"'Bounding Elk' is what
the white man says when he calls to the young
Mohican."
"Here is some confusion of names between us,
le Renard," said Duncan, hoping to provoke a
discussion.
"Daim is the French for deer, and
cerf for stag; elan is the true term, when one
would speak of an elk."
"Yes," muttered the Indian in his native
tongue; "the pale faces are prattling women! they
have two words for each thing, while a red skin
will make the sound of his voice speak for him."
Then changing his language, he continued, adhering
to the imperfect nomenclature of his provincial
instructors, "The deer is swift, but weak; the elk
is swift, but strong; and the son of 'le serpent'
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is 'le cerf agile.' Has he leaped the river to
the woods?"
"If you mean the younger Delaware, he too is
gone down with the water." (91)
The signifier slides endlessly and the exchange ends not
with an absolute but with a conditional: "If you mean . . ."
As Magua tries to pin it down, the signified literally gets
away from him. Heyward's strategy exemplifies Cheyfitz's
notion of colonial figuration as a way of "precisely not
understanding the other" (74).
19 Samuels 89. In its arguments concerning gender and
performance, this chapter is indebted to Samuels's insights
in "Generation through Violence."
20 The coperformances at the beaver pond reaffirm John
Lynen's contention that Cooper's wilderness landscapes, just
like his plots and his characters, are completely dependent
for any force they may have on our active cooperation as
readers. The reifying traffic between "human values and
natural forms" is for Lynen rooted in our desire to make
sense of the inconsistencies and gaps in the text. In
Butler's terms, such "[c]oherence is desired, wished for,
idealized," and "this idealization is an effect of a
corporeal signification"— of a mask of fur, in this case, an
outside that signifies but does not reliably correspond with
an inside.
21 The overwhelming sense of a "natural" body is an
effect, writes Butler, with "no ontological status apart
from the various acts which constitute its reality" (136).
And, as with cross-gender drag, the cross-species drag that
so engages the reader of The Last of the Mohicans "implicitly
reveals" a completely "imitative structure." Indeed,
part of the pleasure, the giddiness of the
performance is in the recognition of a radical
contingency . . . [This notion of] parody does
not assume that there is an original which such
parodic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is
of the very notion of an original, . . . a fantasy
of a fantasy, the transfiguration of an Other who
is always already a "figure" in that double sense.
The "original" is revealed as "an imitation without an
origin," and what "postures as an imitation" is a
"production," part of a "perpetual displacement" (138).
22 Certainly the novel portrays its wild performances
as culturally situated, directed toward specific interloc
utors rather than any "universal." In order for Heyward to
perform the Huron healer, for example, Chingachgook must
reinscribe his civilized body as "savage," a process
compared, appropriately enough, to landscape painting (228).
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"[T]he Sagamore can . . . make a natural fool of you,"
through a practice figured as fully artifactual, as an
oxymoronic "making" "natural" that cannot be assimilated
into any foundational notion of an un-made nature.
Chingachgook, "long practised in all the subtle arts of
his race," proceeds to draw upon Heyward "the fantastic
shadow that the natives were accustomed to consider as the
evidence of a friendly and jocular disposition," making sure
that "[e]very line that could possibly be interpreted into a
secret inclination for war, was carefully avoided" (229).
The Indian body that was earlier as transparent as its twin,
the body of the wilderness, is now to be signified by an
intentional alignment, not with any universal inscription,
but with the customs and codes of a specific interpretive
community.

CHAPTER FOUR
Writing the "Nation's Park": Three Views of Yosemite

Yosemite's early history has been recounted several
times, most recently by Rebecca Solnit in Savage Dreams, and
I will review the story only briefly here.1 For centuries,
Native Americans of California's Miwok tribe had lived in
and around the valley, creating a history of their own
which, like the Miwok people themselves, still disrupts the
"official" historical narrative of the region.2

That

official history, the Euro-American "written record," began
late in the fall of 1833, when Joseph Reddeford Walker tried
to lead a party of fur trappers across the Sierra Nevada to
the Pacific Ocean and got bogged down in the snows of the
Sierra Nevada, somewhere along the high mountain divide
between the Merced and Tuolumne rivers.

According to the

memoir of Zenas Leonard, it was while searching for a way
off of this divide that he found himself looking down upon
huge waterfalls that would, as he put it, "precipitate
themselves from one lofty precipice to another, until they
are exhausted in rain below," and upon cliffs that seemed
"to be more than a mile high."

This was almost certainly

the "first white sighting" of Yosemite Valley.

But because

Leonard's account was not widely circulated at the time and
generated no public interest in the region, historians have
generally declined to credit him with the valley's
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discovery.

In order to "count," a discovery must be more

than a first white sight; it must also introduce the object
into discourse, and Leonard's account almost immediately
fell into obscurity.

There is no evidence that the Walker

party exercised even the most perfunctory of the discursive
privileges of the "first white man to see," that of naming
what has been seen.
The white men who finally did exercise this Adamic
prerogative were members of the Mariposa Battallion,
participants in the so-called Mariposa Indian War of 18511853.

The excuse advanced for this lopsided "war" was the

killing of three men at a trading post owned by James
Savage, an opportunistic and extraordinarily successful
miner, trader, and frontiersman whom Rebecca Solnit has
aptly compared to Joseph Conrad's Mr. Kurtz (338).

Savage's

main concern in the events appears to have been to shore up
his sagging trading empire, which had been based largely on
his personal initiative and authority; the war may, in fact,
have begun as little more than "a personal vendetta" (272).
But Savage managed to convince local authorities that this
isolated incident at the trading post might spark a mass
uprising, and he was authorized to form a militia unit, the
Mariposa Battallion, and to place himself in charge.
The war itself was neither spectacular nor particularly
successful.

Tracking a group of Miwok families led by Chief

Tenaya into Yosemite Valley in March of 1851, the battallion
found only one Indian among the abandoned villages— an
elderly woman who had been unable to flee with the rest.
Rather than pursue and engage the absent Miwoks, Savage and
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his men spent the next three days systematically searching
the valley floor, torching every dwelling and all the food
stores they could find— a scorched-earth policy that
eventually brought many of Tenaya's followers, if only
temporarily, to the reservation.

It was during this brief

initial foray that the soldiers decided to christen the
valley "Yosemity," apparently in the mistaken belief that
this was its native designation.

A second Mariposa

expedition followed in May, pursuing and capturing Tenaya
and several dozen followers who had slipped away from the
reservation.

In 1852, responding to a report that Miwok

tribesmen had killed two white miners at Bridalveil Meadows,
federal troops invaded the valley, where they found and
summarily executed five Indians.

Tenaya, meanwhile, had

left the reservation a second time and crossed the mountains
to live with a group of Paiute Indians in eastern
California.

He was never recaptured, and died in 1853— not,

apparently, doing battle with the whites but as the result
of an argument with some Paiutes.3
As newspaper accounts of the Mariposa War filtered to
the outside world, attention shifted from the fighting to
Yosemite itself.

Public interest in the valley grew

exponentially, and by 1863 the movement was afoot to
preserve it as a park.

The details of this crucial

institutionalization, unfortunately, are still not clearly
understood.

California's Senator John Conness, who

introduced the Yosemite park bill in Congress in the spring
of 1864, claimed later that the idea had been presented to
him by several "gentlemen . . .

of fortune, of taste, and of
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refinement," but he did not name them.

Future park

superintendent Fredrick Law Olmsted may or may not have been
among them; other likely candidates include Thomas Starr
King, who was the author of a popular book on New England's
White Mountains and who was then planning a book on the
Sierra Nevada, and Israel Ward Raymond, a representative of
the Central American Steamship Transit Company (which stood
to benefit from increased tourist travel to California).
This first park bill was not prompted by any organized
popular movement; unlike most later environmental
legislation, it sparked no public debate and was approved
rapidly and quietly in Congress.

President Lincoln,

preoccupied with Civil War matters, signed it into law in
the summer of 1864.4
First View: Lafayette Bunnell and "The Best Prospect Yet"
[T]o aestheticize morality is to make it ideolog
ically effective. . . .
If the aesthetic comes
. . . to assume the significance it does, it is
because the word is shorthand for a whole project
of hegemony, the massive introjection of abstract
reason by the life of the senses. What matters is
not in the first place art, but this process of
refashioning the human subject from the inside,
informing its subtlest affections and bodily
responses with this law that is not a law.
— Terry Eagleton (40, 42-43)
Little would be known of the Mariposa War, and even
less about the Mariposa Battallion's "discovery" of
Yosemite, were it not for the participation of Lafayette
Bunnell, who recorded the events in his Discovery of the
Yosemite and the Indian War of 1851 Which Led to that Event.
Bunnell was born in Rochester, New York in 1824 "and carried
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to Western wilds in 1833," the same year that Zenas Leonard
had peered down into the valley from its snowbound
perimeter.

In the West, as Bunnell rather apologetically

wrote, his "opportunities for culture were limited"; in
particular he "found that the experiences of frontier life"
had not provided him with "the best preparations for
literary effort" (ix).

His Yosemite book, "his first

attempt at authorship," was also his last; no one has ever
called The Discovery of the Yosemite a literary masterpiece.
Why did Bunnell write the book at all?

Like Zenas

Leonard before him, he was the most literate member of his
party and may on that account have felt a special
responsibility for chronicling events.

He claimed that the

many secondhand accounts of the war were "so mutilated or
blended with fiction" as to warrant "a renewed and full
statement of facts," and he did not deem it "just" that
readers "should forget the deeds of [the] men who had
subdued her savages, and discovered her most sublime
scenery" (ix).

On the other hand, he waited nearly thirty

years before publishing his own version of those events; it
seems likely his real motivation was a desire to link his
name and fortunes retroactively to what had become a worldfamous locale.
Neither Bunnell's timeliness nor his accuracy concerns
me here, however.

Much more interesting is The Discovery of

the Yosemite's literary-environmental structure, its casual
and ubiquitous linkage of "subdued savages" and "sublime
scenery."

Representative in this regard is the book's

description of Major Savage's burning of a native food
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cache— a passage that Bunnell seems to have crafted
carefully and that is worth quoting in full.

A certain

quantity of captured food had been set aside for the
soldiers' own use, but as their work was nearly complete,
this reserve, too, has been put to the torch.

Bunnell,

meanwhile, has just returned from a day of "exploring,"
enjoying the scenery and searching for any remaining food
stores; "the flames were leaping high" as he addresses
himself to Savage:
I briefly, but with some enthusiasm, described my
view from the cliff up the North Canon, the Mirror
Lake view of Half Dome, the fall of the South
Canon and the view of the distant South Dome. I
volunteered a suggestion that some new tactics
would have to be devised before we should be able
to corral the "Grizzlies" or "smoke them out."
The major looked up from the charred mass of
burning acorns, and as he glanced down the smoky
valley, said, "This affords the best prospect of
any yet discovered; just look!"
"Splendid!" I
promptly replied, "Yo-sem-i-te must be beautifully
grand a few weeks later when the foliage and
flowers are at their prime, and the rush of waters
has somewhat subsided. Such cliffs and water
falls I never saw before, and I doubt if they
exist in any other place." I was surprised and
somewhat irritated by the hearty laugh with which
my reply was greeted. The major caught the
expression of my eye and shrugged his shoulders as
he hastily said "I suppose that is all right,
Doctor, about the water-falls, etc., for there are
enough of them here for one locality, as we have
all discovered; but my remark was not in reference
to the scenery, but the prospect of the Indians
being starved out, and of their coming in to sue
for peace. We have all been more or less wet
since we rolled up our blankets this morning, and
the fire is very enjoyable, but the prospect that
it offers to my mind of smoking out the Indians is
more agreeable to me than its warmth or all the
scenery in creation." (91-92)
The difference between these two men, the axis of their
misunderstanding, is figured compactly in the word
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"prospect," by which Savage means a pleasing vision of the
future but which Bunnell takes to mean the aesthetic beauty
of the presently visible landscape.

This ambiguous term,

"prospect," in fact has a long history in colonialist travel
narrative.

Mary Louise Pratt has shown how it invariably

implicates such writing in an imperialist teleology, how it
points always toward "the goal of expanding the capitalist
world system."

In the texts which foreground this sort of

dual "prospect,"
European enterprise is seldom mentioned, but the
sight/site as textualizea consistently presupposes
a global transformation that, whether the I/eye
likes it or not, is already understood to be
underway.
In scanning prospects in the spatial
sense— as landscape panoramas— this eye knows
itself to be looking at prospects in the temporal
sense— as possibilities for the future, resources
to be developed, landscapes to be peopled or
repeopled by Europeans.
(125)
The distinction between the presently visible landscape and
the imagined future occupation and reconfiguration of that
landscape tends to become blurred in such writing.

Bunnell,

for example, uses "prospect" in its present-tense sense of
"scenery," but also enlists the present scene to prefigure a
peaceful future when the unpleasant and distracting "rush"
of events will have subsided and "the foliage and flowers
[will be] at their prime."

Similarly, Savage's genocidal

work is future-oriented (the fire will eventually result in
the Miwoks "coming in to sue for peace") but also presently
satisfying (its warmth "is very enjoyable").

This temporal

confusion is further complicated in this particular text by
the fact that the narrator— who speaks in the eighteen
fifties— is the same "I" as the author— who writes nearly
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thirty years later, from within the reconfigured future
toward which the text points.
It is important to note that Bunnell does not see the
battallion's genocidal activities as any less ethical than
Savage does.

Bunnell is not horrified by the major's

laughter, merely "irritated"; he does not see the
battallion's activities as unethical, merely distasteful.
What he arrogates to himself in passages such as this is not
a moral high ground but a superior sensibility, and in the
process what strikes us today as the crucial issue, the
immorality of ethnic cleansing, is deflected from ethics to
aesthetics.
In so doing, The Discovery of the Yosemite exemplifies
the more general ideological function of aesthetic
discourse.

As Terry Eagleton has shown in his analysis of

Alexander Baumgarten's Aesthetica— the philosophical
treatise, published in 1750, which first theorized the
modern notion of the aesthetic— such discourse should "be
read as symptomatic of an ideological dilemma," of what was
then a vexing question: "how can reason, that most
immaterial of faculties, grasp the grossly sensuous?"

The

answer lay in the aesthetic, conceived as a new form of
"cognition" that "mediates between the generalities of
reason and the particulars of sense" (15).

Through such

mediation, power becomes "aestheticized," rendered "at one
with the body's spontaneous impulses, entwined with
sensibility and the affections" (20).

The primary

ideological effect of this aestheticizing is to
significantly "transform the relations" between "morality
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and knowledge" (28).

The Earl of Shaftesbury would make

this transformation more explicit, claiming, as Eagleton
summarizes, that
there is somewhere within our immediate experience
a sense with all the unerring intuition of
aesthetic taste, which discloses the moral order
to us. Such is the celebrated "moral sense" of
the eighteenth-century moralists, which allows us
to experience right and wrong with all the
swiftness of the senses.
(34)
The aesthetic aligns morality with "the springs of
sensibility," positing a moral sense that "consists in 'a
real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a
real affection or love towards equity and right, for its own
sake, and on account of its natural beauty and worth'" (34).
This mapping of the rational onto the sensual has a
tremendous ideological efficacy, because "feelings, unlike
propositions, cannot be controverted" (38).
The aesthetic becomes "an ethics entwined with the
sensuous affections," an "alternative" to a genuine ethics
(35).

But where a genuine ethics would concern itself with

reasoning out the morality of actions, the aesthetic routes
such concerns into an appreciation of the beauty of what is
(above all) seen— just as Bunnell’s play on the "prospect"
collapses action-in-time into a timeless "view":
Beauty, truth and goodness are ultimately at one:
what is beautiful is harmonious, what is
harmonious is true, and what is at once true and
beautiful is agreeable and good. . . . "For what
is there on earth a fairer matter of speculation,
a goodlier view or contemplation, than that of a
beautiful, proportion'd, and becoming action?"
. . . Truth for this passed-over Platonist is an
artistic apprehension of the world's inner design:
to understand something is to grasp its propor
tioned place in the whole. (35, my emphases)
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In Bunnell's case, this atemporal, spatialized "whole"
functions as a sort of synchronic equivalent to the selfserving capitalist teleology whose goal is the acquisition
and transformation of the entire American continent.

To

view the (literally) spectacular Yosemite landscape is to
apprehend Manifest Destiny itself, the larger design within
which acts of genocide have their "proportioned place."
In The Discovery of the Yosemite. Bunnell invokes the
temporal and the atemporal simultaneously, setting up a
division of ideological labor in which he aestheticizes the
battallion's activity while the less sophisticated Savage
rationalizes it.

Savage subordinates the sensual pleasure

of the warmth afforded by the burning food stores to the
rational prospect of military victory; he rejects feeling in
favor of the prospect offered to his "mind," his calculated
awareness of the likely historical effect of his actions.
He understands the rightness of his actions through reason,
albeit a reasoning we today find repugnant.

Bunnell, by

contrast, opts for the prospect that presents itself to his
eye.

He understands essentially the same thing— he no more

doubts the rightness of his actions than does Savage— but
he apprehends this skewed morality aesthetically, in a mode
of understanding which today we do not find repugnant at
all.
Bunnell repeatedly stresses his own aesthetic
apprehension and just as frequently contrasts those tender
feelings to the obliviousness of his less sophisticated
companions.

He writes that "very few of the volunteers

seemed to have any appreciation of the wonderful proportions
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of the enclosing granite rocks" (90), and he quotes Savage
as saying that Yosemite was just "what we supposed it to be
before seeing it, a h

of a place" (92).

His aesthetic

sensibility serves as the class marker distinguishing him
from his crude comrades-in-arms:
To obtain a more distinct and quiet view, I had
left the trail and my horse and wallowed through
the snow alone to a projecting granite rock. So
interested was I in the scene that I did not
observe that my companions had all moved on. (64)
[T]he coarse jokes of the careless, and the
indifference of the practical, sensibly jarred my
more devout feelings . . . as if a sacred object
had been ruthlessly profaned, or the visible power
of Deity disregarded. (68)
From my ardor in description, and admiration of
the scenery, I found myself nicknamed 'Yosemity'
by some of the batallion. . . . From this hint I
became less expressive, when conversing on matters
related to the valley. My self-respect caused me
to talk less among my comrades generally. (95)
In foregrounding this class dichotomy, Bunnell is
aestheticizing and nationalizing his readers as well as the
landscape.

"[R]efashioning the human subject from the

inside," to recall Eagleton's words, he interpellates his
readers as subjects who can (mis)understand the narrated
events as morally justifiable by virtue of the beauty of the
landscape.

The reader's only moral obligation is to

appreciate "the visible power of Deity"; as appreciation
becomes the locus of ethics, any persisting guilt may be
displaced along class lines, onto those who are "coarse" and
"indifferent" to natural beauty.
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Second View: Frederick Law Olmsted, Social Engineer
Scholars and environmentalists alike have stressed the
fundamental importance of the preservation of Yosemite
Valley.

To David Brower Yosemite was "a key starting point

for environmentalism in the United States"; to Hans Huth it
was the "point of departure from which a new idea began to
gain momentum," namely the systematic approach to landscape
preservation which would culminate in the National Park
System, an "institution admirably suited to fill the needs
of the [American] people" (48).

Just as important as the

legislation itself was Yosemite's first management report,
written in 1865 by the new park's first superintendent, the
noted landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted.

"With this

single report," according to Laura Wood Roper, "Olmsted
formulated a philosophic base for the creation of state and
national parks" which "made explicit and systematic the
political and moral ideas" implicit in Congress's creation
of the park and "which not only justified their unexampled
action but established it as sound precedent" (Olmsted 13).
The report has "since his time become a fundamental policy
of the National Park Service" (Todd 145).
As we shall see, Olmsted found in Yosemite far more
than a mere landscape.

He thought himself "a sort of social

engineer," wrote Roper, "whose function was to civilize men
. . . and to raise the general level of American society by
exerting a beneficent influence on environment" (282).

He

hoped to make Yosemite the cornerstone of a wide-reaching
social technology that could, among other things, unite and
consolidate a fractured national identity, improve the
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nation's supposedly worsening physical and mental health,
and elevate the public morals.

The valley's ability to

accomplish all this cultural work— its perceived ideological
efficacy— clearly did not inhere in the landscape itself; it
was inscribed there, in response to specific historical
events: the Civil War, the growth of urbanization and
industrialization, and the capitalist restructuring of the
West.

Far from being "natural," the Yosemite which became

the initial object of an institutionalized environmentalism
owes its modern "nature" to a complex intersection of
aesthetic, sociological, ecological, and other discourses
attendant upon those events.

Its genealogy may be traced in

particular through two northeastern urban reforms: the socalled "rural cemetery," and New York's Central Park.
The rural cemetery movement began in Boston in the
eighteen twenties as an expression of a growing
dissatisfaction with life in an increasingly crowded and
heterogeneous city.

The movement was contemporaneous with

the development of the earliest Boston suburbs, and the
rural cemetery can in fact be seen as analogous to the
suburb, with the relocated grave serving, like the suburban
home, "as a haven in a heartless world" (Farrell 106, 110).
The new burial practice was also a sanitation reform, one of
several civic improvements then under consideration in
response to a population explosion that, in the fifty years
since the Revolution, had put severe pressure on local
environments-

Problems of air and water pollution in

particular were felt to be exacerbated by the interment of
corpses in overcrowded city cemeteries.5

As early as 1822, Boston residents had debated (but not
approved) a proposal to ban in-city burials.

Of course,

even had such a measure passed, a simple ban on in-city
burials could not in itself have solved the problem; new
cemeteries would be needed outside the city.

But who would

create and manage them, and how would they be financed?
large should they be?

Who might be interred there?

How

Might

the land set aside for them perform social functions other
than just burial?

In debating such questions, rural

cemetery advocates moved beyond their initial concern with
sanitation to larger social and political issues.

Some

wondered "whether vault burial was discriminatory within a
democratic society" (Sloane 44), others whether government
should or should not become involved in the matter.

For our

purposes it is worth noting that the debate foregrounded and
integrated several themes that would find expression not
only in the new cemeteries, but also in New York's Central
Park and finally in California's Yosemite Park: questions
not only of sanitation, but also of democracy, of ecology,
of preservation in perpetuity, of government's role in
preserving and managing public lands.

The rural cemetery

movement would transform what had been almost exclusively a
religious topic into a new and far more expansive
discipline.

Distanced from the churchyard, burial would be

regulated more and more within the discourses of science and
aesthetics— particularly as these two discourses came to be
combined in the new discipline of landscape architecture,
whose early development as a profession was intimately bound
up with the rural cemetery movement.
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Theorizing Burial: From Mummification to Museumification
In 1825, three years after the defeat of Boston's
proposed ban on in-city burials, the interment problem was
taken up again by a prominent Cambridge physician, Jacob
Bigelow.

"[I]mpressed with the impolicy of burials under

churches or in churchyards approximating closely to the
abodes of the living," as one contemporary put it, Bigelow
met at his home with a number of prominent Bostonians and
inaugurated the movement that would culminate in 1831 with
the dedication of the first of the rural cemeteries: the 72acre, carefully landscaped Mount Auburn.

(Other cities

followed Boston's lead, most notably New York, whose GreenWood Cemetery opened in 1838.)

A botanist as well as a

physician, Bigelow was a member of the medical faculty at
Harvard and a founding member of the Massachusetts
Horticultural Society.

He was also an enthusiastic admirer

of William Cullen Bryant's "graveyard poetry," and it was
thus perhaps inevitable that the cemetery movement he
founded would realize in concrete practice the popular
romantic conflation of death and burial with picturesque
scenery.
In arguing for the utility of his scheme, Bigelow
infused this sort of romantic aestheticism with the
contemporary scientific discourses of sanitation, botany,
and ecology.

"[S]o inseparably do we connect the feelings

of the living with the condition of the dead," he is
recorded as saying in his address to the 1825 meeting, that
it "is incumbent upon us . . .

to analyze . . . the

principles which belong to a correct view of the subject."
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Foremost among those principles is a complete rejection of
any sort of mummification, and an acceptance of the rapid
and "natural" decomposition of the corpse.

Bigelow

secularizes his argument, basing it not on theology but on
the observation of "nature":
If we take a comprehensive survey of the progress
and mutations of animal and vegetable life, we
shall perceive that this necessity of individual
destruction is the basis of general safety. The
elements which have once moved and circulated in
living frames, do not become extinct nor useless
after death;— they offer themselves as the
materials from which other living frames are to be
constructed.
This recognizeably ecological rhetoric highlights natural
cycles and interdependencies and predicts dire consequences
for ignoring them:
The plant which springs from the earth, after
attaining its growth and perpetuating its species,
falls to the ground, undergoes decomposition, and
contributes its remains to the nourishment of
plants around it. The myriads of animals which
range the woods or inhabit the air, at length die
upon the surface of the earth, and if not devoured
by other animals, prepare for vegetation the place
which receives their remains. . . . Were it not
for this law of nature, the soil would soon be
exhausted, the earth's surface would become a
barren waste, and the whole race of organized
beings, for want of sustenance, would become
extinct.
It is "[m]an alone, the master of the creation," who, at his
own peril, "does not willingly stoop to become a
participator" in this "routine of nature" (qtd. in Walter
29-30).
Bigelow condemns the tremendous efforts made in other
cultures to preserve the human corpse.

Shifting his

strategy, he invokes the rhetoric of democracy rather than
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ecology, noting how the only reasonably successful attempts
at embalming "are cases of extraordinary exemption . . .
such as can befall but an exceedingly small portion of the
human race."

The "common fate," by contrast, is to obey

"the common laws of inert matter."

Mummification is not

merely elitist and un-American, but also unnatural, a
useless "resistance" to inexorable leveling processes that
obliterate social distinctions— processes which must be
obeyed if we are not eventually to "gather round us the dead
of a hundred generations in a visible and tangible shape"—
and "what custom," asks Bigelow, "could be more revolting?"
(Walter 32-33).
To prevent such a political and environmental
catastrophe, nature "ordains" that, like everything else in
nature, human bodies "should moulder into dust."

Bigelow's

compactly dialogic argument skilfully blends this
secularized Christian voice with the discourses of the noble
savage and the democratic discourse of individual dignity.
"[T]he sooner this change is accomplished," he continues,
"the better"; decomposition should occur "peacefully,
silently, separately— in the retired valley or the
sequestered wood," because there "the soil continues its
primitive exuberance" and "the earth has not become too
costly to afford to each occupant at least his length and
breadth" (Walter 34).

Having repeatedly constructed

ecological process as a social, sanitary, and aesthetic
good, Bigelow's argument finally makes a seamless segue back
into a naturalized Christianity:
This can be fitly done, not in the tumultuous and
harassing din of cities,— not in the gloomy and
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almost unapproachable vaults of charnel-houses,—
but amidst the quiet verdure of the field, under
the broad and cheerful light of heaven, where the
harmonious and ever-changing face of nature
reminds us, by its resuscitating influences, that
to die is but to live again.
(35)
Despite the stress on death and decomposition, the
longing for eternity has not disappeared but has merely been
redirected.

As "consecrated ground” that is to "remain

forever, inviolate" (13), it is now the cemetery landscape
rather than the human body which will be mummified.

Green

wood's charter makes elaborate legal provisions for the
cemetery's "permanence," insuring funds for the site's
"perpetual care" and exempting the land "forever" from taxes
and assessments that might eventually necessitate its
foreclosure and sale (Cleaveland iv).

Management at the

site itself is preservationist; "ample provision is made" to
insure "the perpetual embellishment and preservation of the
grounds" (v), with the cemetery's "noble and varied forestgrowth" in particular to be "studiously preserved, except
where convenience or necessity require[s] its removal" (vi).
The desire for mummification has been displaced from the
human body onto the body of nature, in terms that closely
prefigure the "revolutionary" land-management policies later
formulated by Olmsted for Yosemite.
What Bigelow was proposing in 1825 was not just a new
form of burial but an entirely new kind of public space.
The rural cemetery was to be public and secular, democratic
and sanitary, and museumified in a permanently picturesque
state.

Because such spaces were without precedent in the

United States, their creation entailed considerable
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financial risk.

Regardless of whether the new cemetery was

a for-profit, nonprofit, or government-run enterprise, there
was the nagging question of whether enough lots would be
sold to sustain the enterprise.

The organizers "were

committing their association to centuries of burying the
dead," as one historian put it, "but what if the public
would not buy?" (Sloane 45).

To hedge their bets, the

cemetery founders joined forces in 1829 with the
Massachusetts Horticultural Society, which for some time had
wished to create an experimental garden on a large scale.
It was to be a mutually beneficial arrangement: the cemetery
organization would not have to bear the full financial risk
of the venture, while the Horticultural Society felt the
combined garden and cemetery "would ultimately offer such an
example of landscape gardening as would be creditable to the
Society" (46).

As it turned out, this arrangement was not

so mutually beneficial after all; the Horticultural Society
did put up the six thousand dollars for the purchase of the
Mount Auburn site, but the planned experimental garden never
materialized (Rotundo, "Rural" 235).

Nonetheless, the link

between the rural cemetery and the science of horticulture—
so crucial to the professionalization of landscape
architecture— would endure through the end of the century.
Fulfilling early hopes that it would be not merely a
"repository of the dead" but also "a place of consolation
for the living" (Walter 28), the rural cemeteries quickly
became popular sites of recreation, often attracting
hundreds of visitors per day.

By mid-century the crowds at

New York1s Green-Wood Cemetery were estimated to exceed
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thirty thousand visitors annually; they "strolled the
grounds, guidebook in hand," "enjoying the fresh air" and
"picnicking along undulating paths" (Jackson and Vergara
19)— much as they would do in Yosemite a generation later
(see figure 7).
This popularity made the new cemeteries a logical site
for the exercise of a certain cultural work that in fact
they had been expected to perform from the very beginning.
Jacob Bigelow, for example, had appreciated the "didactic
implications of the new landscape aesthetic" realized by the
rural cemetery (Farrell 100); a contemporary characterized
these spaces as providing the opportunity "to meditate on
present plans and future prospects" in a beautiful and
inspiring, yet also morally chastening, environment— where,
as Wordsworth put it, one may "recognize / In nature the
language of the sense, / The anchor of our purest thoughts"
(Walter 5, 7).

Another observer noted how the new

cemeteries prompted "the sentiment of retrospection and
reverence which embalms forever the examples of the
benefactors of our race" (Farrell 108).
"Virtuous Habits of Play: Central Park
Apparently it was William Cullen Bryant who first
popularized the idea of a large-scale park for Manhattan
(Rosenzweig and Blackmar 24).

But it was Andrew Jackson

Downing, the prominent landscape architect and protege of
Frederick Law Olmsted, who first saw clearly that such a
park could, in its didacticism and its normalizing of
tastes, systematically replicate and broaden the
disciplinary functions of the rural cemetery.

Downing, in
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Figure 7. The rural cemetery as a site of outdoor
recreation. Top: "Lawn-Girt Hill, Green-wood Cemetery."
Line engraving from a drawing by James Smillie. In Nehemiah
Cleaveland, Green-Wood Illustrated (New York: R. Martin,
1847), facing p. 61. Bottom: "View from Mount Auburn (near
Boston)." Line engraving from a drawing by James Smillie.
In Cornelia W. Walter, Mount Auburn Illustrated (New York:
R. Martin, 1851), facing p. 112.

fact, conceived of the urban park as essentially a scenic
cemetery without the graves, inaugurating an association of
the two that would long endure on the institutional level.6
Downing joined forces with Bryant, and in 1851 the state
legislature approved their proposal for what would become
Central Park.

Appointed as superintendent of the project

was Frederick Law Olmsted, Downing's friend and former
pupil.

Olmsted admired the writings of both Bryant (whom he

knew personally) and Ralph Waldo Emerson.

He had been

particularly impressed with the latter's recently published
essay, "Nature," and agreed with the Transcendentalists
generally about "the moral value of nature."

He adhered as

well to the Jeffersonian vision of a democracy stabilized by
a rural citizenry (Todd 48-49).

Olmsted was himself an

inveterate New Yorker, however, and knew perfectly well that
the nation's future character was to be increasingly urban,
that even the wilderness of the far western frontiers would
eventually be exhausted.

One way to characterize his wide-

ranging work is to see it as mediating the tensions between
frontier ideal and industrial reality, as an attempt to
sustain a rural democratic vision for what was becoming an
urban citizenry.
Central Park was not to be a cemetery, but Olmsted
nonetheless envisioned it as a species of sanitary reform.
His work during the Civil War as a member of the United
States Sanitary Commission (the future Red Cross) had
involved sanitation as we think of it today, activities
aimed at preventing the spread of infectious disease
(notably, given our topic, through the proper disposal of
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corpses).

But in the mid-nineteenth century the term

"sanitation" had a much broader range of connotations.
Along with today's familiar usages, as the OED makes clear,
it connoted an absence of "deleterious influences"— of the
social as well as the biological sort.

"Sanity" could mean

what today we think of as a strictly physical health, but
carried in addition a connotation of what today we might
term "wholesomeness."

Health was considered "as much a

moral as a biological condition," while disease "was
associated with 'dissipation,'" which included such
activities as drinking, gambling, and boxing, and Olmsted
saw in these notions of "sanitation" the potential for a
full-fledged conservative social reform (Rosenzweig and
Blackmar 24).
Olmsted was a prominent officer in the new American
Social Science Association, and believed that "a social
climate was evolving favorable to the promotion of a
collective concern for the physical and moral welfare of all
Americans" (Todd 33, 35).

He and his Central Park

supporters considered their proposal a "sanitary" or
"health" measure in the most broadly social terms, and at
the root of society was the family, the crucial nexus where
the park was to work its magic.

Reform advocates believed

the park "would provide a site for 'healthy' and 'manly'
exercise," with Bryant stressing
the contribution of parks "to the health . . . and
to the morals of the community." In contrast to
rough male sports or the temptations of "brightly
lighted streets" . . . a park would encourage
family outings and inspire "home associations."
(Rosenzweig and Blackmar 24-25)
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"A park," added Bryant, "might promote 'good morals and good
order' by encouraging virtuous habits of play as well as
work" (26).

Many liberal observers believed at the time

that "women's ill health" in particular "reflected their
general lack of opportunity for physical and mental
development," and that an urban park would provide a
particularly valuable chance for "'fair pedestrians to
[engage in] healthful and natural exercise'" and find relief
from "the burden of domestic duties" (25).

(Of course, by

setting aside a small portion of the city's public space as
a site where women might "properly" appear, park proponents
simultaneously legitimated the continuing segregation of the
sexes elsewhere.)
Like advocates of the rural cemetery, park proponents
practiced a not-so-subtle class politics of "elevating"
their putative inferiors.

Downing, for example, declared

that proper landscape architecture could embody "moral
rectitude" in "rational enjoyments," and thereby "soften and
humanize the rude," while the New York Horticultural
Society's backing of the park was motivated by its vision of
"botanical gardens that would enhance 'cultivation'— in both
senses of the word" (Rosenzweig and Blackmar 29-30).

Robert

Minturn and his wife Anna Mary Wendell, two of the project's
earliest advocates, also came to see the park in such a
light.

Throughout the eighteen-thirties, the Minturns had

been well known philanthropists, friends of the beggars who
crowded their door, but Robert’s approach to poverty then
took a conservative turn.

Deciding in 1843 that "personal

benevolence was a 'dangerous species of charity,'" he gave
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his support instead to the New York Association for the
Improvement of the Poor,
which maintained that the "injudicious dispensa
tion of relief" was the chief cause of increasing
poverty. Its agents would separate out the
"incorrigible mendicants” (who were to be packed
off to the almshouse or the penitentiary) from the
deserving poor (who were to be given limited
physical relief and ample advice on remedying the
character flaws that had landed them in poverty).
Minturn's fellow park advocates may well have agreed with
his basic class sympathies, but tried to convince him "that
a park would be a less repressive means of reforming the
character of the city's working classes" (26).

This easy

conceptual shift from the penitentiary to the park suggests
that the park was to function, in Althusserian terms, as
part of the Ideological State Apparatus, disciplining the
poorer classes via a "less repressive" regulation of tastes
and norms rather than a direct use of force.
Olmsted, along with his partner in the park enterprise,
Calvert Vaux, cast this ideological work as an exercise in
democracy.

While designing the park the two gradually moved

"from defining pastoral scenery as the aesthetic goal of a
public park to a larger social philosophy that claimed, as
Vaux put it, to 'translate Democratic ideas into Trees &
Dirt'" (Rosenzweig and Blackmar 136).

Olmsted in particular

expressed an unshakeable faith in the elevating powers of
his own class.

In his second annual report on Central Park

he wrote that the purpose of this public space was to
provide "healthful recreation for the poor and the rich, the
young and the old, the vicious and the virtuous"— the
parallelisms here betraying his real sympathies— by exerting
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"a distinctly harmonizing and refining influence upon the
most unfortunate and lawless classes of the city" (131,
241).

"Rejecting the views of his 'cowardly conservative'

opponents, for whom class-based cultural divisions were
fixed," Olmsted
believed members of the lower classes should and
could acquire "the refinement and taste and the
mental & moral capital of gentlemen." The "moral
influence" of public parks, like that of public
schools and libraries, offered a way for the
working classes to acquire that "capital" as a
means of cultural improvement. (241)
Olmsted's class may have closely guarded its genuine,
economic capital, but it had "moral capital" to spare, and
one reason for making the park as attractive as possible was
to enable it, in Olmsted's words, "to force into contact the
good & bad, the gentlemanly and the rowdy" (139).

In

precisely this way, "the power of natural beauty lay in its
social influence as well as [its] aesthetic pleasure," and a
judiciously naturalized landscape might have "a distinctly
harmonizing and refining influence upon the most unfortunate
and most lawless classes of the city,— an influence
favorable to courtesy, self-control, and temperance" (131).
Despite the supposedly inherent abilities of landscape
to uplift and refine, however, none of this would happen
"naturally." Olmsted believed firmly that it was necessary
that the ruling class teach the people how best to use the
park.

The public, that is, "would have to be 'trained' to

use a park" (Rosenzweig and Blackmar 5).

On the one hand,

Olmsted had long believed that beautiful landscapes could
"materially promote Moral and Intellectual Improvement" by
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"instructing us in the language of Nature," as if nature
could speak to us without mediation (qtd. in Todd 49).

On

the other hand, ”[i]n order for the park to exercise its
'harmonizing and refining influence,' the public needed not
just firsthand contact with natural beauty"— an unmediated
experience of nature— "but also 'efficiently controlled and
judiciously managed' supervision and guidance" (Rosenzweig
and Blackmar 140).

As Olmsted reported to the Central Park

commissioners shortly after being hired as superintendent,
in language that presages the interpretive programs that
would later be formalized by the National Park Service, "[a]
large part of the people of New York are ignorant of a park,
properly so-called.

They will need to be trained to the

proper use of it, to be restrained in the abuse of it."

By

"abuse," Olmsted means the sort of "careless stupidity"
which he felt stemmed from notions that the park was "'like
a wood,' with which Americans associated 'the idea of
perfect liberty'" (239).
Ten years later, just before resigning his Central Park
superintendency and leaving for the wilderness of
California, Olmsted cited the comparatively small number of
arrests that had been made in Central Park as evidence in
favor of such his theories, noting in his journal that
"[t]he American public is one of the easiest in the world to
regulate if any body will take the responsibility of
regulating it" (258),
The Power of Scenery
In 1863, Olmsted resigned his Central Park position in
a dispute over park policy and took a job in California
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managing the Mariposa County mining properties of the former
explorer and Republican presidential nominee, John Charles
Fremont— land near Yosemite Valley that had once been under
the control of Major James Savage.

Olmsted's social

connections, his experience with Central Park, and his
physical proximity to Yosemite all drew him naturally into
the circle of elite Californians who were then discussing
the proposed state park.

When Congress passed and President

Lincoln signed the Yosemite bill in 18 54, Olmsted was
appointed to the commission charged with managing the new
grant and quickly became its head.7
Up to this time the primary spheres of operation of
landscape architecture, the cemetery and the park, had been
exclusively urban and suburban.

The seamlessness of

Olmsted's transition to managing the new wilderness park
underscores the fundamental parallels in social function
underlying both cityscape and wilderness landscape,
suggesting that this initial institutionalizing of
environmentalism had less to do with preserving the Yosemite
environment "itself" than with contemporary social concerns.
The environmental reform that took the form of the national
park was in fact continuous with the reform of the urban
cemetery and the city park, reforms that became
"environmental" only because of Olmsted's theory of the
socializing utility of nature.
On August 9, 1865, during a visit to the valley with
the other commissioners, Olmsted wrote the commission's
initial report— the first written text to issue from the
bureaucracy of the newly institutionalized environmentalism.
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This report has since come to be regarded as remarkably
prescient and foundational, a sort of environmental maana
carta that established the "philosophic base” for future
park preservation (Olmsted 13).

Subsequent treatments of

park history would foreground the overtly environmentalist
aspects of this philosophy while all but ignoring its
implicit social theory, obscuring the degree to which
Olmsted and his fellow commissioners saw environmentalism as
a vehicle for implementing broadly social aims.
Drawing on his Central Park experience, Olmsted viewed
the valley's preservation as the creation of a work of art—
as just one of several of the great public artworks
completed during the Civil War.

To get a clearer sense of

how Olmsted believes art to function— how for Olmsted it
participates directly and decisively in history— I quote the
report's preamble at some length:
It is a fact of much significance with reference
to the temper and spirit which ruled the loyal
people of the United States during the war of the
great rebellion, that a livelier susceptibility to
the influence of art was apparent, and greater
progress in the manifestation of artistic talent
was made, than in any similar period in the
history of the country.
The great dome of the Capitol was wholly
constructed during the war, and the forces of the
insurgents watched it rounding upward to completion
for nearly a year before they were forced from
their entrenchments on the opposite bank of the
Potomac; Crawford's great statue of Liberty was
poised upon its summit in the year that President
Lincoln proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves.
Leutze's fresco of the peopling of the Pacific
States, the finest work of the painter's art in
the Capitol; the noble front of the Treasury
building with its long colonnades of massive mono
liths; the exquisite hall of the Academy of Arts;
the great park of New York, and many other works
of which the nation can be proud, were brought to
completion during the same period. (13-14)
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Art for Olmsted has considerable power.

The image of the

"insurgent" Confederate soldier watching the completion of
the dome in particular emblematizes Olmsted's belief in the
ability of art to reform the wayward citizen, and its role
in democracy and social unification— the same powers he had
attributed earlier to the carefully contrived (yet
"natural") landscape of Central Park.

These beliefs spill

over into Olmsted's decriptions of the physical landscape of
Yosemite Valley, which he terms "the greatest glory of
nature" precisely because of "its union of the deepest
sublimity with the deepest beauty" (16, my emphasis).
Olmsted's rhetoric underscores his larger concerns with
the health of the body politic, a concern that combines
economics, psychology, and political science into an
emerging environmentalist discourse of what might be called
"social sanitation through outdoor recreation."

Olmsted

describes two specific advantages that will accrue from the
park.

The "first and less important" of these is economic,

"the direct and obvious pecuniary advantage which comes to a
commonwealth from the fact that it possesses objects which
cannot be taken out of its domain."

He argues in effect for

environmental preservation as a form of sustainable
development, as opposed to the sort of resource extraction
economy epitomized by the recent Gold Rush, whose
deleterious ecological and social effects had become
painfully obvious to him while he was managing the Mariposa
Estate.

He describes how the "industrious and frugal

people" of Switzerland have utilized their scenery to common
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advantage, with revenues from tourism having supplied "for
many years the larger part of the state revenue . . .
without the exportation or abstraction from the country of
anything of the slightest value to the people."

For

California and the United States, he concludes, Yosemite
might prove "a similar sort of wealth to the whole
community" (17).
More important than mere pecuniary and ecological
advantage, however, were "considerations of a political duty
of grave importance to which seldom if ever before has
proper respect been paid by any government in the world."
Olmsted couches this argument in terms vaguely psychosociological :
It is a scientific fact that the occasional
contemplation of natural scenes of an impressive
character, particularly if this contemplation
occurs in connection with relief from ordinary
cares, change of air and change of habits, is
favorable to the health and vigor of men and
especially to the health and vigor of their
intellect.
Without such recreation, in situations "where men and women
are habitually pressed by their business and household
cares," they are susceptible to "a class of disorders" that
include such forms of "mental disability" as "softening of
the brain, paralysis, palsy, monomania, or insanity."

Less

severe but more frequent results of a lack of outdoor
recreation are "mental and nervous excitability, moroseness,
melancholy or irascibility," all conditions which
incapacitate the sufferer "for the proper exercise of the
intellectual and moral forces" (17)— that is to say,
conditions which render the sufferer unfit for productive
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labor.

Reprising the argument he had made earlier in

defense of Central Park, Olmsted writes that recreation
generally offers its "greatest blessing" to those classes of
Americans traditionally excluded from it: the poor more than
the rich, and the "agricultural class" more than the urban.
"Women," he adds, "suffer more than men" (20).
Despite its emphasis on inclusiveness, Olmsted's vision
is hardly a democratic one.

Rather it universalizes and

normalizes a particular set of tastes and makes of them a
foundation not only of aesthetics but also of sanity and
morality.

On the one hand there are "faculties and

susceptibilities of the mind" that are "called into play by
beautiful scenery," and "there can be no doubt that all have
this susceptibility."

The "power of appreciating natural

beauty," so "intimately and mysteriously associated with the
moral perceptions and intuitions," is natural and universal,
"something which the Almighty has implanted in every human
being."

Yet "with some" this mental susceptibility "is much

more dull and confused than with others."

Olmsted's

theorizing in fact consistently implies an elitist and
racist teleology in which Yosemite's preservation marks a
milestone not so much of the history of environmentalism as
of the history of American taste and culture, a teleology
that relegates dissenters to the realm of the uncivilized:
The power of scenery to affect men is, in a large
way, proportionate to the degree of their
civilization and the degree in which their taste
has been cultivated. Among a thousand savages
there will be a much smaller number who will show
the least sign of being so affected than among a
thousand people taken from a civilized community.
(20 - 2 1 )

187

Landscape appreciation becomes just another axis of
difference, closely allied with the axes of race and class,
though theoretically distinct from either.

"This is only

one of the many channels," Olmsted concludes, in which the
"distinction between civilized and savage men is to be
generally observed" (21).

The Yosemite landscape will

function not merely to sustain the mental health of the
civilized individual, but also to define the degree and mode
of the individual’s civilization, aestheticizing, as we
shall see more clearly with Clarence King, the existing
class hierarchy.
Third View: Clarence King
Clarence King, geologist and writer, founder of the
United States Geological Survey and author of the best
selling Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada (1872), arrived
in California in 1863, the same year as Frederick Law
Olmsted.

King had gone West to join the newly formed

California Geological Survey, which he felt would offer him
field experience to supplement the classroom training he had
just completed at Yale's Sheffield Scientific School.

He

and Olmsted had been friends back east, and when Olmsted
took over the management of the old Mariposa Estate, he
asked King to help inventory the property's mineral
resources.

With the geological survey in hiatus, King

agreed.
The Mariposa needed the attention of someone like King.
The huge, gold-rich estate had been owned since 1847 by John
Charles Fremont, the explorer and fomenter of the Bear Flag
Revolt that wrested California from Mexico.

At first the
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Mariposa's mining operations had been profitable enough, in
spite of Fremont's haphazard management.

But by the time

Olmsted took over its superintendency in 1863, both the
estate and the general had seen better days.

As Thurman

Wilkins tells it, "[t]hat famous grant, some seventy square
miles in extent, had slipped from General Fremont's absentee
control," and to make good on the estate's many encumbrances
"the general's creditors had formed the Mariposa Mining
Company and thrown its stock upon the market."

It was

precisely because "production at the mines had slumped" that
Olmsted sought out the expertise then available from survey
members such as King.8
In less than fifteen years, that is, the Mariposa had
slipped from the grasp of the archetypal rugged
individualist and into the hands of the eastern capitalist.
The Mariposa was in this respect a microcosm; events there
presaged and typified the economic transformations that
would occur with greater and greater rapidity in the West of
the latter nineteenth century, events widely perceived in
terms both mythic and economic: as the inexorable passage
from a heroic to a prosaic age, from the bold enterprise of
the' hero to the systematic exploitation of a northern and
eastern capitalist technocracy.9

Clarence King would play

a significant part in facilitating and mystifying this
western commodification.

In his adventure writing, he

consistently "celebrat[ed] a romantic ideal of self-reliant
heroism" (Howarth xii), while his professional activities,
by bringing western resources more and more under the sway
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of corporate investors, just as consistently functioned to
foreclose on such local enterprise.
In 1864, King was already thinking ahead to his
greatest professional triumph, the ambitious Fortieth
Parallel Survey, which would map and inventory a vast swath
of the West and lay out the path for a transcontinental
railroad.

But his first survey was far more modest.

After

the creation of the Yosemite State Park, Olmsted appointed
King to determine the boundary of the new grant and produce
a map.

Amid what he described as the "prosaic labor of

running the boundary line" IMountaineering 120), King had
plenty of time to admire the scenery, which seemed to him to
be itself a mythic western narrative, the visible record of
an older and more heroic order.

The boundary line ran

through the High Sierra country above the valley walls,
where it seemed that the ice-age glaciers had only recently
retreated, leaving behind bare expanses where "[n]ot a tree
nor a vestige of life was in sight."
where life was

It seemed

a place

just beginning, offering to King a visionof

the bleak Eden of

the Darwinists he so much admired.

Peeringdown into

the valley, now verdant but once filled

with rivers of

ice, he found it impossible "not to imagine a

picture of the

glacial period" when ice-erosion sculpted

Yosemite into its present morphology.

He depicts the scene

as it must have appeared in the Pleistocene era:
Granite and ice and snow, silence broken only by
the howling tempest and the crash of falling ice
or splintered rock, and a sky deep freighted with
cloud and storm,— these were the elements of a
period which lasted immeasurably long, and only in
comparatively the most recent geological times
have given way to the present marvellously changed
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condition. Nature in her present aspects, as well
as in the records of her past, here constantly
offers the most vivid and terrible contrasts. Can
anything be more wonderfully opposite than that
period of leaden sky, gray granite, and desolate
stretches of white, and the present, when of the
old order we have only left the solid framework of
granite, and the indelible inscriptions of
glacier-work? To-day their burnished pathways are
legibly traced with the history of the past. (ISO131)
Nature for King is a mythic history, the readable record of
tumultuous passages, from storm to calm, from savagery to
civilization, from wilderness to metropolis, most generally
from a primitive (but admirably heroic) past to a civilized
(but lamentably prosaic) present.

Throughout Mountaineering

in the Sierra Nevada, he is most particularly struck by the
contrasts between the naked granite expanses of the heights
and the luxuriant forest growths below— where "richness of
soil and perfection of condition" sometimes actually "prove
fatal through overcrowding."

The Sierra landscape for King

is a map of the human world, a Malthusian narrative full of
proto-ecological warnings for the future, its forests
"wonderfully like human communities" where "[o]ne may trace
in an hour's walk nearly all the laws which govern the
physical life of men" (119).
A Realist Aesthetic
In 1870, during a respite from the fieldwork of the
Fortieth Parallel Survey, King reviewed a pseudo-scientific
travel narrative, James Orton's The Andes and the Amazon,
for the Overland Monthly.

Though his friendship with Bret

Harte had everything to do with King's receiving this
assignment, he was nonetheless an appropriate choice for the
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job, for two reasons.

As a working geologist, he was

familiar with the new ideas then being introduced by science
into the popular imagination.

And as a developing writer,

who had already published a travel piece of his own in the
Overland and was at work on several more (which would be
collected in 1872 in Mountaineering). King was grappling
with the special problems inherent in writing about littleknown lands.

These two facets of King's career— the

literary and the scientific— were not as disparate as might
at first seem, for both involved the same challenge: that of
reading and writing western landscapes in a way that would
be comprehensible to his largely eastern audience.

As both

reader and writer, King thought of himself as a "realist"—
as a sensitive observer capable of perceiving the way things
"really" are and an objective writer whose words faithfully
mirrored that reality.

I want now to read King— the

geologist as well as the writer— as he reads the landscape,
and to problematize his seemingly straightforward conception
of realistic representation.

In particular, I want to show

the close relationship between King's realist texts, his
work as a scientist and the ongoing capitalist appropriation
of the landscape itself.
King's critique of The Andes and the Amazon focuses on
a departure from what appears in retrospect to be a key part
of his developing literary aesthetic.

In particular, he

faults Orton for failing to convey anything which the reader
has not already encountered in the accounts of previous
writers, for occupying
that uninteresting middle condition where he has
neither the naive sensitiveness of a new traveler,
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nor the penetration of the practiced observer. No
sooner is he mounted upon a mule than he begins to
recognize things with a reckless freedom. The
ghosts of Humboldt and Darwin flank him upon
either side. What they had seen, he sees. Not
once does he lift his eyes from the dusty trail,
but confines himself to the role of a corrobo
rator. (King, "Current" 578)
Orton, that is, has failed to elicit any genuinely new
sensations in the reader, for whom the book is a mere
"corroboration" offering only the chance to "recognize" what
has been encountered before— in this case, in the
travelogues of Humboldt and Darwin.
King's emphasis on the desensitizing effect of
repetition and, especially, of "recognition" would seem to
make him an early exponent of the sort of formalism codified
later by Viktor Shklovsky, for whom "the purpose of art is
to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and
not as they are known," "to make objects 'unfamiliar'" (58).
But for Shklovsky, making the reader "see" rather than
merely "recognize" is a matter of effort, of "art as
technique"; the object must be "defamiliarized" in order to
remove it from the domain of automatized perception.

King

is suggesting another means of attaining the same end, a
means implicit in his specific concern with narratives of
travel and exploration— a genre characterized by special
limitations but also special opportunities.

In the words of

Mary Fuller, such narratives "document a situation of
enunciation in which the matter of speech, the topic, the
referent, physically existed but was always going to be
physically absent from the place of speaking and listening"
(46).

This conception suggests special problems which I
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will address later; what is important here is that in the
genuine exploration narrative, the "matter of speech" begins
as something unfamiliar to the reader.

To represent such

material using the technique of some preceding travel writer
hardly makes it any newer; if anything, this begins the
process of familiarizing it.

The exploration narrative thus

seems to be particularly amenable to mimesis, for the
obvious way out of the dilemma is to avoid any evident
technique at all, to reproduce the object unadorned in its
already-unfamiliar reality.

For King this crude realism is

the "technique," suggested in his critique of Orton, of the
naive traveler who need only read the landscape sensitively
and then mirror it faithfully for the reader.
King's account in Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada
of a ride to a remote camp suggests that he conceived of his
descriptive nature writing as just such a mimetic
reproduction:
I was delighted to . . . expose myself, as one
uncovers a sensitized photographic plate, to be
influenced; for this is a respite from scientific
work, when through months you hold yourself
accountable for seeing everything, for analyzing,
for instituting perpetual comparison. . . .
No
tongue can tell the relief to simply withdraw
scientific observation, and let Nature impress
y o u . (108)
The movement from science to literature is for King a shift
from the active to the passive, from analysis to impression,
from the production of knowledge about the landscape to the
mimetic reproduction of the landscape. Though this movement
takes him into a literary mode, it is paradoxically a
movement away from language (it is something about which "no
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tongue can tell").

What King sees himself moving toward is

not words about things, but things themselves— particularly,
as the reader of Mountaineering quickly becomes aware,
things in their most basic and immutable manifestations.
This tendency certainly reflects King's concern with what,
as a geologist, he naturally viewed as the "hard,
materialistic reality" of nature (253), but it is also
consonant with a peculiarly American conception of the
"real," in which, as Lionel Trilling put it, "reality is
always material reality, hard, resistant, unformed,
impenetrable, and unpleasant" (qtd. in Sundquist 16).

This

conception of a rock-solid reality appealed not only to the
geologist in King, but to the writer as well, for— to use
Trilling's words again— "that mind alone is felt to be
trustworthy which most resembles this reality by most nearly
reproducing the sensations it affords" (17).

If mimesis is

the key to representing landscape memorably, then mimesis
that somehow does justice to a landscape's most fundamental
and enduring phenomena is the key to representing it
truthfully and convincingly.
Thus it is hardly surprising to find in King's nature
writing the recurring tendency "to reduce things to their
bare essentials, to strip away the superficies of
vegetation, animal life . . . and human culture"; in doing
so, he seeks in stone a foundation for a more trustworthy
language:
[He] is not only seeking accurate knowledge of the
unexplored mountains of California, but direct
unmediated experience of the absolute, primal
world of matter. . . . King's descriptions of the
Sierra mountainscapes are attempts to recreate in
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language an unmediated experience.

(Fontana 25)

Certainly King's writing is most energetic in those
mountaineering episodes that take place above timberline,
where the last settlements and the last vegetation have been
left far below and he is left alone to contend with the
primal simplicity of rock and ice.

But the fact that his

attempts to mirror "unmediated experience" produced some
highly energetic stories hardly validates the literary
theory behind them.

In fact the linguistic claim underlying

King's aesthetic— that matter and experience can pass into
language with the same directness and fidelity with which
landscape passes into image in photography— would almost
immediately be called into question by a series of bizarre
events in his own career.
The Footprints of a Man: Deconstructing Landscape
Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada appeared in 1872.
Mark Twain's Roughing It appeared that same year, but it was
Mountaineering which was hailed by the Overland as "the book
of the season."

The book was well received elsewhere as

well, and within two years would sell out five printings
(Wilkins, Mountaineering v ) .

Its popularity received an

unexpected boost from King's involvement in the Great
Diamond Swindle of 1872, a scam which had begun two years
earlier when two men posing as miners appeared in San
Francisco carrying a sack of rough diamonds.

The two men—

Philip Arnold and John Slack— were secretive at first,
dropping just enough hints to start the entire city talking
about their cargo and the mine from which it must have come.
The diamonds were appraised, first in San Francisco and
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later by the Tiffany establishment in New York, and valued
at a hundred thousand dollars.

Slack allowed himself to be

talked into selling his share of the putative mine— whose
whereabouts were still kept secret— for just that amount, to
San Francisco banker William Ralston.

Arnold did not sell

out until later, when the speculative frenzy hit its peak;
he received half a million dollars for his share (Wilkins,
Clarence 171-182).
In July of 1872, Ralston filed incorporation papers for
the San Francisco and New York Mining and Commercial
Company, which was promptly capitalized at ten million
dollars.

To verify the mine's authenticity, Arnold and

Slack allowed a visit by company officials and the expert
Henry Janin, who was regarded as one the most competent and
incorruptible mining engineers in the country.
what he saw.

Janin liked

"I consider this a wonderful discovery," he

wrote in a report which appeared August 10, "and one that
will prove extremely profitable. . . .

I do not doubt that

further prospecting will result in finding diamonds over a
greater area than is yet proved to be diamondiferous"
("Diamond" 379).

Elsewhere he speculated that, if worked by

just twenty miners, the diamond fields could yield as much
as a million dollars worth of gems per month— setting off
widespread speculation that the mine might severely depress
the international diamond market and even shift the center
of the gemstone industry from Amsterdam to San Francisco.
Janin's pronouncements circulated widely in the papers, and
by the end of the summer, investors had formed at least
twenty-five "wildcat" companies, capitalized at more than
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two hundred million dollars in total, in hopes of cashing in
on the boom as soon as the location of the fields should be
made public (Wilkins, Clarence 173, 182-183).
Everything was in place for a major rush, which
undoubtedly would have taken place had it not been for the
intervention of Clarence King.

Whenever their survey work

brought them into contact with civilization, King and his
coworkers had brought themselves up to date on the latest
diamond news, and by -the end of the summer they had pieced
together enough clues to locate the purported diamond field
in a remote, potentially diamondiferous region of eastern
Utah, within the confines of King's survey.

Clearly such a

major find in his own bailiwick could not be ignored, and
when the summer's fieldwork was completed, King set out
quietly to inspect the claim himself, arriving at the site
in November.

There he found footprints; following them to

where they converged with other tracks, he found mining
notices posted on trees.

A quick search of the area turned

up several rubies and a few diamonds, and at first he was as
much a believer as Janin.

Further inspection, however,

began to reveal disturbing evidence, and by the end of the
second day he was convinced the ground had been salted and
the claim was a fraud (Wilkins, Clarence 177-179).

When

Ralston and Janin were informed, they returned to the site
with King, who had little trouble convincing them they'd
been deceived.

The story went public, and King was lauded

not only for saving investors millions of dollars, but for
preserving the reputation of California's fledgling
financial establishment.

He was the toast of the nation,
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and his name graced front pages from San Francisco to
London.

Not coincidentally, sales of his recently released

book surged forward (Wilkins, Mountaineering vi).
The entire episode can be read as a linguistic parable,
in which the swindlers' clever manipulation of the investors
and the media engendered an intertext made up of newspaper
stories, investment prospectuses, the report of the mining
engineer, and, of course, the carefully inscribed
"realistic" landscape of the diamond field.

Such a text was

not without precedent, its linguistic underpinnings being in
fact typical of the "El Dorado" narratives so common in the
literature of the Americas.

A similar situation— Walter

Ralegh’s claims in his 1596 Discoverie of Guiana concerning
a fabulous South American gold mine— has been analyzed in an
instructive way by Mary Fuller and is worth examining
briefly here for the parallels it offers to the Diamond
Swindle.
In the apologia worked up by King James's court to
justify Ralegh's execution, the latter's claims concerning
the existence of what he variously called Manoa or El Dorado
are subjected to a close analysis:
James's accusations amount to an intensely
skeptical critique of Ralegh's language. He
claims that Ralegh's writing is a screen not for
things but for palpable intentions; that the
things of which he writes are imaginary, and that
their objective properties . . . are constructs
responsive to the wish and will of the writer.
To defend his text in the face of such skepticism, Ralegh
had resorted to physical evidence in the form of gold ore, a
"handfull of the mine" which he hoped would ground his claim
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somewhere safely beyond the unstable realm of language.
Though he doubtless did not think of it in quite these
terms, he hoped to demonstrate that at the end of the chain
of signifiers making up the legend of Manoa there was
something incontrovertible, that is, not another signifier
but a material object which was not itself the product of
any linguistic operation.

In so doing, Fuller notes, he was

attempting to make use of "resources not available to the
mere poet: speaking of gold, he puts a piece of ore in the
refiner's hand" (44).
But material reality— in Ralegh's case, a "handfull of
the mine"— proves insufficient to validate such claims.
How, for one thing— assuming that El Dorado exists in the
first place— was the reader in London to know that the ore
had actually come from there?

The supposedly "mute"

testimony of objects turns out to be not univocal but
ambiguous, and hence to require corroboration; instead of
providing the hoped-for escape from words, the material
routes the reader back into the circuit of language.

In the

case of the discovery narrative, as with other attempts to
ground the sign in "nature," not even things turn out to be
free of the influences which engender the figurative drift
of language.

As Fuller notes, the objects Ralegh produced

as underpinnings for representations . . . were
always and everywhere fully implicated with
rhetorical procedures: substitutions of parts for
whole, transportations, ellipses. . . . [I]n the
particular case of Ralegh, the part-for-whole
synecdoche of handfull for mine masks a previous
figure of metonymy— in fact, a congerie of
previous figures. (45)
Ralegh's critics had good reason to question the validity of
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his synecdoche, of his rhetorical substitution of a handful
of ore— which might have come to London from anywhere— for
an actual gold mine in Guiana.

Clearly, the synecdoche

cannot be valid unless the felicity of the underlying
metonymy, the "naturalness" of the association of the
transported ore with a specific mine, can be established.
This Ralegh could not do with certainty, since, as he
admitted, he had never personally been to El Dorado; he
claimed only to have come near it (54).
In the end, the material Ralegh had hoped would serve
as irrefutable testimony turned out to be vulnerable to the
same sort of skeptical analysis to which his words had been
subjected.

In a final effort to validate his claim, he '

returned to Guiana in search of the mine itself, an
expedition which became "literally a search for the
referent, a place to which [could] be attached the proper
names Manoa and El Dorado," and which, unfortunately for the
soon-to-be-executed Ralegh, proved fruitless (51).
The text engendered by the Diamond Swindle has much in
common with other El Dorado stories.

There was, for

example, a great deal of money at stake— as dozens of
nervous investors were all too aware— and the remote, stillsecret location of the mine precluded the usual means of
verification.

It thus shared what Fuller called the

"peculiar constraints" of the discovery narrative, of "a
writing situation . . .

in which the issue of truth,

veracity, was particularly at stake and also particularly
difficult to check" (45).

More important, its authority

rested ultimately on an appeal to the material— in this
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case, to the gems displayed in San Francisco by Arnold and
Slack, and the stones turned up by Janin in situ in the
field.
King was not a linguist but a geologist, and his on
site investigation of the swindlers' text focused not on its
words but on the material representations underpinning them.
His procedure, which recalls the virtuoso tracking
activities of the heroes in Chapter 21 of The Last of the
Mohicans, amounts to a "close reading" of the material:
[W]e . . . lay down upon our faces, and got out
our magnifying-glasses and went to work, system
atically examining the position of the stones and
their relation to the natural gravels. The first
point which excited my suspicion was the finding
of a diamond on a small point, or knob of rock
. . . in a position from which one heavy wind, or
the storms of a single winter, must inevitably
have dislodged it. (Deposition)
The questions which King must answer— How did this object
come to be here?
humanintervention?

Is its occurrence natural or the result of
Are these formations such as would

naturally be associated with a diamond field?— are
essentially questions about rhetorical procedures, about the
transportations and substitutions undergone by the objects
produced to bolster the swindlers' truth-claims.
His suspicion having been aroused by what appears to be
an unnatural transportation, one which left a diamond
sitting where the elements would not have allowed it to
remain for long, King continues the investigation, embarking
upon a plan of testing the whole question, which
consisted of a system of outside prospects
conducted over the whole mesa, carried out by
digging a bushel or two of earth, averaging it,
sifting it in sieves, and then washing both the
saved gravel and the refuse dirt at the stream; of
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an examination of the trails and tracks of all the
party; a following of their work from beginning to
end; . . . a scrutiny of the rock itself, and of
the so-called Ruby Gulch. . . . The result . . .
was that we found no single ruby or diamond
anywhere off the neighbourhood of the rock or off
the line of the original Arnold survey.
At issue here is the appropriateness of a metonymy.

The

swindlers' claims rely heavily on the purportedly natural
association of the gemstones to the gravels in which they
are found, but King's investigation demonstrates that the
gems are actually more closely associated with the hoaxers
themselves:
I fixed upon the trail of Arnold and Janin, recog
nizing Mr. Janin by his slender foot. . . . Along
the line of their outward march, here and there in
the vicinity of survey stakes, we found an
occasional ruby, but 10 ft. off their line of
travel never one.
The final touch in King's analysis of the swindlers' text is
his examination of the ant mounds found at the site.
Because ants systematically bring small stones from lower
levels of the earth up to the surface, prospectors use
anthills the way a psychoanalyst uses a slip of the tongue,
to gain information about a formation's underlying
structure.

King's examination reveals
artificial holes broken horizontally with some
stick or small implement through the natural crust
of the mound, holes easily distinguished from the
natural avenues made by the insects themselves;
when traced to the end each artificial hole held
one or two rubies.

The purported association of the stones in the anthills with
the underlying levels of the putative mine, another
metonymical underpinning for the part-for-whole synecdoche
of the gems displayed in San Francisco, is again shown to be
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invalid: not only are the holes made by men clearly
distinguishable from those made by ants but, as King so
tellingly adds near the end of his deposition, in every case
"about the salted ant-hills were the old storm-worn
footprints of a man" (Deposition).
Later it would be discovered that Arnold and Slack had
actually purchased the gems in Amsterdam and London
(Wilkins, Mountaineering 184).

If we agree with Fuller that

a thing "carried from a place in which it is proper to one
in which it is not proper" has already "undergone the
process which makes words figurative or metaphorical" (49),
then King's deposition amounts to a demonstration that what
was claimed to be natural was all along rhetorical, the
result of human agency, a product of the human will— a
construct, to recall Fuller's words, "responsive to the wish
and will of the writer."

The swindlers' salted landscape-

text is comparable to the "lying trail" written by that
other troublesome figure, Magua, the one destabilizing the
"grounds" of an expanding corporate capitalism just as the
other destabilized the grounds of a European colonialism.
Self-Made Myths
King's exposure of the Diamond Swindle demonstrates how
intentions insinuate their way into seemingly "natural" or
"realistic" representation.

It foregrounds the persistence

of rhetorical mediation between language and the things it
claims to represent, of the suspect character of King's own
mimetic esthetic.

Yet he seems never to have applied the

lesson to his own texts; if anything, his trust in the
authority and objectivity of his language grew stronger
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following the incident.

He seems to have seen in his

analysis of the swindler's text not a warning about the
subtlety and persistence of mediation, but a vindication of
science as a way of discovering and outwitting it.
This heightened confidence in his own language is
demonstrated clearly in a long passage, describing his 1873
ascent of Mount Whitney, that was added to the 1874 edition
of Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada.

Following the

climb, viewing the peak from below, King reflects on the
persistence of "mythologizing" in our appreciation of
landscape— a mode he feels has typified descriptions of
mountains ranging from the Aryan myth of the "white
elephant" Dhavalagiri to Ruskin's "Mountain Gloom" and
"Mountain Glory" chapters in Modern Painters (252).
Contrasted with this mode is the scientific approach, as
exemplified by the Alpine writings of the geologist John
Tyndall.

"To follow a chapter of Ruskin's," King writes,

"with one of Tyndall's is to bridge forty centuries and
realize the full contrast of archaic and modern thought"
(253).
. King acknowledges the power and attraction of the
Ruskinian mode, but leaves no doubt as to which of the two
is to be privileged.

As he muses on "the geologic history

and hard, materialistic reality" of the mountain, his
reverie is interrupted by an archaic figure, a Paiute Indian
elder who tells him that
the peak was an old, old man who watched this
valley and cared for the Indians, but who shook
the country with earthquakes to punish the whites
for injustice to his tribe. . . .
I watched the
spare, bronzed face, upon which was written the
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burden of a hundred dark and gloomy superstitions;
and as he trudged away across the sands, I could
but feel the liberating power of modern culture
which unfetters us from the more than iron bands
of self-made myths. . . .
I saw the great peak
only as it really is, a splendid mass of granite,
14,887 -feet high, ice-chiselled and storm-tinted,
a great monolith left standing amid the ruins of a
bygone geological empire. (253)
The familiar dichotomy between "myth" and "reality" is
here widened by King, who demotes myth to mere
"superstition" as he imputes a "liberating power" to modern
culture— which for him, as for so many others of his postDarwinian generation, is exemplified by science.

His

alignment of science with "reality" implies the replacement
of the Indian's myth with a projection of his own, but King
does not make obvious what is really at stake here: the
displacement of one ideology by another.

The Indian's myth,

his interpretation of the meaning of natural phenomena, is
openly political, for it attempts to legitimate the restora
tion of his people's fast-dwindling power.

But whereas the

content of the Indian's myth is explicit, the politics with
which King replaces it is disguised; couched in the language
of science, it appears natural and objective to any reader
who valorizes such language.

This movement is very deft.

The appearance is not of two ideologies in contention, but
of an obvious "myth"— clearly a construct, openly political-being replaced by an innocent description, a mimetic,
"unmediated" representation of just that sort of hard
reality which, as Trilling reminded us, was well calculated
to instill trust in the minds of King's American readers.
King promises he will show us the mountain "as it really

is," and indeed the facts he proceeds to give us are
reasonably accurate.

But by offering them as a replacement

for the Indian's myth— which is not a fact but a truth, a
statement about the meaning of fact— he collapses a crucial
distinction.

According to Max Westbrook, this sort of

conflation is common in "objective" or "realistic"
discourse; in such usage, "fact and truth are the same, fact
and meaning of fact are the same.

All you have to do is

invoke the magic word, reality" (13).

King uses the word

"really" here in just this way: as the magic word that
allows him to pass off mere facts as their own meanings, to
mythologize under the cover of simply reproducing the "real"
in language.

But to say that a mountain is 14,887 feet high

is not merely to state a fact; it is also— if only in the
implication that the fact is worth foregrounding for the
reader— to suggest an interpretation.

Of what value, after

all, is it to know and to present this particular fact?

To

the Paiute elder— who might not dispute its accuracy— such a
precise figure as "14,887 feet" has no meaning, for it has
no relation to his ideology, to his culture or its
prospects.

But it is meaningful to King precisely because

it establishes a datum in the immense grid he is imposing on
the landscape, a mapping whose primary purpose is to allow
the region to be more efficiently controlled and exploited.
That this is the context in which this particular detail
begins to have meaning is made clear by the metaphorical
passage immediately following it, in which the mountain, now
a perdurable symbol of American hegemony, towers above the
"ruins" of the Indian's culture, whose time has passed just
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as surely as a former geological epoch.

By identifying the

Paiute's culture with inevitable geological processes, the
passage naturalizes that culture's disappearance; the text
legitimates power by representing as natural what is really
the result of human agency.
To write that the mountain is "ice-chiselled and stormtinted" is to report a fact of geology, that the peak
underwent glacial erosion and weathering.

But to do so

using metaphors grafted onto nature from the realms of
sculpture and painting is to assign a meaning for this fact,
to suggest that there is a shaping hand, a conscious design,
at work in nature.

For King that design could be no other

than the belief that the nation's westward expansion, so.
greatly facilitated by his surveys, had divine sanction.
How I Loved Cotter: Mystifying the Frontier
The mountains of our great vacant interior are not
barren, but full of wealth; the deserts are not
all desert; the vast plains will produce something
better than buffalo, namely beef; there is water
for irrigation, and land fit to receive it. All
that is needed is to explore and declare the
nature of the national domain.
— Clarence King (qtd. in Raymond 631)
To be moved from national resource to commodity to
profit, the West's holdings clearly had to be
transformed by an investment of capital and labor.
This was the elemental fact obscured by the myths
and romances.
— Patricia Limerick (97)
King's description of "the nature of the national
domain" is typical of a certain kind of travel writing.

He

knows the land is not "vacant" at all; if the tales in
Mountaineering are any indication, virtually everywhere he

turned in it he found Indians, Mexicans, and newly arrived
whites already in possession.

But the rhetoric of discovery

habitually effaces such human presences, producing an
"attenuated" prose in which agency resides not with human
beings but with the land itself (Pratt 123).

Thus for King

it is neither labor nor investment but the land itself that
will produce wealth in the West, just as it is the land that
legitimates its own appropriation.

Such writing bespeaks

the confidence of a maturing capitalism that sees no
particular obstacles between the discovery of raw resources
and their transformation into wealth: "all that is needed"
is to know what is there and to proclaim it one's own.

The

ideological effect of such writing, as Limerick suggests, is
to obscure the realities of western transformation, to write
out of existence the unequal social structures organizing
frontier economies.

The West appears as edenic not only in

its absence of previous human occupants, but in the absence
of fixed social classes. 10
That King founded his aesthetic, as he thought, in a
"realistic" rejection of mythmaking is ironic, given that
today Mountaineering reads so patently as part of the
nation's myth of this "classless frontier."

If this seems

so in its descriptions of landscape, it is even more so in
its narrative chapters, particularly in the two chapters
detailing the ascent of Mount Tyndall.

King's official

report on this exploit is prosaic enough (Wilkins, Clarence
68), but the account in Mountaineering is full of bravado
and hair-breadth escapes and has obviously benefitted
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considerably in the retelling.

This embellishment aims, of

course, to thrill the reader; it also embodies the idea,
popularized twenty years later by Frederick Jackson Turner,
of the democratizing effects of the frontier.

This myth

creeps up on the reader gradually in those passages,
scattered throughout Mountaineering, where the raw
exigencies of western life bring members of disparate races
and classes into intimate contact— the backwoods settlement
where all eat together in the only inn, or the mountain
storm which brings everyone together in the warmth of the
same campfire.

It is precisely the sort of interclass

conviviality Olmsted hoped to induce with Central Park.
Like Olmsted, King moved in the highest society.

In

New York he frequented William Cullen Bryant's Century Club;
in Washington he was close friend with the likes of Henry
Adams and John Hay.

On the high mountains of the Sierra, in

contrast, King frequently finds himself teaming up with the
only other member of the survey crew willing to take the
risks of extreme mountaineering: the mule-skinner, Dick
Cotter.

These two men presumably would never have crossed

paths back east, but as they pass through one alpine
adventure after another, the social barriers between them
appear to fall away.

This process reaches its climax on the

perilous ascent of Mount Tyndall, just when their shared
hardships become most extreme— when night overtakes the
climbers on a narrow shelf of rock, forcing them to bivouac
with neither fuel nor shelter in temperatures fast falling
toward zero.

Such extreme circumstances produce a degree of
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intimacy and cooperation impossible within the strictures of
the metropolitan class structure.

"How I loved Cotter,"

King wrote of the long, freezing night in which they nearly
perished.

"How I hugged him and got warm, while our backs

gradually petrified, till we whirled over and thawed them
out together!" (51).

This is the natural exigency of

frontier existence keyed to its highest pitch; survival both
allows and dictates interclass contact that elsewhere would
be proscribed. 12
For the remainder of the climb, King and Cotter appear
to work together as equals.

Cotter more and more frequently

takes the lead when King is at a loss as to how to proceed,
and when the terrain steepens, they rope themselves together
so that, should the worst happen, they will "share a common
fate" (58).

At one point, King is forced to tie his silk

handkerchiefs around a spike of rock as an anchor (57); the
fine cloth signifies King's superior status, but also serves
as an aid to their mutual survival.

Suggestively, this

class marker is left behind early in the journey.
Cotter and King reach the top of the peak two days
later.

The apparent class integration which has developed

during the climb will resume during their long trek
homeward, but for a moment on the summit, we are reminded
that it is only a myth after all.

"I rang my hammer upon

the topmost rock," King writes of this moment of triumph.
"We grasped hands, and I reverently named the grand peak
MOUNT TYNDALL" (64).

The pronouns here are noteworthy: the

two men share equally in the event by shaking hands, but to
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King alone is reserved the right of naming the peak.

This

Adamic prerogative is his, of course, by virtue of his rank
in the survey hierarchy, in the class structure which,
despite the narrative's nearly ubiquitous assertions to the
contrary, he has transplanted intact into the heart of the
"democratizing" wilderness.
This brief slip is for King what the unnaturally placed
diamond was for Arnold and Slack: an unintentional
revelation that the "realistic" text is not a faithful
reproduction of some objective "reality," but instead a
construct, "responsive to the wish and will of the writer."
The social function of this construct becomes clearer when
we realize that it appeared just as King's detailed surveys
were making the West less democratic— when, by facilitating
the orderly development of the region by absentee corporate
financiers, they were precluding the sort of individualistic
entrepreneurship of the democratic myth.

To see the myth in

this way is to see its similarity to that of the old Indian,
for whom mythologizing was a means of perpetuating a vision
in spite of disturbing evidence that it would never again be
a reality.

It is also, perhaps, to see what may well be the

only consistent thread running through the widely varied
activities of King's career: his reading and writing of the
West in ways that served an ideology of capitalist
expansion.

When that ideology called for accurate maps

which would facilitate development, King was there to
provide them with his transit and barometer.

When it called

for a secure and predictable investment climate, King was
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there again— this time to deconstruct a swindle which
threatened to panic the market.

Finally, as the influx of

capital began the long-running economic reorganization that
would replace the mythic frontier hero— the lone prospector,
the resourceful Forty-Niner, even the death-defying,
mountain-climbing geologist— with the likes of Kennecott
Copper and Peabody Coal, King was there again, not to
deconstruct this time, but to construct a landscape that
seemed the very embodiment of boundless opportunity, that
maintained in image the illusion of what was even then being
foreclosed in reality.
Notes to Chapter Four
1 For detailed treatments of the Mariposa War, see
Solnit 268-354 and Annie Mitchell, "Major James D. Savage
and the Tularehos."
2 The accepted white historiography of Yosemite Valley
implies that Indians ceased to live in Yosemite after the
Mariposa War.
Solnit points out, however, that considerable numbers
of native people continued to live either in or immediately
adjacent to the valley, and that those people were evicted
on a recurring basis— by military forces in 1851 and 1906,
and by the National Park Service in 1929 and 1969 (288).
For details, see the discussion of Savage Dreams in Chapter
Five.
3 See
"Ten-ie-ya
fact there
tribe, and
281-282).

Bunnell 297-299. Bunnell claims elsewhere that
was the last chief of his people" (80), but in
remained several other leaders of the Yosemite
resistance continued after Tenaya’s death (Solnit

4 Though created by federal legislation, Yosemite was
not strictly speaking the first national park, because
immediately after its creation the federal government ceded
the site to the State of California for management.
Yosemite would not become a national park until 1890,
eighteen years after the creation of Yellowstone National
Park, which remained under federal control from the
beginning (Nash 106). See also Huth 65-68.
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5 Rotundo, "Mount Auburn" 258; Sloane 45. In addition
to these two sources, I have drawn in this section on
Rotundo's "The Rural Cemetery Movement"; James J. Farrell's
"Inventing the American Way of Death"; Stanley French's "The
Cemetery as Cultural Institution"; Thomas Bender's "The
'Rural' Cemetery Movement"; and David Schuyler's "The
Evolution of the Anglo-American Rural Cemetery." Hans Huth
has preceded me in discussing the movement's relation to
environmentali sm (60-62).
6 The American Association of Cemetery Superintendents,
which preceded by twelve years the creation of the American
Society of Landscape Architects, was in many ways the latter
group's direct antecedent.
In 1895, when the AACS changed the title of its
official journal from Modern Cemetery to Park and Cemetery,
the journal's editor noted that "the superintendents of our
leading cemeteries" had long "recognized the fact that the
requirements of the cemetery, apart from the burial of the
dead, are very largely those of the park" (qtd. in Farrell
117) .
7 Olmsted 13, Todd 145. Apparently because he feared
that the funding requested by Olmsted for the new Yosemite
park might be taken from the funds earmarked for his own
California Geological Survey, Josiah Dwight Whitney helped
to suppress this report, which never reached the California
legislature and remained lost until it was recovered in 1952
(Roper 13).
8 Wilkins, Clarence 57; see also Roper 233-234.
9 As Patricia Limerick has pointed out, mining
operations such as those at the Mariposa Grant provide a
particularly clear window into this period of western
history because they recapitulate the region's frenetic
economic and social transformations in a sort of fastforward:
Mining placed settlements of white people where
none had been before. It provoked major conflicts
with Indians. It called territories and states
into being and forced them to an early maturity.
It drew merchandising and farming into its wake.
As it changed from individual enterprise to a
consolidated, industrialized business, mining
threw the West into the forefront of
industrialized life. (99-100)
In reality King was highly class conscious, a fact
that manifests itself when he writes in modes other than
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that of the discovery narrative. Like Lafayette Bunnell, to
give one example, King tries to dissociate himself from what
he considers Yosemite's more vulgar visitors. Here he has
just passed near the famous Inspiration Point, which has
provided generations of visitors their first view of the
valley:
I always go by this famous point of view now,
feeling somehow that I don't belong to that army
of literary travellers who have here planted
themselves and burst into rhetoric. Here all who
make California books, down to the last and most
sentimental specimen who so much as meditates a
letter to his or her local paper, dismount and
inflate. (127)
On another occasion King writes of the "vulgar gold-dirt"
(154) of the mining districts in which he worked.
This contempt for Mammon strikes me as a hollow pose,
however, considering how assiduously King strove for wealth
later in his life. But at least in his belletristic
writings he evidently felt compelled to mimic the sort of
disinterested air which his wealthy friends could genuinely
afford.
11 In this scene and elsewhere, the sexual undercurrent
of King's adventures with Cotter is unmistakable. In
addition to a genuine homosexual desire it may mark a
certain gendering of King's class anxieties.
The two men's socially proscribed class relationship,
that is, may be conflated here with an equally "transgressive" gender relationship. Any attempt at a queer
analysis of King would have to take into account his commonlaw marriage to a poor black woman, Ada Todd— a heterosexual
but otherwise socially transgressive relationship crossing
boundaries of both race and class. William Howarth termed
this secret marriage "King's supreme fiction, the novel he
never wrote" (xi), and contends that while
King detested this secrecy . . . he lacked the
courage to defy prevailing social taboos. He also
had a lifelong preference for women of color, an
appetite that conveniently preserved his own
prestige and power, (xii)
The marriage may thus have functioned more generally to
compensate King for the feelings of social inadequacy he
presumably felt while circulating in the high society of
Washington and Manhattan. Todd was more than twenty years
younger than King (Wilkins, Clarence 359)— a factor which
also would have worked to bolster King's sense of power and
prestige.
Wilkins notes that while King was attracted toward
women of color, whom he seems to have viewed as embodying
"the archaic" he so much admired, "his role of voluptuary of
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the primitive and exotic . . . could swing to that of bitter
misogynist" when it came to white women "of his own class"
(Clarence 359).
For details, see Mountaineering xi-xii and Wilkins,
Clarence 362-364 and 408-411.

CHAPTER FIVE
Savage Dreams and The End of Nature: Two Views
of the Postnatural Landscape

"We live," writes Bill McKibben, "in a postnatural
world" (60).

What might it mean to be postnatural?

More

specifically, how might notions of the postnatural help or
hinder us in revising the myth we have come to call the
environment?

I have tried throughout this project to show

how early constructions of the environment enabled and
naturalized a position from which to misunderstand our
relationships to the land and to each other, allowing
literary environmentalism to serve not only a progressive
ecological thinking but also a conservative social agenda.
The question that interests me here is whether those
constructions must continue to serve that agenda.

In this

final section I want briefly to examine the idea of
postnaturality as it has been deployed in McKibben's The End
of Nature and Rebecca Solnit's Savage Dreams, texts that
seem to me to demonstrate both the danger and the promise of
a postnatural environmental writing.
Nightmare in Eden
The danger is that a new environmental writing will
simply reinscribe the old myths, and this is precisely what
happens in Bill McKibben's oddly reactionary notion of
postnaturality.

Despite the postmodern ring of his book's
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title, nature for McKibben remains an idea grounded in an
ideal: wilderness, nature untouched by "man," the mythical
scene of our origin and the physical scene to which we could
always return to remind ourselves of who we are.

But, says

McKibben, genuine wilderness no longer exists, because such
contemporary phenomena as ozone depletion and acid rain have
altered the earth's entire ecosystem, leaving "every spot on
earth man-made and artificial" (58).

The ecological

moorings of the idea of nature have disappeared, and this
for McKibben is the crux of postnaturality.
Now that our wilderness paradise has been lost, one
must work to imagine the pristine nature that was once so
easily experienced.

McKibben insists that we should

continue to perform this work, and he tells us just how to
go about it: first by suppressing any disturbing evidences
of the social within the natural, and second by appealing to
an imagined purity.

The first of these steps requires a

sort of willed blindness or psychological repression— what
McKibben calls "[o]ur ability to shut the destroyed areas
from our minds, to see beauty around m a n ’s degradation"
(57).

The second involves accessing an original wilderness

of. which one's own surroundings may be imagined as a copy.
If the ground is dusty and trodden, we look at the
sky; if the sky is smoggy, we travel someplace
where it's clear; if we can't travel to someplace
where it's clear, we imagine ourselves in Alaska
or Australia or some place where it is, and that
works nearly as well. (58)
To illustrate how these processes work in the fallen world
of the postnatural, McKibben describes an Adirondack lake in
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which he and his wife like to swim.

"A few summer homes

cluster at one end" of this lake, "but mostly it is
surrounded by wild state land" (49).
During the week we swim across and back, a trip of
maybe forty minutes— plenty of time to forget
everything but the feel of the water around your
body and the rippling, muscular joy of a hard kick
and the pull of your arms.
But on the weekends, more and more often,
someone will bring a boat out for waterskiing, and
make pass after pass up and down the lake. And
then the whole experience changes, changes
entirely. (49)
Clearly this utter change is as much psychological as it is
ecological; as important as any disruption of the lake's
ecology is the motorboat's intrusion into a carefully
guarded psychic territory:
Instead of being able to forget everything but
yourself, and even yourself except for the muscles
and the skin, you must be alert, looking up every
dozen strokes to see where the boat is, thinking
about what you will do if it comes near. It is
not so much the danger. . . .
It's not even so
much the blue smoke that hangs low over the water.
It's that the motorboat gets in your mind. You're
forced to think, not feel— to think of human
society and of people. (49)
To be forced to think rather than feel is to be forced out
of the aesthetic mode which permits McKibben to experience
this impure setting as wild, which allows him to blind
himself to the presence "of human society and of people."
For McKibben, the increasing difficulty of repressing this
ubiquitous "smoke" is the tragedy of the postnatural world.
The other task of the postnatural wilderness-seeker is
to appeal to an originary landscape.

Since genuinely

pristine country is not available in the present, it must be
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called up from the past, accessed from the literary
tradition of nature writing-

Out "of a thousand examples,"

McKibben chooses to quote "his favorite," an exemplary
passage from George Catlin's journal, a description of a
valley "'far more beautiful than could be imagined by mortal
man,'" one of those increasingly rare "visions of the world
as it existed outside human history."

McKibben makes no

bones about this passage's mythic function: it is "a
baseline, a reminder of where we began"; if it "had a little
number at the start of each sentence, it could be Genesis"
(52).
Of course, McKibben can imagine Catlin's valley as Eden
only if he can imagine Catlin as Adam, and Catlin can only
be Adam if he is the first man on the scene.

This will take

some effort, for, in a passage elided by McKibben, Catlin
writes of this valley that
[tjhe Indians, also, I found, had loved it once,
and left it; for here and there were their
solitary and deserted graves, which told, though
briefly, of former chants and sports; and perhaps,
of wars and deaths, that have once rung and echoed
through this silent vale. (105)
By excising this crucial sentence, McKibben makes an
inhabited valley into a wilderness via precisely the same
process he used to make a wilderness of his Adirondack lake.
But this valley, of course, was not supposed to be such a
performance; it was supposed to be the original.
Catlin himself fantasized this valley as Eden, but for
him it was not so easy to efface the presence of native
people.

Indians, after all, were precisely what he had gone
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out West to see.

He nonetheless strives to minimize their

presence— by relegating it to a mythified past— and this too
is an act of narratorial and psychological repression.

But

in Catlin's case the repressed is still perilously close to
the surface; the Indian grave yet "speaks” to him, and the
sound of those chants and wars— of all that evidence of
"human society and of people"— has clearly gotten into his
mind, as McKibben might say.

We are not surprised, then, to

find Catlin prefacing his description with the following
strange tale.

He is camping out in the beautiful vale,

sleeping peacefully, as it seemed, under the stars, when in
the middle of the night I waked, whilst I was
lying on my back, and on half opening my eyes, I
was instantly shocked to the soul, by the huge
figure (as I thought) of an Indian, standing over
me, and in the very instant of taking mv scalp!
(103)
"[Pjaralysed" for a moment by a "chill of horror," Catlin
soon realizes he is looking up at his horse.

One does not

need to be Freud to see here the return of what must always
be repressed in constructing the wilderness Eden, in making
of any previously occupied territory a scene of origin.
If Catlin, too, makes his wilderness via the same sort
of willful repression by which McKibben makes a wilderness
of his Adirondack lake, how can one say that today "all is
changed"?

What is clear is that these "originals" are as

constructed as their postnatural simulacra.

McKibben

completely misses the crux of postnaturality: it is not that
pure nature has been irreparably sullied, but that there was
never any such purity to begin with.
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Reading the Environment Responsibly
Unlike McKibben, Rebecca Solnit does not sidestep the
implications of postnaturality.

She engages the social

dimensions of the environment forthrightly and, as I will
argue below, responsibly.

What might it mean to read and

write the environment responsibly?

To answer this I want to

return briefly to the problem posed by Lafayette Bunnell's
description of the genocidal "prospect" of Yosemite Valley.
In The Discovery of the Yosemite. as we have seen, Bunnell
aestheticized the Mariposa Battallion's genocidal
activities, inviting his readers to understand the rightness
of those actions through an appeal to the valley's natural
beauty.

"[R]efashioning the human subject from the inside,"

to recall Terry Eagleton's phrase, he interpellated his
readers in a way that encouraged them to feel aesthetic
beauty rather than think about political reality.
The situation is analogous to that analyzed by Myra
Jehlen in a recent essay on the horrors depicted in Gustave
Flaubert's Salammbo, and I would like to reframe her
argument here, asking, "What would constitute a
'responsibility' of the reader of a text whose aesthetics
seems to be grounded in such manifest evil?"

Reading,

Jehlen suggests, "ought to engage the imagination not only
aesthetically but ethically as well" (10)— but what is the
reader to do when when the ethical and the aesthetic are
opposed?

Bunnell is no Flaubert, and The Discovery of the

Yosemite is no Salammbo. in terms of either literary
sophistication or of the extremity of the depicted
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atrocities.

Nonetheless it seems fair to characterize it,

as Jehlen does Salammbo, as "a text that seems to have
issued from a nightmare rather than a dream and seems to
adT%nce at each step in defiance of all duties save one,"
the "hardly moral" allegiance to beauty (10).

More

particularly, the extravagantly depicted violence of
Salammbo produces something very like the effect Bunnell
achieves in his own depiction of Yosemite's ethnic
cleansing,
something that less repulsive accounts might not
achieve, namely, a separation of exquisite form
from hideous content and the subsequent triumph of
form over content. The separation occurs when
readers are repelled by the content and attracted
by the form; it occurs when a content, by its
repulsiveness, forces the reader to become
conscious of the difference between it and an
attractive form. . . . Flaubert has created a
tension between the repellent unpleasantness of
the scene described and the aesthetic attraction
of the description as art [and] this tension works
to enhance the aesthetic experience by making it
stand apart, distinctively valuable and moreover
ultimately redemptive of the repugnance engendered
by the disgusting content. (11)
In Bunnell's case, this "separation" is structured a bit
differently; it is the scene we find attractive and the
narration that is repugnant.

Nonetheless, Bunnell's

abstraction of form from content produces the same tension
Jehlen describes above.
I am not suggesting that we are doomed to read The
Discovery of the Yosemite with the same racist sensibility
that Bunnell's contemporaries presumably brought to the
text; clearly we are capable of maintaining a certain
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critical distance.

But what of our reading of its

intertext, the Yosemite landscape "itself," which Bunnell
has also written for us, via precisely the same strategy of
aesthetic abstraction?

I am not so sure we can completely

divorce our appreciation of this text from the violence of
its initial inscription; little has happened in the
intervening century to suggest that Euro-Americans have
rejected the sense that Yosemite's beauty is "ultimately
redemptive" of its repugnant history.

Our aesthetic

responses, as Eagleton said, cannot be so easily
controverted.

Jehlen puts it a bit differently: "When the

beauty of the literary expression triumphs over the
ugliness" it expresses, "it also triumphs over the reader's
ethical impulse to condemn" (11).

Furthermore, the reader

is even "brought to actually value" the ugliness, "since it
permits such beautiful writing."

Confronted with "an art

that nourishes itself from the contemplation of suffering"
(12), the reader "abjures her or his moral responsibility in
order to enjoy [the] dream" (11).
What, then, may the reader do to "be responsible
toward" a text such as Salammbo or Yosemite Valley?

Jehlen

suggests that the contradictions enabling such aestheticism
are "permanent" and "can only grow further apart"; she
doubts "whether there is anything beyond recognition to be
done."

She considers this a "weak conclusion" (13), and

indeed mere recognition may not seem like much.

But when

the root of the problem is precisely repression— as it is in
traditional literary environmentalism— then recognition
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seems a crucial part of the solution.

If we think of

Yosemite not as a fixed natural inscription but as
continually reconstituted social text, then recognition may
become re-cognition, a rethinking of the landscape's uses
and meanings.

And if that rethinking is performed in

response to the region's genuine history and politics— as
opposed to some mythic essence of the landscape "itself"— it
will constitute a responsible recognition.

For a concrete

example of what I have in mind, I turn now to Savage Dreams.
Landscapes in History
Rebecca Solnit does not use the term "postnatural"— the
coinage appears to be McKibben's— but her Savage Dreams
nonetheless strikes me as a genuinely postnatural text.

It

is not primarily concerned with changes in the biological
configuration of life on the planet; it is not rooted in
ecology, or nature, or even "reality."

Unlike The End of

Nature, Savage Dreams is not about escaping to some mythic
origin, but about the here and now, "about trying to come to
terms with what it means to be living in the American West."
Where McKibben longs to "forget human society," Solnit
strives to recover a full political and historical
consciousness, and her writing is explicitly concerned with
"how what we believe blinds us to what is going on," in
particular to "how the nuclear war that was supposed to be
our future and the Indian wars of our past are being waged
simultaneously" in the present (xi) .
Savage Dreams categorically rejects the "problematic
idea" of virgin wilderness (24).

It does not cling to the

idea of nature as eternal and separate, nor does it
privilege particular landscapes on the basis of traditional
aesthetic criteria.

Rather it juxtaposes two landscapes

that at first seem utterly unassimilable: the highly
canonical Yosemite National Park in California, and the
decidedly noncanonical Nevada Test Site northwest of Las
Vegas.

What relates the two is not nature but political

struggle, the fact that both are flash points in the "hidden
wars of the American West."

Each is a fiercely contested

site, and each has witnessed the unspeakable— genocide on
the one hand, and some nine hundred nuclear explosions on
the other.

Each deepens the author's conviction that

"political engagement [is] a normal and permanent state"
(14).
For the writer of the postnatural environmental
narrative, landscape must highlight rather than obscure the
complexities of politics, and the Nevada Test Site does this
well.

It is a central target of the international

antinuclear movement, useful for its ability to give
concreteness to "[t]hat utter abstraction the Arms Race"
(14)..

It is also part of a 43,000-square-mile tract of land

that the Western Shoshone people consider their nation, land
they have never ceded and are still actively trying to claim
(30).

The first half of Savage Dreams details Solnit's

participation in Native American land struggles and in the
American Peace Test of the late nineteen-eighties and early
nineties.

The narrative focuses not on the lyric portrayal

of landscape— though there is some of that— but on her
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conversations with the various people contesting the
landscape: her fellow nuclear protestors; government
officials from the county, the military, and the Department
of Energy; and Western Shoshone tribespeople, such as the
ranchers Mary and Carrie Dann.
The Danns' story is particularly instructive because of
the way it complicates environmental politics, implicating
traditional environmentalism in the larger structures of
power that organize the West.

In particular, the Danns'

narrative shows how Bureau of Land Management policies
designed to protect the ecology of rangelands prove
inseparable from unresolved questions of sovereignty and the
ongoing oppression of the Shoshone.

Says Mary Dann of her

first encounter with a BLM official:
[H]e was waiting for me in the house, and we
talked, and he says, "Do you know you're tres
passing?" I told him I wasn't. I told him that
the only time I'd consider myself trespassing is
when I went over on the Paiute land. Then I would
be trespassing, I says. I'm in our own territory,
our own treaty. I told him about the treaty and
showed him the map and he told me, "Well that's a
big territory." And I told him, Yes." (159).
The tone is gentle, but challenging, and there is no promise
of any easy resolution.

When the BLM threatens to

confiscate the Danns' cows, the antinuclear protestors join
forces with the two women.

Since many of the protestors are

themselves environmentalists with traditional views of
ecological purity— including a distaste for cattle grazing
on public rangeland— the incident becomes a complex parable
of environmental revisionism.

.
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Savage Dreams makes no effort to reduce the
complexities of environmental politics to a simple visual
image of a picture-postcard wilderness.

Solnit's desert and

mountain environments are free to exist and evolve within
human history.

They are not perpetually available for the

nature writer's mythic reinscription; they are places that
have always been inhabited, places that have already been
invested with a multitude of stories.

Savage Dreams is

"responsible" precisely in its response to these stories:
rejecting the traditional habits of repression and mystic
appeal, Solnit insists that competing stories be restored
and heard; that they be evaluated from an ethical rather
than an aesthetic standpoint; and finally that their
conflicting claims be negotiated.
This is a complicated and often messy process, and not
necessarily conducive to the elegiac style of traditional
nature writing.

Solnit's landscape descriptions are often

poetic, but she is wary of investing scenery with trans
cendent meanings.

It is instructive to compare McKibben's

traditional (and traditionally masculine) treatment of his
Adirondack lake to Solnit's postnatural description of a
swim in the Yosemite Sierra:
I finally got to Lake Tenaya, on a warm day in
August. The water was marvelously clear. . . .
Skeins of golden light slipped over the lake
floor, and rounded boulders rose out of the water
or hovered just below its surface. . . .
It was
an uncanny place. It was hard to trust that this
cold, clear substance would bear me up if I
immersed myself in it, or that I would emerge the
same as I went in. In the gravelly shallows,
eddies of fool's gold rose around me at every
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step, glittering in the bright light of the
mountains. (279)
With its domestic imagery ("skeins") and its references to
roundedness and immersion, this is a decidedly feminine
landscape.

But it is not the typical scene (as analyzed by

Annette Kolodny and epitomized by writers from Cooper to
McKibben) of the masculine subject's escape from the
suffocating domestic order of civilization, nor is it an
attempt to imagine a stable, transcendent ground of identity
and meaning.

It is, rather, a landscape "hard to trust,"

sparkling with "fool's gold"— a perfect figure for the
unreliability of the "natural" significations swirling
around the subject.

It is literally a fluid rather than a

fixed scene, not a secure ground in which to affirm one's
identity.

The author suspects that the water will not "bear

her up," and she fears uncertain changes should she enter
it.

Where McKibben might have found solidity and

assurances, Solnit offers a cautionary tale of fluidity and
trans formation.
In the second half of Savage Dreams, Solnit approaches
Yosemite's mountain landscape with a political consciousness
awakened in the politics of the Nevada desert.

She finds

Yosemite, too, a fiercely contested site, an intersection of
struggles over both land and the meaning of land.

She

acknowledges the work of traditional environmentalists
trying to change the more destructive policies of the Park
Service, but she problematizes what is merely an ecological
agenda by situating it within human history.

Citing the

229

insights of postmodern ecologists like Daniel Botkin, she
points out that attempts to "restore" Yosemite to a "pre
contact" state are both incoherent and politically
obnoxious: the valley as it was "discovered" by Savage and
Bunnell was not a wilderness, but a garden that had been
tended for thousands of years by native people.

Efforts to

"restore" Yosemite to a "wilderness" state provide a point
of continuity with earlier white attempts to naturalize the
valley— attempts stretching back to the days of Mariposa
War.
Such a purely ecological approach to managing the park
reinscribes a colonialist mythology under the guise of
"protecting" the land.

It naturalizes a racist

historiography predicated on the idea that Yosemite's
Ahwahneechee Indians "became extinct" in the nineteenth
century.

Writing across this official grain, Solnit reveals

that in fact large numbers of native people have continued
to live either in or immediately adjacent to the park, and
that the federal government has seen fit to evict them on a
recurring basis— not just in 1851 but also in 1906, 1929,
and .1969.

This is a decidedly different "prospect" than the

traditional view still privileged by the National Park
Service's own interpretations (288).
Such hegemonic interpretations are challenged most
effectively, of course, by the Ahwahneechee people
themselves.

Particularly instructive is a story related by

Jay Johnson, a Park Service employee and an Ahwahneechee,
"part of the leadership of the Mariposa Indian Council
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attempting to get federal recognition for the 2,000 Southern
Miwok still in the area" (290).

In 1980, Johnson and four

other Yosemite Indians visited the Smithsonian Institution,
where they found an exhibit about their tribe.

A caption

offered the information that the Yosemites had ceased to
exist, and Johnson tried to alert a Smithsonian employee to
the error.

The ensuing exchange is a telling parable about

the social construction of the environment.

As Solnit

retells the story, Johnson informs a curator that the
exhibit "is nice, but there's an error in the statement,"
and she says, "Oh no, there can't be. Every
little word goes through channels and committees
and whatnot," and I says, "It's OK, but," I says,
"It tells me that there are no more Yosemite
Indians today." She says, "Well that's true, it's
very sad but whatever's out there is true." So I
say, "Well I hate to disturb you, but I'm a
Yosemite Indian, and we're here on business for
our tribe." And she caught her breath and said,
"Ohhh, uh, let me call somebody," and she called
somebody who was in charge of exhibits, andI went
and told her the same thing. If there's a
statement saying that there are descendants of the
Ahwahneechees living there today, all of us
natives would be satisfied. But it hasn't been
changed. (292-293)
It should not be thought odd that the Ahwahneechees,
discursively effaced and literally dispossessed, would be
satisfied with such a seemingly minor concession as simply
revising this caption— nor that the Smithsonian should be so
reluctant to revise it.

Each side recognizes in this

epistemological standoff the key to both the interpretation
and the ownership of the nation's most canonical landscape.
By foregrounding this linkage between interpretation and

ownership, Savage Dreams departs radically from what I
referred to in Chapter One as the "Great Books" tradition of
literary environmentalism.

In that tradition, the national

parks function as an environmental canon, a collection of
reverently preserved texts with seemingly transparent and
unchallengeable meanings.

Through the interlocking

interpretive activities of institutions such as the National
Park Service and the Smithsonian, those meanings are
generated and disseminated as part of the larger formation
of "cultural literacy," the highly selective complex of
knowledge that, as E. D. Hirsch quite correctly claimed,
helped to "create" and serves still to "perpetuate" the
nation (ix).

The postnatural environmental writing of

Savage Dreams. by contrast, works not to perpetuate but to
destabilize the fictional narrative of "nation," not least
by restoring the voices traditionally excised from it.
Where the purely natural environment has functioned as a
myth facilitating the landscape's appropriation and
commodification, the postnatural environment may serve as a
revisionist history, a new and more inclusive myth enabling
the landscape's democratization.

If that is what it means

to live, as McKibben insists we do, "in a postnatural
world," I see no need to mourn nature's demise.
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